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Social and environmental information are key elements of corporate disclosure 
where it attracts stakeholders concern due to some agitations in Nigeria. This is in 
addition to low quality and less reporting where corporate governance mechanisms 
are believed to be the factors responsible for the reporting quality of the disclosure. 
In addition, there are stakeholder‘s agitations on social and environmental issues. In 
order to address these problems therefore, this study examines the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality among listed firms in Nigeria. Due to some inconsistencies found 
among the relationships, this study introduced non-executive director‘s ownership as 
moderator. The data in this study is based on annual reports and content analysis of 
100 listed companies for five years (2010-2014) obtained from Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. The data is analysed using feasible generalized least square (FGLS). The 
finding shows a significant positive relationship between board size, board 
independence, directors‘ qualifications, audit committee independence, and 
corporate social and environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL). However, a 
negative significant relationship is established between board meetings and corporate 
social and environmental disclosure quality. Meanwhile, non-executive directors‘ 
ownership significantly moderates the relationship between board independence, 
board committees, audit committee independence and corporate social and 
environmental disclosure quality. The findings contribute theoretically by using 
stakeholders and agency theory, methodologically by introducing non-executive 
directors‘ ownership as moderator, the use of Global Reporting Initiative to calculate 
the quality of corporate social and environmental disclosure and the use of FGLS as 
techniques of analysis. Based on the result that shows a low social and 
environmental reporting, this study provides a way forward for government and 
policy makers to address the Nigerian companies on social and environmental 
disclosure quality. 
 








Maklumat sosial dan alam sekitar adalah kunci utama kepada pendedahan korporat 
kerana ia menarik kebimbangan pihak berkepentingan ekoran daripada beberapa 
pergolakan di Nigeria. Ini adalah tambahan kepada kualiti yang rendah dan 
kekurangan laporan di mana  mekanisme tadbir urus korporat dipercayai menjadi 
faktor yang bertanggungjawab kepada laporan kualiti pendedahan. Di samping itu 
juga, terdapat pergolakan oleh pihak berkepentingan tentang isu-isu sosial dan alam 
sekitar. Dalam usaha untuk menangani masalah-masalah tersebut, kajian ini  
mengkaji hubungan antara mekanisme tadbir urus korporat dan  kualiti pendedahan 
sosial korporat dan alam sekitar dalam kalangan syarikat yang tersenarai di Nigeria. 
Oleh kerana terdapat beberapa percanggahan yang ditemui dalam  hubungan 
tersebut, maka kajian ini memperkenalkan pemilikan pengarah bukan eksekutif 
sebagai penyederhana. Data dalam kajian ini adalah berdasarkan kepada laporan 
tahunan dan analisis kandungan daripada 100 buah syarikat yang tersenarai selama 
lima tahun (2010-2014) yang diperolehi daripada Bursa Saham Nigeria. Data 
dianalisis dengan menggunakan Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS). 
Dapatan kajian menunjukkan hubungan positif yang signifikan antara saiz lembaga, 
kebebasan lembaga, kelayakan pengarah, kebebasan jawatankuasa audit dan kualiti 
pendedahan maklumat sosial korporat dan alam sekitar. Walau bagaimanapun, 
hubungan negatif yang signifikan wujud antara mesyuarat-mesyuarat lembaga dan 
kualiti pendedahan  sosial korporat dan alam sekitar. Sementara itu, pemilikan 
pengarah bukan eksekutif menyederhana secara signifikan hubungan antara 
kebebasan lembaga, jawatankuasa lembaga, kebebasan jawatankuasa audit dan 
kualiti pendedahan sosial korporat serta alam sekitar. Dapatan kajian menyumbang 
daripada aspek  teori dengan menggunakan teori agensi dan teori pihak 
berkepentingan. Secara metodologinya pula, ia memperkenalkan pengarah bukan 
eksekutif sebagai penyederhana, menggunakan indek Laporan Inisiatif Antarabangsa 
untuk mengira kualiti pendedahan sosial korporat dan alam sekitar serta 
menggunakan kaedah FGLS sebagai teknik analisis.  Berdasarkan penemuan yang 
menunjukkan kekurangan pelaporan maklumat sosial dan alam sekitar, kajian ini 
membuka jalan kepada kerajaan dan  pembuat dasar  untuk menangani kualiti 
pendedahan sosial dan alam sekitar  syarikat-syarikat di Nigeria. 
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1.1 Background of the Study  
 
Corporate social disclosure (hereafter called CSD) refers to disclosure of social issues 
on corporate reporting which include, human resource, consumers‘ issues and 
community with stakeholders concern (Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 2011). 
Others are training and development of employees, employee‘s health and safety, 
non-discriminant opportunity, wage related issues, labelling of a product, 
communication, complaints by customers, local community involvement, corruption 
control, concern for public policy and law compliance (GRI, 2011).  
 
While corporate environmental disclosure (hereafter called CED)  means disclosure 
of environmental issues in an organizational, financial reporting or separate reporting 
concerning the environment (Kovács, 2008; Márquez & Fombrun, 2005). These 
include used materials and recycling, energy consumption, water consumption, 
control of emissions, control of wastages and final products related environmental 
effects (GRI, 2011). 
 
As a country with a population of over 150 million people and it ranks as seventh in 
the production of crude oil globally, yet Nigeria is among the country that faces both 
social and environmental challenges in the form of soil degradation; air pollution; 
water pollution; fast deforestation; desertification; crude oil pollution, health and 
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safety issues, products recycling etc. (Central Intelligence Agency, United Nation, 
United State of American Government, 2012). This could be from the activities of 
the companies operating in Nigeria through oil spills; gas flaring; loss of arable land; 
release of chemical substances and rapid urbanization (Central Intelligence Agency 
et al., 2012). In addition, these could cause so many damages to the environment in 
the form of climate change, global warming and environmental pollution.  
 
Since the country is identified among the polluters of the environment via the release 
of carbon and second country in the world that flare gas from the oil companies that 
operate in the region of the Niger Delta (Hassan & Kouhy, 2013), then it is expected 
that those companies operating under their watch are socially and environmentally 
responsible. However, that is not the case even though almost all the companies 
including manufacturing, banking and finance industries also contributed to the 
environmental pollution in one way or the other (Anomohanran, 2011).  
 
However, some scholars in Nigeria believed that product recycling, carbon and 
wastages could lead to environmental degradation with little or no concern on their 
disclosure (Eweje, 2006; Jike, 2004). These could be the source of conflicts between 
the stakeholders and the operating firms in Nigeria e.g. the Niger Delta Militant.  
 
Since corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) involves stakeholders 
therefore, this study utilized stakeholder theory as one of the theories suggested by 
Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar (2004); Friedman and Miles (2002). This is in addition 
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to agency theory that is used for corporate governance mechanisms (CGM). 
According to VanMarrewijk and Werre (2003), the perception of firms is to make 
the disclosure of social and environmental activities clearly, also to interact with 
relevant stakeholders. This is because, social and environmental issues have attracted 
a number of considerable interests recently.  
 
Two components of corporate disclosure are CSD and CED (Sutantoputra, Lindorff, 
& Johnson, 2012) henceforth consider as corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (CSED). Studies on CSED has global attention with less consideration in 
Africa, particularly in Nigeria (Adeyemi & Owolabi, 2008). In other words, very few 
studies are conducted on CSED in Africa with less consideration to Nigeria as so 
many researchers concentrate on corporate social responsibilities and not 
environmental disclosure issues (see Eweje, 2007; Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010; 
Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Amaeshi, Adi, Ogbechie, & Amao, 2006a, 2006b; 
Idemudia, 2010; Renouard & Lado, 2012). Therefore, there is a need for more 
research in the area of CSED in Nigeria.  
 
Furthermore, the entire world is concerned about social and environmental problems 
(Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). One of the aims of social and environmental reporting is 
to inform stakeholders the effect of the environment as a result of the firm‘s 
activities on the society (Gray, 2010).  
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Furthermore, is to sustain a social and environmental responsible representation 
(Gray, Javad, Power, & Sinclair, 2001). Therefore, the declining of stakeholder‘s 
information irregularity is attained through CSED.  
 
On the other hand, there is a serious need for companies to give more credible 
information on their CSED (Clarkson, Fang, Li, & Richardson, 2013). That 
triggered the issue of the quality of the CSED. According to Iatridis (2013), the 
quality of CSED is essential to the firms value and its performance. In addition, the 
CSED quality play an important role in the image of a firm in the eyes of the 
stakeholders (Cormier, Magnan, & Van Velthoven, 2005). Despite the studies on 
CSED quality therefore, up to this moment there is limited studies in Nigeria as 
regard to the quality of CSED.  
 
The quality of CSED is measured using the indicators of social and environmental 
quality stipulated in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2011). The reason for the 
use of the GRI is because other measurement of CSED quality which include; 
counting the number of words, or counting the number sentences in the annual report 
in respect CSED, is weak (Berthelot, Cormier, & Magnan, 2003; Campbell, 2004; 
Guthrie & Parker, 1989). Furthermore, many studies suggested that, GRI is one of 
the best measurement of social and environmental quality globally (Boiral, 2013; 





In order to maintain the quality of disclosure therefore, corporate governance plays 
an important role (Cormier, Ledoux, Magnan, & Aerts, 2010; Khan, Muttakin, & 
Siddiqui, 2013; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). However, there are so many studies 
on differences in CSED and corporate characteristics with very few studies on 
internal factors affecting CSED (Haniffa & Cooke, 2000), notwithstanding the effort 
put on the governance structures. One of the major internal factors is corporate 
governance mechanisms (henceforth refers to as CGM) (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005).  
 
The CGM in this research is composed of board independence, board size, board 
meetings, directors' qualifications, board committees, the independence of audit 
committee and non-executive director‘s ownership (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004; 
Abidin, Kamal, & Jusoff, 2000; Adams, 2002; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011).  
 
In the early 1980s, CGM was not an issue (Leblanc, 2007). Some scholars argued 
that good CGM is connected with improved transparency and credible disclosure 
(Cormier et al., 2010; Gul & Leung, 2004). Generally, scholars use agency theory in 
CGM (Leblanc, 2007). This study also employs agency theory on CGM in addition 
to the stakeholder theory. That will improve accountability, because CSED is beyond 
the provision of financial disclosure if companies have wider environmental 





For better quality of CSED, it is vital to study its relationship with CGM. Even 
though, very limited studies have been conducted in this area, they are conducted in 
advanced countries and not in Africa particularly Nigeria (e.g Clarkson et al., 2013; 
Cong & Freedman, 2011; DeVilliers, Naiker, & vanStaden, 2011; Gray, Kouhy, & 
Lavers, 1995; Marquis & Toffel, 2011; Yu, Jian, & He, 2011). Furthermore, the 
results of the studies in the area of CGM and CSED are mixed, as some reported 
positive relationship between CGM and CSED, some studies reported negative 
relationship and other studies reported zero relationship. Thus, the study used non-
executive directors‘ ownership to moderate the relationship between the CGM and 
CSED that arose from the mixed results of other studies. 
 
Therefore, this study presently investigates the empirical evidence on the moderating 
effect of non-executive director‘s ownership on the relationship between CGM and 
CSED quality in Nigeria.  
  
1.2 Problem Statement  
 
According to KMPG (2011) and GRI (2011) statistics, CSED level have increased in  
the advanced and the developing countries in the last twenty years. For example, the 
majority of CSED studies is from Europe, which is (45%), Latin and Northern 
America (28%), Asia (20%), Oceania (4%) and Africa (3%) as reported (GRI. 2011). 
From the statistics, it shows that African countries had the lowest reporting on 
corporate social and environmental issues. 
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Moreover, the research on CSED in advanced countries increase significantly and 
is abundant (Ackers, 2009; Bewley & Li, 2000; Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002; 
Deegan, Rankin, & Voght, 2002; Khan et al., 2013). However, this is not the case 
in Africa that has low disclosure on CSED and Nigeria is not in isolation despite 
being recognized as one of the environmentally polluted country in the form of gas, 
liquid and solid wastes (Aminu Hassan, 2012). The causes of the low CSED may 
be due to  absence of legal requirement for CSED (Adelopo, 2011), lack of 
legislation (Adelopo, 2011; Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010; Ifeanyi, Olagunji, & 
Adeyanju, 2011), lack of education on accounting or finance by the managers 
(Adeyemi & Owolabi, 2008; Smith, Adhikari, & Tondkar, 2005), inadequate 
awareness on environmental concerned (Gray, 2010), weak corporate governance 
(Abidin, Kamal, & Jusoff, 2000; Adams, 2002), weak reporting framework 
(Adeyemi & Owolabi, 2008), little pressure from public (Amaeshi et al., 2006a; Liu 
& Anbumozhi, 2009), negligence of the public concerned (Cormier et al., 2010), and 
the firm‘sabilityy to identify environmental issues in addition to misperception of 
CSED benefits (Monteiro & Aibar-Guzmán, 2010). 
 
In related development, in its 8th National Council on social and environmental 
reporting, the Minister of Environment, Mrs. Hadiza Ibrahim Mailafiya disclosed 
that firms in Nigeria contribute negatively to the environment with little effort to 
disclose the harm the firms caused to the environment in their respective annual 
report (Council, Environment, & At, 2011). The Minister further stated that, almost 
all companies contribute negatively to the environment in the process of production 
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or rendering services (Uwalomwa, 2011). For that reason, the companies are solely 
responsible for both social and environmental issues.  
 
This is also peculiar with firms around the world as they failed to address 
environmental issues (Ball, 2007; Patten, 2002). This situation triggered an 
increase in stakeho1ders concerned with the attitude of firms toward environmental 
issues (Leszczynska, 2010). Therefore, firms did not put more efforts to meet the 
various needs of all stakeholders on the environment (Ball, 2007). In addition, many 
firms did not address social and environmental concerns (Kaghan & Bowker, 2004). 
This indicated the weakness of firms on socio-environmental objectives (Bewley & 
Li, 2000) and the ignorance on environmental matters (Bewley & Li, 2000; Clarkson 
et al., 2013) and Nigeria is not in isolation.  
 
There is high demand for voluntary disclosures enhancement and the stakeholder 
approach has reinforced it and disclose that a company has many stakeholders and not 
just shareholders who can demand for information about the effect of the company's 
activities since they have the right (Lu & Abeysekera, 2014). Precisely is the value of 
CSED to the stakeholders (Clarkson et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2005) that trigger firms 
to reveal their information about environmental activities on their account. There is 
still the question of why CSED practice cannot meet the need of information to 
various stakeholders even though there are some growth and development (Cormier 
et al., 2011). Since current disclosures are not enough to satisfy the stakeholders, they 
demand more reporting and questionable information of CSED. Therefore, there is a 
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need for more studies and research into the quality of CSED which could clarify the 
sustainability of firms that concerns various stakeholders.  
 
To tackle the low reporting in addition to the quality of the disclosure, however, 
O‘Sullivan, Percy, and Stewart (2007), Cormier et al. (2005), Brammer and Pavelin 
(2008) argued that, CGM, which include board independence, board size, board 
meetings, audit committee independence, director's qualifications, and board 
committees, could play a major role where the said mechanisms is seen not only to 
enhance the reporting but to determine the quality of the disclosure.  
 
In addition, CGM especially the selected variables of the study, which include; board 
independence, board size, board meetings, directors‘ qualifications, board 
committees and the audit committee independence are seen to be the main reason for 
the corporate failures of many firms as reported by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Nigeria (Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2011) thereby resulting from the amendments of the rules governing the 
firms in 2011 by the SEC of Nigeria (National Council of Environment, 2011). 
Moreover, it is argued that the standard of reporting coupled with the volume of 
disclosure is determined by the CGM of the organizations (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 
2010). Some studies also attributed the agitations of the stakeholders in Nigeria on 
social and environmental disclosure to the weakness of CGM of the companies 
concerned and this is supported by both stakeholder and agency theory where the latter 
supported the argument of the more the company has good CGM, the higher the quality 
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of the disclosure of that company which in turn could address the complain of 
stakeholders (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011; Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010; Adeyemi 
& Owolabi, 2008; Okeagu et al., 2006). On the other hand, the stakeholder theory is 
bridging the gaps between the agents of the company and the stakeholders of the 
companies which include the communities, the shareholders, the government, the 
regulators and the non-governmental organizations. Based on the argument above, 
therefore, this study seen the need for more research on CGM. This is because it 
will effectively solve the problems of various stakeholders and address the low 
quality of CSED in Nigeria.  
 
There is also contradiction and mixed result in respect to some studies on CGM and 
CSD, CED and CSED globally. The CSD means corporate social disclosure while 
CED indicates corporate environmental disclosure. Meanwhile, the combination of 
social and environmental disclosure is CSED. Those contradictory nature of past 
studies displaying controversies in addition to mixed results is linked to numerous 
factors such as changes in socioeconomic differences (Monteiro & Aibar-Guzmán, 
2010), political and environmental differences among countries (Kabir & Akinnusi, 
2012), companies' structures (Rahman & Ali, 2006), development of the 
informative items in disclosure index (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, & Hughes, 2004) 
and the errors during sampling (Ahmed, & Courtis, 1999).  
 
Current evidence regarding the impact of firms CGM on CSED is affected by so 
many restrictions (Patten, 2002) that showed the contradictory nature of existing 
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findings (Gray et al., 2001). These restriction issues are about the dimensions, kinds 
and proxies of the variables, the diverse control variables, the size of the sample 
and the type, the time horizon, and the technique of estimation in respect of the 
association. Therefore, since there are irregularities in the results, the condition for 
moderation is present (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008). Thus, this study considered the 
need for moderation.   
 
In line with the above argument and to tackle the problem of the mixed findings, 
Chobpichien (2008) disclosed that, the effectiveness of the board of directors relied 
on the structure of the firm. For instance, firms that owned by outside shareholders, 
larger, supposed to achieve much transparency in their annual report (Chobpichien, 
Haron, Ibrahim, & Hartadi, 2008). This is because, according to Morch, (1998), 
outside directors oversee the performance of all the officers of the firms as expected 
since they have no salary or bonus thereby resulting in their primary objective of 
watching the other officers, especially if they have shares in the firm.  
 
Since, non-executive directors are also seen as outside directors, therefore, the larger 
the ownership of the board, especially non-executive directors, is associated with the 
level of disclosure which means an additional information in their annual report for 
transparency (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). In the same vein, the larger the ownership 
of the directors the more they paid attention to internal mechanisms such as board 
independence, board size, board meetings, audit committee independence, director's 
qualifications, and board committees (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Brammer & 
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Pavelin, 2008; Mak & Li, 2001) which in turn could lead to more disclosure and its 
quality.  
 
In Nigeria, the chairman of the board must be a non-executive director as prescribed 
by Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria, 2011 and the selection of non-
executive director in Nigerian case is mostly drawn from non-executive shareholder 
who happen to come from certain region due to some crisis or pressure arise from 
the region however, this is not guided by any law rather is the understanding of the 
directors to curtail the agitation from communities where the firms operated. This is 
because, a lot of pressure from the communities leads to non-operation of the 
business, hence the performance of the business will definitely decline, thereby 
resulting to low reporting of the said firms since it was established that the higher the 
performance of a firm, the higher the disclosure of the said firm.  
 
It was also established by Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) that non-executive 
director's ownership will likely improve board independence and board 
independence will increase the transparency and disclosure (Michelon & Parbonetti, 
2012) in one hand and it will control CGM of the company on the other hand, 
therefore, the ownership of non-executive directors could moderate the relationship 
between CGM and CSED. Even though the result of Linck et al. (2008) is contrary 
to that of Akhtaruddin and Haron, (2010) yet, this study seen the likely hood that 
non-executive directors‘ ownership could play the role of moderator on the 
relationship between the CGM and CSED, thus, this study introduces non-executive 
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director‘s ownership as moderator to provide some insight into whether the non-
executive director‘s ownership has an effect on the relationship between CGM and 
CSED quality.  
 
This is because, the non-executive members, also seen as outside directors by some 
studies such as Mak and Li, (2001), could play a significant role on the disclosure of 
the company (CSED inclusive) (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008), could alsos reduce the 
agency cost of the company (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) and could improve the 
CGM of the said company (Mak & Li, 2001). As a result of its role mention above, 
this study argued that non-executive directors‘ ownership could also strengthen the 
relationship that exists between CGM and CSED thus, protect the image of the 
companies in the eyes of its stakeholders. This is also supported by Akhtaruddin and 
Haron (2010) where they argued that, the role of the moderator is to strengthen the 
relationship between two variables. 
 
Furthermore, most of the studies conducted in this area, did so using data collected 
from firms at a particular period of time (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Haniffa, & Cooke, 
2000). In other words, the studies reviewed in this area used cross-sectional data. 
Consequently the current study tries to extend these efforts by conducting panel data 
to analyse the relationship between CGM and CSED quality in the context of 
Nigeria. This is due to, panel data could overcome the problem of inadequacy of 




Therefore, the motivation of this study is derived from the gaps identified above and 
justified the need for this research to fill in the gaps which in turn will contribute to 
the existing knowledge by addressing the research problem which is the influence of 
CGM on CSED quality as moderated by non-executive director‘s ownership. 
 
1.3 Research Questions  
 
This study is designed to answer the question related to the relationship between 
CGM and the CSED quality in Nigeria. Other specific questions are: 
1. What is the trend of CSED quality in Nigerian listed companies for 
the period 2010 to 2014?  
2. Does a corporate governance mechanism have relationship with 
corporate social and environmental disclosure quality in Nigerian 
listed companies?  
3. What is the moderating effect of non-executive director‘s ownership 
on the relationship between CGM and CSED quality in Nigerian 
listed companies? 
 
To answer the questions above, the research is supported with theories and findings 





1.4 Research Objectives  
 
Consistent with the main research question posed above, this study aims at 
evaluating the relationship between CGM and the quality of CSED of listed 
companies operating in Nigeria. Other objectives consistent with this aim are stated 
as follows:  
 
1. To evaluate the trend of CSED quality of listed companies in Nigeria for the 
period 2010 to 2014. 
2. To investigate the relationship between CGM and CSED quality in Nigerian 
listed companies. 
3. To investigate the moderating effect of non-executive director‘s ownership 
on the relationship between CGM and CSED quality of listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study  
 
This research is paramount for so many reasons, among which there are limited 
studies in the area, the use of panel data in the study, the establishment of disclosure 
quality measurement using GRI guideline where a checklist is drawn from GRI and 
is established base on the context of Nigeria, the use of more CGM, and most 
importantly, the use of moderator to ascertain the real relationship. The study also 
used both stakeholder and agency theory to support the relationship to support the 
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relationship. Moreover, the study determined the trend of CSEDQL. Most 
significantly, this study is unique in Nigeria and is among the earliest research, to the 
best of the researcher‘s knowledge, to find out CSED quality assessment and 
moderating effects of non-executive director‘s ownership. Based on the above 
reasons, this study contributes theoretically, practically and methodologically. 
 
1.5.1 Theoretical Contribution 
 
This study used both stakeholder theory, agency theory on CG perspective in relation 
to CGM over CSED quality. A number of studies (Fassin, 2012; Martin Freedman & 
Patten, 2004; Freeman et al., 2004; Hill & Jones, 1992) discussed the importance 
ofstakeholders theory in achieving either CSD or CED. However, this study 
contribution is combination of agency theory and stakeholder theory in enhancing 
CGM in relation to CSED quality. This is because, stakeholder theory takes account 
of the stakeholders concerned and their agitations, while the agency theory carter the 
dissemination of information between the companies and its stakeholders. In 
addition, stakeholders are more about issues relating to the dependent variable social 
and environmental disclosure while the agency is more about governance issues 
relating to the company's governance.  
 
Many studies argued that stakeholders agitation can be predicted or align to the 
disclosure of the company. In other words, the more the social and environmental 
disclosure by firms in their annual report, the less the stakeholders‘ agitations and 
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complains. However, the agency theory argued that the issue of disclosure of both 
financial and otherwise in an annual report of firms, depends on the how strong are 
the representatives of the firms which means CGM in this study. Therefore, agency 
theory argued that CGM, which include board independence, board size, board 
meetings, directors‘ qualifications, board committees and audit committee 
independence, determines the disclosure of any form in an annual report of firms. 
 
Therefore, the contribution of this study as stated earlier, is combination of 
stakeholders‘ theory which tackled the dependent variable CSED quality and agency 
theory which is concerned about the CGM.   
 
1.5.2 Methodological Contribution 
 
According to Botosan (2004), quality identification as well as measurement issues is 
crucially essential which deserve serious attention and if framework for quality 
assessment disclosure is developed, it will be a good step in the development and 
advancement of CSED research. In addition, another researcher Beattie et al. (2004) 
draw attention to the problems and that need for more studies for enhancing new 
method of recording disclosure, identification of the quality of the disclosure and 
developing some proxies. For that reason, this study makes necessary step that will 
contribute to the scholars in the area of CSED by filling the gap in CSED quality 
literature using GRI. Also, the study used non-executive director‘s ownership as 
moderator which will add more to existing literature. 
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In addition, the study contributed to the quality of social disclosure, environmental 
disclosure and both including their measurement with which will in turn improve on 
sustainability among companies in Nigeria and in Africa at large. Empirically, the 
study also improves the governance issues, especially at this crucial time where so 
many companies are facing such issue as major concerned.    
 
Furthermore, the majority of the studies concentrated on one methodology (see 
Abbott et al., 2004; Abu-Baker & Naser, 2000; Adams, 2002; Burgwal & Vieira, 
2014; Cho & Patten, 2013). One of which is over utilisation of Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). This method is not suitable for binary data that is obtained usually 
in content analysis (Gujarati, 2004). Therefore, this study focused on Feasible 
Generalized Least Square and that will overcome the problem of OLS (Gujarati, 
2004) which is limitations of some prior research. Meanwhile, the issue of quality 
measurement will also be improved since the study established 29 checklists for 
CSED quality; this will enhance the measurement as well as the methodological 
issues concerning quality measurement. There is also an index which this study 
utilised. With the high number of checklists, the issue of index is appropriated. With 
the conduct of multivariable (several proxies) examination of the CGM and CSED of 
firms in Nigeria, the study contributes to enhancing the empirical value of CSED 
quality. This is in addition will broaden the perspective of examining CGM and 
CSED quality which provide a clear understanding of firm behaviour such that 




1.5.3 Practical Contribution 
 
The finding of this study is further significant in the following manners; 
Stakeholders such as host communities and corporate bodies can benefit from the 
findings in the formulation of appropriate CSED determinants. Environmentalist can 
benefit from the findings through understanding the characteristics of a firm that 
discloses social and environmental issues and how it performed. Local and foreign 
investors can identify through the findings the nature of companies as to whether the 
firm is socially and environmentally friendly or not. They can invest their savings to 
maximize returns. Government and other policy makers like Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Nigeria (SEC) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) can 
understand through the findings the clear effect of economic policies to the sectors 
under study. From the findings, they can get useful information for the determination 
of appropriate social and environmental policy to the economy.  
 
In addition, the study targeted audience are employees of the company, the 
shareholders of the firm, the media both local and international, environmentalist, 
trade and industry associations and customers. Others are the suppliers, 
environmental regulators, local communities, scientist and educationist (Singh, 
1996). Managers of companies will also find this study contributory since is 
expected to provide more insight on the problem of governance and CSED. 
Professional bodies such as Institute of Chartered Accountant of Nigeria (ICAN), 
Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN), Chartered Institute of 
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Management Accountant (CIMA) will benefit from the outcome of the study since 
they rely on financial disclosure of companies for their opinion and auditing. Finally, 
the finding provides potential researchers with areas for further study. 
 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
 
The study focused on assessing the relationship between CGM and CSED quality of 
Nigerian listed firms. The CGM is limited to board independence, board size, board 
meetings, directors' qualifications, board committees, the independence of audit 
committee and non-executive director‘s ownership. Meanwhile CSED quality is 
concerned on the checklist on social and environmental disclosure as provided by 
GRI guideline. Due to inconsistency in the literature, the study investigates the 
moderating effect of non-executive director‘s ownership on the relationship between 
CGM and CSED quality. The study used data of all listed firms in Nigeria for the 
period of five years (2010-2014). The choice of time frame is as a result of recent 
changes in the corporate governance code by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of Nigeria (2011) which include the structure, composition and 
responsibilities of the firm‘s officers for well organised internal governance. Those 
companies with short of annual report between 2010 and 2014 were excluded. This 
will provide a better result for the CSED trend of the firms given the environmental 




1.7 The Structure of Thesis  
 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. After the current chapter as Chapter One, 
Chapter Two provided an overview of CSED and CG in Nigeria. While, Chapter 
Three is a review of the relevant literature. The chapter explored literature on the 
quality of CSED and their relationship with CGM. Previous studies on the 
relationship between CGM and CSED quality.  
 
Chapter Four discussed the theoretical framework of the study. It reviewed some 
relevant theories. It also discussed the hypothesis for the study  
 
Chapter Five highlighted the methodology for this study. It commenced with 
research methodology and source of data, population as well as measurement of all 
the variables including the methods and design.  
 
 
Chapter Six highlighted the result and discussion of the study. It commenced with 
descriptive statistics and later the inferential statistics. 
 
Chapter Seven discussed the summary of the findings of this study, the policy 










This chapter started with environmental control in Nigeria and its firm‘s attitude 
toward the environment. It continued with the establishment of the concept of CGM 
and traces the development of CG code in Nigeria. The remaining parts are devoted 
to relevant laws on environment issues in Nigeria, sanctions for defaulters of the 
laws, the development of environmental ministry in Nigeria and the emergence and 
development of CG in Nigeria.  
 
2.2 Nigerian Environmental Control  
 
The management of environment in Nigeria begun in 1980s. However, this is 
modified as a result of an effort made by international companies, that performed 
through an agent, to dispose harmful substances in the form of waste in the Niger 
Delta area of Nigeria (Odoemene, 2011). Therefore, the Nigerian government in 1998 
promulgated Decree No.42. Based on that, it becomes an illegal for firms to pollute 
the environment in the form of waste or harmful substances. The decree provides for 
an agency called Federal Environmental Protection Agency (henceforth called FEPA) 
to control waste and pollution (Nigerian Constitution Decree, 1998). However, the 
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decree was revised in 1992 which gave FEPA a wider coverage in terms of control 
and penalties. The area to be covered by FEPA include: the quality of water quality 
and air, environmental security, level of disturbance and the control of dangerous 
ingredients. These signify the initiatives made by subsequent companies to improve 
the environmental solution of the country. However, on 1999, the Federal 
Government of Nigeria put more effort to tackle the concern of environmental 
stakeholders about their problem with the pollution by operating firms in their 
respective region. That also led to creation of Ministry of Environment by the then, 
President of Nigeria Obasanjo. The Ministry overcomes the functions of FEPA.  
 
This development made the country to be in controlled of pollution, environmentally, 
culturally and health wise in line with the evaluation of global standard and the 
regulating framework is in full force and is backed by various rules and laws as stated 
below.  
 
2.2.1 Environmental Waste and Management Rules in Nigeria 
 
The Environmental control is in place to overcome the exploitation of natural 
sources and to promote economic growth, which in turn will result in environmental 
stability and sustainability especially by the firms and its surroundings. The modern 
environmental law manages environmental violations. Therefore, among the 
environmental laws in Nigeria is Act 30 (1) of the Constitution of Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1989 which assures the right to sensibility to clean air, water and land. 
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Violation of this Act could lead to imprisonment of at least two years (Nigerian 
Constitution Act, 1990). There is also a criminal act in respect of the any company 
that pollute a community Act No. 88 (1988). This act provides punishment for 
polluting part or entire communities. The punishment includes jailing, payment of 
fines and suspension of the company or firm from its business (EIte & Ibok, 2013; 
Effiong & Etowa, 2012). Others include Act 1979 for gas re-injection, which 
control flaring and emissions of gas into the atmosphere and re-injection of the gas 
(Hassan & Kouhy, 2013). 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance Definition and its Development  
 
Corporate governance basically relates to how an organization is controlled (Cong & 
Freedman, 2011). In addition, Salo (2008) described it in terms of management and 
control of its system by organisations. However, Aryani & Prabowo (2011) 
expressed CG as a system of which a company is govern and guided which 
involve the stakeholders and investors.  
 
In accounting, CG is an issue of concern, especially its procedures and components. 
For example, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) mentioned that CG is the procedure by which 
organizations are made tuned in to the privileges and desires of stakeholders. While 
Khan, Muttakin and Siddiqui, (2013) suggested that it is association among various 




Since CG determine the relationship between a company and its stakeholders 
(Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2009), therefore, is considered as successfully describing 
the privileges and obligations of each group of stakeholders in the company 
(Ahunwan, 2002). Under this point of view, Kochan & Rubinstein (2000) insist that, 
the government framework changes from a principal-agent to a group manufacturing 
design, and the government become crucial on projects to make sure is effective and 
increase in quality issues, rather than just management and to spread the designed 
value in ways that sustain dedication to several stakeholders.  
 
In line with the definition above, CG has two components consist of internal factor 
and external factor (Miller & Setley, 2010). In their study, they consider internal 
factors as board characteristics and external factors as stakeholders and investors. 
Customarily, there was little interest on CG (Becht, Bolton, & Röell, 2002). The 
term CG hardly ever persisted before the 1990's (Cheffins, 2012). However, 
recently CG has extremely drawn attention worldwide. Some aspects of CG are 
modified in addition to the improved issue with CG problems which consist of 
unfavourable takeovers, institutional investors increasing significance, improving 
interest to directors' legal responsibility, stress for more effective organisations and 
financial issues and regulations (Cheffins, 2012; Leblanc, 2007).  
 
Several major business scams rocked companies worldwide followed by business 
breakdown. Among the companies affected with this CG problem is a popular firm 
called Enron, which operates in the United States. Others are Coloroll and later in 
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United Kingdom Barings company, HIH Insurance Ltd, Sydney, finally Parmalat 
in European countries (Bauer, Braun, & Clark, 2008; Cheffins, 2012; Chhaochharia 
& Laeven, 2009; Kolk, 2008). Consequently, more strict guidelines, requirements, 
and concepts of CG are enforced in reaction to the scams (Chhaochharia & Laeven, 
2009). Cheffins (2012) claimed that good CG is unattributed to set of guidelines 
only, rather an on-going procedure of appropriate technique execution targeted at 
increasing long-term value and development. 
 
What comprises good CG may differ in the context of a particular organisation 
which are suggested and are made by scholars. However, most requirements of best 
practice, highlight enhancing CG techniques and disclosure in some areas which 
include: board framework, review and controls of finance, executive settlement, 
investor privileges, and control of the market (Chaghadari, 2011). A broader 
viewpoint for CG is strictly specifying some issues as maintainable economic 
development, objective accomplishment and socio-economic stability.  
 
2.3.1 Corporate Governance in Nigeria  
 
In the development of CG in an organisation and its performance through financial 
growth and development of any country, and the need to make sure the CG of these 
organisations meet up the expectation of the stakeholders, some developing countries in 
Africa such as South African have taken actions to overcome CG issues (Rossouw, 
Watt, & Malan, 2002). In the case of Nigeria, they paid high attention for the efficient 
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CG of public firms. For example, in July, 2000, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), constituted a Panel on CG of Nigerian Public Firms (Ahunwan, 
2002). 
 
After the Panel's review, it was presented in April, 2001, in which it laid down 
suggestions about the transparency and accountability and the control of public entities. 
The Panel arrived its suggestions after examining the situations in Nigeria and the 
global standard for best practices (The Report of the Committee on CG, 2001). 
 
However, the need to overcome the deficiency of CG in Nigeria was acknowledged 
when the 28th Annual Accounting Firms Meeting organized by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) on Sept 1998, had obligated, to re-emphasize 
the dedication of the carrier to be responsible and committed to good CG and to 
impress the community that business problems are not synonymous with review 
failures but a good CG (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011). 
 
According to Yakasai (2001) there were significant evidence of CG progress in 
Nigeria, in the financial sector specifically banking sector. Although not much is 
known about the condition of CG in Nigeria, there is evidence of existing studies 
(Semiu, Babatunde, Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Ifeanyi et al., 2011), in respect of 
financial reporting structure in Nigeria. Furthermore, Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010) 
offer some solution to the problem of CG laws in Nigeria. The primary lawful 
structure for CG in Nigeria is the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), 1990 
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(CAMA, 1990). Some recommendations have been made to the designs of CG 
within each nation thus, make it possible to be modified over time to accommodate 
some changes in business and social environment (Yakasai, 2001). This is 
particularly real in Nigeria, where the modification is allowed in company‘s law 
which offered a solution to the present conditions in Nigeria (Ifeanyi et al., 2011). 
 
While the CG control promulgated by the government may appear to be quite 
extensive, the systems for administration and conformity are very poor or worthless 
(Ahunwan, 2002).  
  
2.3.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Nigeria  
 
Corporate governance mechanisms are those strategies both internally and externally 
put in place to guide, monitor and even control how organisation perform its duties, 
activities and reporting in line with a stipulated rules and guidelines (Upadhyay, 
Bhargava, & Faircloth, 2014). There are two types of CGM in Nigeria, internal 
CGM and external CGM. The internal CGM of a company is the one that is 
contained in the Code of Corporate Governance of public companies in Nigeria 
issued to the company by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria (SEC, 
2011). The commission revealed the structure, composition, duties and even the 
responsibilities of each officer of the company for good governance of the company. 
While the external CGM is those factors that stimulate the governance structure of 
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the company. This could be government policy, regulatory bodies and financial 
institutions among others. 
2.3.3 The Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria  
 
The SEC is the highest capital market regulator in Nigeria. It is an institution that 
governs how companies operate in Nigeria. One of its responsibilities is to protect all 
the players in the Nigerian Stock Exchange market, thus, it provides the regulatory 
framework for the development of the market. It has an act that gives it power for 
example, section 37 and section 45 of Investment and Security Act of Nigeria 
empower SEC of Nigeria to monitor and inspect all the books of record of the 
companies in Nigeria should be properly kept and up to date. The said Investment 
and Security Act of Nigeria added that, all companies registered in Nigeria must 
keep annual audited financial report and statement with the Nigerian SEC. The SEC 
has provision governing the corporate organisations for good governance. 
2.3.4 The Provision of Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria (2011) 
 
The SEC of Nigeria (2011) gives a provision of the company‘s governance that, 
the company most have a board of directors. The SEC also outline the duties of the 
board of directors which include, the management of the affairs of the company, 
policy implementation of the company, monitoring the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the company‘s internal control system, compensation of the members of the 
board after appraisals, ensuring a credible and transparent financial and non-
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financial reporting (disclosure), ensuring an ethical standard in the process of 
delivering its duties and finally, insurance of compliance with Nigerian laws by the 
company (SEC, 2011). The SEC also provides that there must sufficient number of 
directors on the board and they should be composed of executive and non-
executive directors because according the SEC, the composition of the board will 
translate into the diversity of experiences and maintained independence, integrity, 
compatibility and regular attendance of a meeting. In addition, the board of the 
directors must have higher non-executive directors and according the SEC, this 
will ensure the independence and transparency of the board. There is also a 
provision that the board should meet at least once in every quarter of the year and 
each director should at least have attended two-thirds of all the sum of the annual 
board meetings. There is also a provision that the board members should be at least 
five members and to some extend more members this is to ensure an adequate 
monitoring of the firm's activities and compliance behaviour.  
 
The composition of the board should be as follows; 
i. Executive directors and non-executive directors include the chairman. 
ii. Among them non-executive directors should be higher and there must 
be at least one independent director. 
iii. The managing director (CEO/MD) position and the chairman of the 
board position should be clearly separated. 




The SEC similarly made it clear that the executive director should be 
knowledgeable in the area of the company‘s activities and necessary qualification 
that will prove the directors roles on any assignment and responsibility given to the 
chairman. In addition, the non-executive directors should have the required 
experience that will make them handle the affairs of the company properly. 
Furthermore, the SEC (2011) provides that, the board should delegate its duties and 
responsibilities to committees formed by the board. That means the board will 
perform its duties through the committees. The board is responsible for the 
determination of the size, composition and designation of responsibilities, 
including their area of expertise of the committees. The committees to be set 
include and not limited to audit committee, risk management committees, 
remuneration committee and/or any other committee that the board deemed it 
necessary to form e.g. social and environmental committee. The SEC provides that 
at least one of the members of the committees should have financial expertise on 
either accounting or financial management or relatively closest qualification. 
 
The SEC also provided that, the audit committee should have executive and non-
executive members with the expectation that, the non-executive members should 
be at least 50% of the audit committee members. This is to ensure their 
independence and compliance with regard to the relevant provision as the non-





While the external CGM are those institutions that guide and monitor the market as 
well as the customer protection against corporate organisations. These include, 
Corporate Affairs Commission of Nigeria that registered all companies in Nigeria, 
Central Bank of Nigeria which is responsible for regulation of banks and financial 
institutions, National Insurance Commission that is responsible for the regulation 
of all insurance companies in Nigeria, Financial Reporting Council that enforce 
compliance of standard of reporting and auditing by all corporate organisations and 
finally the Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria which is the apex 
capital market regulator which also monitor how corporate organisations govern 
internally through their board.  
 
2.4 Summary of the Chapter 
 
The chapter expresses the environmental issues and control in Nigeria. In addition, 
the corporate governance is also defined in addition to discussion of its related 
development in Nigeria. Therefore, examining previous literature works would be the 
next step in order to expose whether CG has improved CSED quality. Paying attention 
to the level to which company environmental reports, designed to fulfil the needs of 
stakeholders‘ information which is an issue of internal CG in Nigeria and finally 
discussed all the relevant institutions that govern corporate organisations in Nigeria. 
Therefore, next chapter reviewed the relevant literature on CSEDQL and CGM coupled 









This chapter is devoted to reviewing the literature on CSR generally and CSED in 
Nigeria, corporate governance and CSD, corporate governance and CED, the 
relationship between corporate characteristics and the quality of CSED; previous 
studies on the identification of CSED and assessment issues. Finally, the study 
discussed research conducted previously which explored the basis for the failure of 
other prior studies to come up with consistent results. This is coupled with an 
identification of any gaps in the literature. 
 
3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility  
 
Corporate social responsibility (henceforth called CSR) is a global phenomenon that 
attracted scholars around the globe and have been in existence nearly a century. It 
was established for sustainability of corporations. For companies to meet the demand 
of the society without compromising the future, corporate social responsibility as a 
product of sustainability, which consist economic, social and environmental issues 
come in. CSR could be defined as the communication and flow of information on 
both economic, social and environmental issues and their related impact on an 
organisational economic performance directly or indirectly in relation to an interest 
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group in a given society (Sharp & Zaidman, 2010). Furthermore, Chapple (2005) as 
a means by which a company reports its activities on social and environmental issues 
in relation to the company‘s performance and its related techniques. This is also seen 
as an ethical, responsible behaviour of corporations. The term CSR (also called 
sustainability reporting) is composed of both economic, social and environmental 
concerned. In line with GRI, (2011) also called G3 version, it describes CSR as a 
combination of economic disclosure which consist of economic performance, market 
presence and indirect economic impact.  
 
Meanwhile, social disclosure consists of four categories in accordance with the GRI 
guideline which include labour practice and decent work, human rights, the society 
and products responsibility. The labour practice and decent work are composed of 
employment, occupational health and safety, training/education and diversity and 
equal opportunity. The human rights include, security practices and indigenous 
rights. Meanwhile the society include, community, corruption, anti-competitive 
behaviour and compliance. Finally, products responsibility is composed of customer 
health and safety, product and service labelling, marketing communications, 
customer privacy and compliance as the last category. These all fall under social 
disclosure in the GRI which are also considered in the checklist of the study as the 
ones that are relevant to Nigerian environment.  
 
Whereas, the environmental disclosure index consists of material, energy, water, 
emission etc.  Therefore, for a company to have good CSR then it has been the one 
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that combine economic, social and environmental disclosure in their financial 
statement for it to be sustainable. 
 
Sustainability means the ability for firms to meet up the demand of their society 
presently without the compromising the future of the society which include social 
equity, economic efficiency and environmental performance (Labuschagne, Brent, & 
van Erck, 2005). In fact, companies of these days have much interest on 
sustainability and for that to be sustained, they tend to be more interested in those 
issues of economic, social and environmental. According to World Bank Report 
(2011), 60% firms globally, especially industrialised ones, do pay attention on 
sustainable development by disclosing more on economic and social issues with less 
attention to environmental issues simply because it is voluntary in nature. Even 
though sustainability reporting is designed to cater for overall performance of 
companies be it economic, social and environmental, it was reported less on social 
and environmental globally with very insignificant reporting behaviour in Africa as 
reported by Labuschagne et al., (2005). Therefore, this study focused on social and 
environmental disclosure so that it will enhance the contribution by African on 
sustainability as there are inefficient studies on social and environmental as 
discussed earlier.  
 
In the early 1960‘s there were so many debates on CSR of an organisation as 
whether the action of the company will not translate into good CSR or bad as the 
case may be (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010). This is done through the campaign for 
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CSR by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (also called 
OECD) in 1960 with Canada as a major contributor to the development of CSR 
globally (Vanhamme & Grobben, 2009). This precisely explained the trend of CSR 
in the world today as it has been an issue of concern for the past 55 years going by 
the development of CSR as mentioned by the OECD. With the establishment of the 
relationship between CSR and company's performance in relation to its 
sustainability, however, the attention by firms could be more focused on the CSR 
due to the public and stakeholders concerned. 
 
Moreover, as scholars established a positive relationship between CSR and 
organisational economic performance, CSR and organisational image therefore, all 
companies around the globe, especially those from Europe, USA, Canada with few 
from Asia paid much concern on the CSR be it CSD or CED and sometimes both 
CSED (Moskowitz, 2010). Therefore, this indicates there is a need for more 
disclosure of social and environmental information since is established to have a 
positive impact on an organisation and any company that want to protect its image 
globally most accounts for social and environmental issues surrounded by it. 
 
3.2.1 Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure  
 
According to Uwuigbe (2011) the major element in CSR is social and environmental 
issues which are all issues that could be accounted for by an organisation through the 
disclosure of such in their financial reporting be it in qualitative or quantitative 
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terms, this is because it will boost the image of the organisations in their respective 
community, hence, it will promote the peace between the organisation and the 
stakeholders in the community in addition, to the sustainability expectation of the 
firms in their respective societies. The Uwuigbe also emphasize that, social 
disclosure was the first issues in between 1960 and 1970 when companies used to 
give information in qualitative form about social issues to the stakeholders. 
However, around 1981 to 1990, the companies shift from social to environmental 
disclosure, the author added.  
 
While from 1990 up to this moment, companies globally report both social and 
environmental information on their annual report and the trend is increasing rapidly, 
especially in the advanced countries with less in Asian countries (Rizk, 2006). In the 
case of Africa, however, Uwuigbe (2011) emphasize that there were insignificant 
disclosure on CSR be it social, environmental or both with very few in Nigeria. 
 
From the fact that CSED is part of CSR, therefore, CSED could be seen as a joint or 
separate disclosure of information on social or/and environmental issues in 
qualitative, quantitative terms or both in line with  a global accounting standard like 
International Accounting Standard (Rizk, 2006). Even though, CSED is voluntary in 
nature, however, there is tremendous increase in CSED in the world due to 
stakeholder‘s agitation and economic benefits that surround the disclosure of such by 




In Europe, for example, GRI (2011) reported that, Europe has the highest number of 
disclosures of social or/and environmental information up to 45%. Meanwhile, Latin 
America accounted for 28% of CSED but Africa is the least and it accounted for 
only 3% of CSED globally. With this simple percentage analysis, therefore, one can 
conclude that, Africa suffered most in reporting behaviour of social and 
environmental issues around the globe as disclosed by GRI. In addition, in its annual 
survey in 2013 however, KPMG (2013) conducted a survey globally, which involved 
4100 large companies across 41 different countries consist among others USA, 
Canada, Chile, Brazil, Cambodia, United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany and 
Norway. Others are New Zealand, Malaysia, Japan, China and India. Also the 
countries include Nigeria, South Africa and Angola. The survey indicates a high rate 
of CSR in USA, China, Japan, Canada and United Kingdom. While Nigeria is 
among the least, Angola was having more insignificant reporting on CSR. For 
example USA has 27%, Japan 13% and Nigeria has less than 1% of CSR among its 
firms which could be attributed to low studies in the area. That revealed a need for 
more studies on CSR in Nigeria. 
 
In terms of number of items disclosed often, empirically studies paid more attention 
to social disclosure than environmental (Khan et al., 2013; McKendall, Sánchez, & 
Sicilian, 1999; Roy & Ghosh, 2011). Those studies in this area also considered more 
of contents analysis usually number of sentences, volume of disclosure, checklist and 
binary operation as either disclosed or not (Gray & Bebbington, 2000; Gray et al., 
1995; Gray, 1992, 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2000; Krippendorff, 2004). These 
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claimed are more consistent in advance countries as confirmed from the percentage 
of social and environmental disclosure revealed by GRI. Even though Asian 
countries contributed little in this area, however, Africa is the least as indicated 
earlier. Yet, among the African countries, South Africa and Egypt firms disclosed 
social and environmental issues more than any country in Africa (Rizk, Dixon & 
Woodhead, 2008) with little effort on environmental disclosure in Nigeria (Uwuigbe, 
2011). This made it possible to seek more attention on CSED in Africa in general 
and Nigeria in Particular after looking at the trend of CSED in Nigeria. 
 
3.3 Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure in Nigeria 
 
Corporate social disclosure (henceforth called CSD) is a global issue that attracts 
global concern, especially by the players and stakeholders around firms. As indicated 
earlier, for example, GRI (2011) expressed the level of CSD (CED inclusive) Europe 
is the highest with the 45%, followed by Latin America with 28% and the least is 
Africa 3%. Africa suffered most in reporting behaviour of social issues as disclosed 
by GRI. Yet, among the African countries, South Africa and Egypt firms disclosed 
social and environmental issues more as compared to their African counterpart 
(Rizk, Dixon & Woodhead, 2008).  
 
In the case of Nigeria, it was reported by Amaeshi, Adi, Ogbechie, & Amao (2006) 
that the country is among the least in terms of CSD in Africa. Other researchers that 
followed the same suit are Adewuyi and Olowookere (2010) and Okeagu, Okeagu, 
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Adegoke and Onuoha (2006). Adewuyi further stated that, even though Nigeria is 
among the top countries in Africa that pollute environment, is still having the poorest 
disclosure about social and environmental issues. For instance, the World Bank 
reported on the trend of pollution in Nigeria. It disclosed that, Nigeria with 
population 170 million and economic growth of 9% recently, is among the countries 
that have serious environmental issues in addition to the social issues (World Bank, 
2011). 
 
Several studies are conducted on CSD with few conducted in Nigeria (Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2011; Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010; Adeyemi & Owolabi, 2008; 
Okeagu et al., 2006). Moreover, there was no attention so far on the quality of such 
disclosure. Even though, there were few studies on CSD in Nigeria with the 
ignorance of the quality of the disclosure, banking sectors played a significant role 
on CSD (Uwuigbe, Egbide, & Ayokunle, 2011). This is due to their financial 
discipline, high standard of reporting among their counterpart and monitoring 
mechanisms put in place by the banks. 
 
The available studies on CSD globally will not hinder such study in Nigeria because 
of differences in economic, geographical location, and mode of reporting, standard 
of reporting, government policy and CG which could be among the factors that may 
lead to lower CSD in Nigeria. In addition, this study, particularly pays attention to 
the quality of the disclosure and not just disclosure as perceived by so many 
researchers. This could be seen in Gorla, Somers and Wong (2010) who prescribed 
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quality in terms of either value or good service or meeting the requirement of a 
particular standard and best practice (such as GRI guideline) and finally to meet the 
need of customer in terms of satisfaction and expectations. While Dranove and Jin 
(2010) see quality in terms of disclosure as variability of information, systematic 
measurement of information by certification agency and availability of report about a 
quality of a product in a given market. Therefore, the quality of information on a 
standard of best practice is the one that is relevant to this study as is to use GRI 
guideline as one of the globally accepted best practice in terms of CSED disclosure 
quality. 
 
3.4 Corporate Governance and Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure  
 
Studies about CG and CSD, CED and CSED were reviewed. The objective is to give 
an insight on previous literature which in turn explores some gaps from the literature 
in line with the objectives of the study. Therefore, the study looked at the 
relationship between CGM and CSD first. Thus, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) analysed 
CSD in Malaysia. Among which Societal and CG were considered. Content analysis 
techniques were employed with a sample of 139 firms in 1996 and 2002. Descriptive 
research design with parametric and nonparametric tests indicated significant 
variations in CSD with the little legal guideline. While other factors in the study were 




Still in Asian countries, Naser, Al-Hussaini, Al-Kwari, and Nuseibeh (2006) 
empirically, examined CSD in Qatar. They examined the impact of organization size, 
organization risk and ownership on CSD. Content analysis using checklist was 
employed with 15 classes of the checklist. These include evidence, concept, place 
and amount. 21 Qatar firms were examined for one year between 1999 and 2000. 
CSD was discovered to be associated with the firm‘s size and firms' risk However, 
evidence shows that other factors had little impact on CSD. 
 
In addition, Ghazali (2007) investigated the impact of ownership on CSD in the 
annual report of Malaysian firms. The ownership also involves the structure which 
includes director ownership, ownership concentration and government ownership. 
Other variables examined were organization size, industry type and profitability on 87 
firms as sample in 2001. The CSD checklist is used to evaluate the level of CSD 
which include environmental disclosure. The outcomes revealed that director 
ownership and that of government have impacted positively on CSD. However, 
ownership of the largest investors was not significant in explaining changes in CSD. 
Both firm‘s industry type and profitability were not related to CSD. 
 
For example, Cooper and Zainudin (2009) examined quality of CSD, the area 
covered and method of reporting of CSD across countries which are nine for the 
period of 2005. A sample of the countries is composed of 315 companies. Company 
size, industry, leverage and profitability were examined. Quality is calculated as 
first, the quality of the characteristics and detail of disclosure using strategy identical 
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to Toms (2002). The area of disclosure on issues is extracted from annual report or a 
separate report. 
 
The study used some checklist extracted from GRI (2002), on quality is allocated as 
from 0 = nondisclosure; to 3 = monetary quantitative disclosure. The result showed 
that profitability significantly affects disclosure. Meanwhile size was also significant 
but environmental sensitivity by sectors showed up to be negligible. However, 
bigger firms were significant to improve disclosure in environmentally sensitive 
industries.  
 
In a related development, García-Sánchez (2008) documented newly established 
technique for CSD by firms. The study used an information part of companies as 
dependent, with section categories in companies with problems, and categorised as 
non-monetary and qualitative considered as same in Spain. Corporate features 
examined consisted of dimension, profitability and type of industry using 32 
sample quoted firms. Particularly, two categories of firms were recognized. The first 
is the disclosure of quantitative details on products relevant to the environment and 
response to community. Meanwhile the category was revealed based on the 
environmental issues. It was found that first category pays much interest to the CSD 
than the second category. Though, profitability is not related to the level of CSD. 
 
In contrast, Mio (2010) analysed aspects impacting sustainability quality and CSD 
of firms in Italy. The analysis provided the association between disclosure quality 
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and the sustainability technique, complexity, maturity, territoriality and interaction, 
growth, privatisation as supported by CSR. They evaluate the quality of reports as 
designs in the globe (GRI-G3 and Accountability 1000). Using 0-5 scaling of 
ranging from 0 as a non-principles and 5 fully principles. From the analysis 
complexity and territoriality coupled with privatisation impacted the disclosure 
quality with zero correlation between disclosure quality and other variables.  
 
In relation to environmental disclosure, however, studies were reviewed and some 
relationship was established in respect of corporate governance. For instance, Halme 
and Huse (1997) investigate the interaction among CGM and the reporting of 
company‘s environmental issues in their financial reports, considering industry 
factors as well as country factors. Empirical evidence is collected from Finland, 
Norwegian, Sweden and Spain, with a sample of 40 companies. The environmental 
reports were examined with three-class of information: thus, little or no information 
on the environment; an individual report; and policy accomplishment of 
environment. CG variables used are ownership concentrate and board size. The 
outcomes showed that, CG impact is positively relevant to CED with no 
relationship with ownership concentration.  
 
To establish the effect of CGM on CSED, Magness (2006) examined Ullmann's 
hypothesis and technique, customized by financial performance, using stakeholder 
strength to comprehend firm's CED. Using 44 samples, regression technique was 
used to analyse annual reports of CED the mining sector in Canada at the end of 
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1995. A disclosure score was used to evaluate CED. The scores developed consist 
of monetary products compared to non-monetary and qualitative products, future-
oriented products compared to historical products. 
 
However, using internet disclosure, Arussi, Selamat and Hanefah (2009) examined 
the connection between CED and ethnic background of CEO. Other variables 
examined include leverage, the firm‘s size and profitability. The study is conducted 
in Malaysia using 201 firms as sample size in 2005. The technique used for the 
sample was random. A linear regression technique was employed in the analyses. It 
was found that the technology, CEO ethnicity and firm‘s size impacted CED 
positively. While lifestyle of personality is negatively associated to financial 
disclosures others are not associated with CED. Others like profitability and leverage 
have no significant relationship with financial disclosure and CED. 
 
Meanwhile McKendall, Sánchez and Sicilian (1999) analysed the effects of CGM on 
environmental offenses which is non-disclosure of environmental details as serious 
offence and otherwise as non-offences. CGM analysed consist of CEO duality, 
independent directors, shares owned by the authorities of the board, the committees 
of social responsibility and the board lawyer‘s composition. While controlling for 
business profitability, company productivity, firm dimension and company 
concentration using samples of 150 US firms, with Tobit regression analysis from 
1985 to 1987, the results showed that the shares of company authorities on board 
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impacted positively on environmental offenses. In a nutshell, all other variables were 
not found to be significant on environmental offenses.  
 
Moreover, Roy and Ghosh (2011) examined the relationship between performance 
and CED quality. The study is conducted in Asia composed of seven countries. In 
line with Clarkson et al. (2006) content analysis, the outcome showed that 
performance and CED were not endogenous and relevant. Remarkably, analysis 
exposed that environmentally sensitive industries revealed less details which in 
turn lower quality disclosures. In the same way, firms from nations with high 
emissions also exposed a low quality of disclosure. 
 
On the part of the voluntary disclosure (henceforth VD) which is composed of both 
financial and non-financial disclosure (Chobpichien et al., 2008), however, VD is 
reviewed since it engulfed CSD and CED. Thus, Haniffa and Cooke (2000) 
analysed the association between CGM and social voluntary disclosure of 
Malaysian firms using 167 sample in 1995. The study used index to arrive at the 
disclosure. Among the variables used, only non-executive directors, chair and 
percentage of families on board were negatively and significant in explaining 
changes on voluntary disclosure with others found no relationship. 
 
In a related development, Gul and Leung (2004) empirically, analysed the 
connection between the proportion independent directors also known as outside 
directors on board and VD (CSED inclusive). A regression analysis was employed 
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and the findings of the studies using 385 listed firms in Hong Kong were examined 
for the period of 1996. With variables as company dimension, leverages, 
profitability, company‘s auditor, audit panel and company's growth. Others 
include, listing status, liquidity and type of industry. Outcomes revealed that 
manager‘s willingness to reveal additional business details may be influenced by 
the structure of the board in addition to its quality. Moreover, the variable CEO 
duality decreased VD. Outcomes also showed that companies with large number of 
professional among the directors reduced VD. Remarkably, a negative relationship 
between the duality of CEO and company VD exist.  
 
Furthermore, Chau and Gray (2002) studied the structure of an organization 
ownership in relation to VD (CSED inclusive) for listed firms in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Using annual reports for the year 1997, with 60 firms as sample in Hong 
Kong and 62 firms in Singapore, VD index scores with a simple average calculated 
as total VD scores divided by the highest possible VD scores. A multiple regression 
technique was used. Company dimension, dimension of auditors, multi-nationality 
and profitability, were the control variables in the study. Outcomes revealed that 
shares owned by outsiders are related positively with VD that include social and 
environmental disclosure.  
 
In India, Hossain and Reaz (2007) analysed the relationship among firm features and 
VD using 38 financial firms as sample. In the study CSED is one aspect of VD. The 
result found to be significant on assets in-place and company size in relation to VD, 
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while others were insignificant in explaining changes in VD. This research suffered 
some shortcomings because it considered only one company for one period.  
 
In their analysis, Barako, Hancock, and Izan (2006) examined CGM, ownership 
structure and firm features with voluntary disclosure which include CSED. The 
sample comprised of all 54 Kenyan firms. It considered 10 years with an index to 
evaluate VD by firms. CGM is composed of: - board structure, board management 
and audit committee. The outcomes showed that VD (CSED inclusive) is affected by 
organisations CGM, ownership framework and characteristics of firms.  
 
Moreover, Lim, Matolcsy and Chow (2007), explored the relationship among board 
structure and VD (CSED inclusive) in Australia using 181 sample of firms. The 
study utilised checklist which is composed of 67 items. Two-stage multivariate 
analysis was utilised to overcome the endogeneity issue, First level they estimated 
the relationship between the independent directors and company characteristics with 
VD. They later examined the impact of board structure on VD in the second stage. 
The outcomes showed a significant relationship between board structure and VD. 
While insignificant relationship was detected between board structure and disclosure.  
 
Meanwhile, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) analysed the effect of ownership and the 
structure of the board on VD which include CSED of listed firms in China. A 
disclosure index was designed for VD of company, strategic, financial firms and 
non-financial firms. The structure of the ownership involved block holder, 
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managing, legal-person, state and foreign stocks possession. While the structure of 
the board involved the percentage of non-executive directors and that of CEO 
duality, company size, company growth, leverage, and the reputation of auditor 
were controlled. With 559 firms as sample for 2002 only, the outcomes using 
regression research showed that foreign stocks possession and greater block 
ownership are positively related with VD. But, other factors were not found to be 
associated with VD and finally, CEO duality decreases disclosure.  
 
Rizk, Dixon and Woodhead (2008) analysed firms in Egypt on 60 sample to deal 
with CSED in 2002. A checklist was used with 34 items using un-weighted index. 
The effect of industry account, private ownership and government ownership on 
CSED were observed using an ANOVA test. The research showed that the CSED is 
low. The result also showed that membership of industry is found to be significant in 
explaining changes to the CSED. In inclusion, firms own by government disclose 
more in terms of employee while private firms disclose more on environmental 
information. The research suggested the increase in sample size.  
 
Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) examined the consequences of CGM, using board 
attributes which includes, management, composition and structure, on sustainability 
disclosure that include CSED. Other variables were controlled for firms‘- certain 
attributes. CSED was identified making use of content analysis of annual records of 
the year 2003 and sample of 114 European and American companies. Furthermore, a 
positive relationship was detected on community influence and CSED of the firms. 
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Consequently, the research moderately supports the concept that a good governance 
improves voluntary disclosure of companies. 
 
In their study, Post, Rahman and Rubow (2011) analysed the association between 
composition of boards and both environmental and social responsibility disclosure 
(henceforth called ECSR). They used website by both government and the firms to 
arrive at ECSR. In the cause of determine ECSR, 26 products classified as 
governance information, credible information and environmental efficiency signs 
and the ratings by Gentler, Lydenberg, Domini, Inc. (KLD) were used.  
 
KLD revealed companies' environmental activities as hazardous waste, regulating 
issues, ozone burning substances and emissions among others. CGM analysed were 
directors' position, education, sex and age. 78 sample firms extracted from Fortune 
1000 firms in 2006 and 2007 was utilised. The research discovered that a greater 
percentage of outside directors on board is positively related to ECSR reports. Sex 
also played a significant role on KLD ratings. Moreover, age and qualification 
determined ECSR. 
 
3.5 Corporate Governance Mechanisms and CSED 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms in this study, are composed of board 
independence, board size, board meetings, directors‘ qualifications, board 
committees, audit committee independence and non-executive directors‘ ownership. 
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While the control variables are firm size, industry and profitability. This study 
carefully reviewed literature on each of the CGM and the CSED.  
 
3.5.1 Board Independence 
 
Literature on board independence is in abundance, however, pending the situation on 
the floor in addition to the variables used for the analysis. Board independence is one 
of the CGM effective tools of disclosure (Lu & Abeysekera, 2014). The disclosure 
could be in the form of voluntary disclosure, financial disclosure, non-financial 
disclosure, intellectual capital disclosure, social disclosure and environmental 
disclosure among others. Therefore, this study reviews some literature in respect of 
board independence and social and environmental disclosure.      
 
For example, Arcay and Vazquez (2005) used cross sectional analysis in 1999 to 
examine the relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure. The 
study took place in Spain with initial sample of 117 out of which 91 firms quoted on 
the Spanish Stock Exchange is used. Using one way ANOVA and Kruskall Wallis 
test as non-parametric analysis, the study found board independence to be positively 
and statistically significant at 5% in explaining changes in VD. Therefore, the study 
concluded that, the more the increase in non-executive directors on board, the more 




In a related development, Post, Rahman and Rubow (2011), examined the 
association between board independence, gender and social disclosure 
(environmental inclusive) using data from 1000 firms shortlisted by Kinder 
Lyndenberg Domini  (henceforth called KLD). Seventy eight samples are utilised in 
the study. The scoring system is used to measure the social and environmental 
disclosure with checklist composes of three categories and a rating ranging from 0 to 
3. After taking into account of some control variables, the study found that, board 
independence, enhanced social and environmental disclosure among the KLD firms. 
This study is also in line with Cheng, Courtenay and Krishnamurti (2006), where 
they found board independence to be positively and significantly related to voluntary 
disclosure. Although they differ in terms of sample, measurement, techniques of data 
analysis, time, place and the model constructed.  
 
Huafang and Jianguo (2007) conducted a study on board independence and firm size 
using sample of 526 firms out of 559 firms with eleven different sectors in China. In 
the process of the analysis to determine the relationship, OLS is employed on the 
cross sectional data of the year 2002. Corporate VD is measured using checklists and 
content analysis was also employed. The findings indicated that, board independence 
is positive and significant in explaining changes on corporate VD. Thus, the study 
found that one increase in non-executive directors on board will bring about a 
corresponding increase on corporate VD. Huafang and Jiango also found that an 
increase of firm size will increase corporate VD. Since their relationship is also 
positive and is statistically significant at 1%. In addition, the study found that, those 
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firms that are larger tend to disclose more information on their financial report than 
the non-larger firms. Other variables used in the study are, ownership structure and 
CEO duality. 
 
In the African countries, specifically Kenya, Abeysekera (2010) examined board 
independence and capital disclosure using dependency theory to back the study. The 
study argued, based on dependency theory that firms with larger board can mitigate 
individual directors‘ deficiencies in business skills through collective decision.  The 
study covered 2002 and 2003 years individually with a sample of 26 firms among the 
population of 52 firms. The disclosure is categorised into internal, external and 
human disclosure. The disclosure is measured using 0 and 1 for non-disclosed and 
disclosed respectively. The study used logistics regression to estimate the 
relationship and found that, board independence is associated positively and 
significant with all the categories of the disclosure. Abeysekera also found that larger 
firms disclosed more than their counterpart. Other variables used in this study are the 
size of the firm, type of industry and board size. Despite the outcome of the study, it 
suffered some setback as the sample is inadequate, measurement of disclosure is 
weak and audit members are not included in the analysis. 
 
On the issue of CSR, in Bangladesh, Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) examined 
board independence in relation to CSR in aspect of legitimacy theory. Content 
analysis is employed to measure the CSR using some checklist constructed by the 
author to suit the content of the study. The study utilised cross sectional data for the 
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analysis with OLS regression as a tool of analysis on the association. Among the 
variables used in the study in addition to board independence is audit committee. The 
study found an evidence of positive relationship between board independence and 
CSR in Bangladesh.   
 
Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan (2011) examined both social and environmental 
disclosure in Canada. The study is conducted on the sample of 137 quoted firms in 
Toronto Stock Exchange for the year 2004 and 2005 independently. Stakeholder 
theory is applied in order to reduce information asymmetry. Board independence, 
firm size and board size were among the variables examined in relation to social and 
environmental disclosure. The disclosure is measured using coding as used by Al-
Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes (2004) and OLS is utilised as the techniques of 
analysis. The result showed that, there is a positive and significant relationship 
between board independence and social and environmental disclosure in Canada. 
Both the years under consideration turned to be in agreement with existing findings. 
The study suffered some deficiencies as the study used cross sectional data instead of 
panel data since the data for 2004 and 2005 were available. In addition, the use of 
OLS in the study is another weakness of this research. 
 
However, in Kenya Barako and Brown (2008) found a contradictory result in respect 
of CSR and board independence. The relationship between board independence and 
CSR found is negative and is statistically significant. Therefore, there was sufficient 
evidence to conclude that, the more the increase in non-executive directors on board 
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the less the disclosure on CSR and by extension, the less the disclosure on CED, The 
study measured CSR on a binary scale of 0 and1 for non-disclosure and disclosure of 
CSR among the sample of 40 banks which served as the population of the banks in 
Kenya. Unweighted index is used as it gives equal weight for all the items disclosed 
and that eliminate the issue of biasness the author insist. Unlike Cormier, Ledoux 
and Magnan (2011), this study suffered the sampling inadequacy and industry 
restrictions. Even though the study contributed in African literature on CSR, there is 
also need for more studies in Africa, taking the heterogeneity nature of the countries 
found in Africa, their cultural and their economic background. 
 
In the same vein, Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006) conducted a study in Kenya on 
board independence and voluntary disclosure. The disclosure is measured using a 
checklist of 47 extracted from 106 available checklists. The reduction of the 
checklist is based on the suitability of the checklist in Kenya. The time period 
considered is from 1992 to 2001 inclusive. Therefore, panel data is said to be used in 
the research. Pooled PLS regression techniques are employed with standard error 
correction. Agency theory is utilised and the study found a negative and significant 
relationship between board independence and VD. Among the variables studied by 
this research is audit committee, which was found to be positive in relation to VD. 
 
Contrary to the previous studies above, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) examined the 
board independence and the quality of CED. The variable CED quality is measured 
using a checklist from PIRC 2000 and is categorised into five. With 450 samples of 
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large firms out of 700 firms in the United Kingdom, the study found that there was 
no relationship between board independence and CED quality in the first category. 
However, in the remaining four categories, the relationship proves to be negative. 
This is done after taking account of one period lag for dynamic model analysis. 
Other variables include in the model are firm size and profitability which are found 
to be all positively related with the CED quality in all the five categories. Finally, it 
was clear that firm that is large disclosed more information on CED than other firms 
of the smaller structure in terms size. 
 
3.5.2 Board Size 
 
Several studies are conducted on board size and disclosure, be it voluntary, capital, 
social and environmental disclosure, especially in advance countries (see Cormier, 
Ledoux, & Magnan, 2011; Halme & Huse, 1997; Laksmana, 2008; Michelon & 
Parbonetti, 2012) with very few and limited studies in Africa (Abeysekera, 2010). 
The reason for the inadequacy of studies in the area of social and environmental 
disclosure in Africa could be attributed to lack data availability (Amaeshi et al., 
2006a), weak government policy on corporate social or/and environmental issues 
(Okeagu et al., 2006), low public awareness on environmental concern (Tsamenyi, 
Enninful-Adu, & Onumah, 2007) and constrain on proper documentations of social 
and/or environmental disclosure (Hassan, 2012). Therefore, there need for more 
studies on CSED in Africa especially in Nigeria. To overcome these problems, so 
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many literatures are reviewed in respect of board size and disclosure in general with 
social and environmental disclosure in particular.  
 
The literature is reviewed as follows, Abeysekera (2010), examined board size and 
disclosure in Kenya. The disclosure is categorized into internal, external and human 
capital disclosure. With a population of 52 firms listed on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange, 26 firms were used as sample in the study for the period of 2002 and 
2003. The disclosure is measured using categorical measurement, hence, a logistic 
regression is applied to estimate the relationship between the dependent variable and 
the independent variable. It was found that, board size is positively and significantly 
related to the capital disclosure among all the categories in the study. Therefore, the 
more the increase in board size the more the voluntary capital disclosure by Kenyan 
firms. The study also examined firm size, board independence and industry and they 
are all positively related to the disclosure. However, the study suffered some 
deficiencies of weak measurement, inadequate samples and audit members were not 
included in the model. 
 
Laksmana, (2008) conducted a research on board size and voluntary disclosure using 
500 sample firms on S&P with six different categories of industries. Voluntary 
disclosure is measured with 23 checklists constructed by the author in line with the 
study's objectives. Two independent years 1993 and 2002 were considered for the 
study with a sample of 218 and 232 respectively. In the first analysis, OLS is used to 
estimate the relationship. It was further estimated with two stage least squares 
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(henceforth called TSLS) to overcome endogeneity problems. After the estimation, 
board size is found to be in a positive relationship with VD and statistically 
significant at 5%. Therefore, evidence of increase in board size will increase VD in 
the study, in the same findings, board meeting and board independence both 
significantly and positively associated with VD. 
 
In addition, Halme & Huse (1997) tested the hypothesis drawn from board size and 
environmental reporting of four Scandinavian countries compose of Norway, 
Sweden, Spain and Finland. A sample drawn from those countries were 40, 40, 20 
and 40 respectively. Therefore, total sample used from all the countries is 140. 
Institutional theory is applied in the study. Using logistics regression and content 
analysis as measurement of environmental reporting, the result of the hypothesis 
showed a positive relationship between board size and environmental reporting and 
is statistically significant at 5%. The study also examines the effect of CGM on 
environmental reporting of those Scandinavian countries individually and 
collectively. While other variables in the CGM affect environmental reporting 
among the countries, some found not to affect the reporting among the countries. 
 
Huang and Kung (2010) investigated the nature of the relationship between board 
size and CED firms using a panel data drawn from an initial sample of 1680 firms. 
With the final sample of 759, thus, 951 were not used due to insufficient data among 
other reasons from 2003 to 2005 financial years, it was indicated that, board size is 
positively associated with CED.  The study is in agreement with Cheng, Courtenay 
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and Krishnamurti (2006), where they also found board size to be positively and 
significantly related to voluntary disclosure in Singapore. This could be ascertained 
even though they differ in terms of sample, measurement, techniques of data 
analysis, time, place and the model of their studies.  
 
Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan (2011) conducted a study on both social and 
environmental disclosure using Canadian firms. The study utilised the sample of 137 
quoted firms in Toronto Stock Exchange for the independent years of 2004 and 
2005. Stakeholder theory is applied in order to reduce information asymmetry. Board 
size, firm size and board independence were among the variables examined in 
relation to CSED. The disclosure is measure using coding as used by Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen and Hughes (2004). The study used OLS as techniques of analysis. The 
result showed that, there is a positive and significant relationship between board size 
and CSED in Canada. Both the years under consideration turned to be in agreement 
with existing findings. The study suffered some deficiencies as the study used cross 
sectional data instead of panel data since the data for 2004 and 2005 were available. 
In addition, the use of OLS in the study is another weakness of this research since 
not suitable for categorical data. 
 
However, some researchers found contradicting results between board size and 
disclosure. For example, Arcay and Vazquez (2005) examined board size and 
voluntary disclosure in Spain. Board independence, firm size and audit committee 
were among the independent variables in the model. Using a sample of 91 from an 
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initial sample of 119 Spanish firms in 1999 financial year, the study employed one 
way Analysis of Variance (otherwise called ANOVA) and Kruskall Wallis test in 
addition to structural equation modelling (also known as SEM) for the measuring the 
relationship primarily, it was disclosed that board size is negatively associated with 
VD. Meanwhile, all other variables proved to be positively related to VD. The study 
witnesses some deficiencies as cross sectional data is used which could not account 
for time constrain. 
 
Moreover, Cormier, Ledoux, Magnan and Aerts (2010) investigated board size and 
governance disclosure which include board independence, board meetings, firm size 
and audit committee. The research took place in Canada with ten categories of 
industries and initial sample of 155 firms of which 131 firms were drawn as final 
sample. Governance disclosure is measured using 17 checklists constructed by 
United Nation 2005. Panel regression analysis is applied and Huasman test is 
conducted on the panel data ranging from 2004 to 2005. Board size is found to be 
negatively related to governance disclosure and is significant at 5%. Therefore, the 
study concluded that there was sufficient evidence that increases in both board size 
and audit committee significantly decrease governance disclosure. With the 
exception of board meetings and audit committee, the remaining variables are said to 
be positively related with the disclosure. 
 
Despite some studies established positive relationship between board size and 
disclosure in general (including both social and environmental) and some negative 
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relationship was established, however, Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) examined 
board size in relation to CSR in Bangladesh. A legitimacy theory is used and content 
analysis is employed to measure the CSR using a checklist the study utilised cross 
sectional data for the analysis with OLS regression as a tool of analysis on the 
association. Among the variables used in the study in addition to board size is board 
independence and audit committee. The study could not establish any relationship 
between board size and CSR. In other words, no relationship exists between board 
size and CSR.  
 
3.5.3 Board Meetings 
 
Research on board meetings is limited compared to other variables like board size 
and board independence. However, pending the situation on the floor in addition to 
the variables used for the analysis, the board meeting is one of the mechanisms of 
governance on disclosure (Cormier et al., 2010). This study considered disclosure in 
general in the form of voluntary disclosure, financial disclosure, non-financial 
disclosure, intellectual capital disclosure and specifically social and environmental 
disclosure for this research. Therefore, this study reviews some literature in respect 
of board meetings and disclosure, be it social and/or environmental.  
 
Laksmana (2008) investigated the association between board meetings and voluntary 
disclosure (social and environmental inclusive) with sample drawn from S&P 500 
firms within six different categories of industries. Voluntary disclosure is measured 
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with 23 checklists constructed by the author in line with the study's objectives. Two 
independent years 1993 and 2002 were considered for the study with samples of 218 
and 232 respectively. In the first analysis, OLS is used to estimate the relationship. It 
was further estimated with TSLS to overcome the endogeneity problems. After the 
estimation, board meetings is found to be of positive in relation to VD and 
statistically significant at 5%. Therefore, the study concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence that board meeting frequency will increase VD in the study, in 
the same findings, board size and board independence both significantly and 
positively associated with VD. 
 
Moreover, Chou, Chung and Yin (2013) conducted a study in 2006 and 2007 in 
Taiwan. Variables investigated include board meetings, board size and board 
independence on firm performance disclosure measured as return on assets (ROA). 
The sample of the study was 647 and 661 for the year 2006 and 2007 respectively. It 
was reported that board meetings frequently increase the value of a firm disclosure 
and is statistically significant at 5%. That means the more the meetings of the board, 
the more the performance of a firm as stipulated with empirical evidence found in 
this study.  
 
In Australia, Nelson, Gallery and Percy (2010) examined board committee among 
other variables in relation to executive stock option disclosure among the sample of 
115 drawn from 300 firms. The research used 2001 to 2004. Coding process ranging 
from 0 to 3 is used to measure the stock option disclosure with un-weighted 
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disclosure index. A panel regression is applied to ascertain the relationship thus, 
board meetings proved to be positively related to disclosure. Even though, audit 
committee independence is also positive, board independence is found to be 
negatively associated with the disclosure. 
 
However, Cormier, Ledoux, Magnan and Aerts (2010) examined board meetings and 
governance disclosure which include board independence, firm size and audit 
committee. The study is conducted in Canada with ten categories of industries and an 
initial sample of 155 firms of which 131 firms were drawn as final sample. 
Governance disclosure is measured using 17 checklists constructed by United Nation 
2005. Panel regression analysis is applied and Huasman test is carried out on the 
panel data ranging from 2004 to 2005. It was found that there was no relationship 
between board meetings and governance disclosure. Unlike other variables in the 
study, audit committee significantly decrease governance disclosure. With the 
exception of board meetings and audit committee, the remaining variables are said to 
be positively related with the disclosure. 
 
Furthermore, Liao, Luo and Tang (2015) conducted a study on the relationship 
among greenhouse gas emission (henceforth called GHG) disclosure, as listed in 
Carbon Disclosure Projects (CDP), in United Kingdom and board meetings among 
other variables that includes environmental committee, board independence, board 
size, firms size and profitability. The disclosure of GHG is measured as dummy 
variables indicated as 1 for firms disclosed on CDP and 0 otherwise. The study used 
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a sample of 329 largest firms in the year 2011. A stakeholder theory is applied and 
probit regression coupled with logit regression was also utilised on the cross 
sectional data. In addition, the sectors were divided into carbon sensitive firms and 
non-carbon sensitive firms. Going by the probit result, there was no enough evidence 
to suggest that board meetings frequently determined GHG disclosure. In other 
words, no relationship exists between board meetings and the GHG disclosure. 
While board independence, environmental committee, firm‘s size and board size 
were positively associated with GHG disclosure, profitability measured as ROA is 
found to be negatively related to such disclosure. But the logit regression result 
disagrees with the probit regression result only on board independence that prove to 
be insignificant. 
 
3.5.4 Directors’ Qualifications 
 
Qualification, also known as education, is an ingredient in decision making which 
lead to performance in any organizations (Welford, 2007). Hence,  there are studies 
that are conducted on qualifications or education and disclosure, be it social and 
environmental disclosure, especially in advance countries (see Bushee & Noe, 2000; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2000; Wallace & Cooke, 1990) with very few and limited studies 
in Africa (Barako et al., 2006). As indicated earlier, there are few studies on CSED 
and disclosure generally in Africa. The reason could be attributed and not limited to, 
lack of data availability, weak policy, inadequate publicity and constrain on proper 
documentations of social and/or environmental disclosure (Amaeshi et al., 2006a; 
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Okeagu et al., 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Therefore, there need for more studies 
on education and CSED in Africa especially in Nigeria. To overcome these 
problems, so many literatures are reviewed in respect of qualifications or education 
and disclosure in general with social and environmental disclosure in particular.  
 
For example, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examined qualification of directors and 
voluntary disclosure (social & environmental inclusive). Qualification is seen in the 
study as those directors with an accounting background and those with finance 
background. A survey of 167 in 1995 was conducted to establish the relationship in 
Malaysia. Regression analysis is applied and the result established that, accounting 
education is positively and significantly associated with disclosure. Therefore, the 
more the directors with accounting background the more the disclosure. However, 
the result also signified that finance education is negatively related to disclosure. 
Other variables examined in this study are, board independence and industry, which 
are both negatively associated with disclosure while firm size is positively related to 
voluntary disclosure. The study faced weakness of data, technique of analysis and 
low number of observations in comparison to the population of the study. 
 
3.5.5 Number of Committees on Board 
 
The delegation of duty is mostly from the board of directors whose, in line with the 
Nigerian SEC rules, delegates its duties to other committees under its jurisdiction. 
For example, the board of directors assigns few of its obligations to subcommittees, 
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in which agency theory persists that it lead to management control, hence, 
shareholder protection (Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid, 2012; Engel, Hayes, & Wang, 
2010; Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard, 2009). Based on the reason mentioned above, the 
sub-committees of the boards also can be factor determinants of board effectiveness 
since their roles are now diversified for efficiency, accountability and transparency 
on any duty performed. One of the reason for their effectiveness is as a result of the 
size of the committees as indicated in (Caskey, Nagar, & Petacchi, 2010; Cohen, 
Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2014; Engel et al., 2010).  Therefore, presence 
of committees is an issue that attracts scholars on general disclosure, including 
CSED and research on presence of committees are limited compared to other 
variables like board size and board independence. However, pending the situation on 
the floor in addition to the variables used for the analysis, presence of committees is 
one of the mechanisms of governance on disclosure (Rodrigue, Magnan, & Cho, 
2013). This study considered disclosure in general in the form of voluntary 
disclosure, financial disclosure, non-financial disclosure, intellectual capital 
disclosure and specifically social and environmental disclosure for this research. 
Therefore, this study considered the presence of committees be it risk, social and/or 
environmental and remuneration‘s among others and disclosure.  
 
For example, Peters and Romi (2014) conducted a study on committees and 
disclosure of carbon emission using Carbon Disclosure Projects (CDP) list in 
accordance with the greenhouse gas emission (GHG). A questioner is distributed to 
1620 firms in line with the GHG requirements. Out of the 1620 firms only 1238meet 
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the requirements of the study.  Emission disclosure is measured 1 for disclosure and 
0 for non-disclosure of emission. While, the committee is measured as ―1‖ for the 
presence of the committee and ―0‖ for the absence of the committee, therefore, 
probit regression is used to estimate the relationship and the result showed that the 
committee is positively and significantly associated with emission disclosure. Firm 
size measured as total assets is also found to be positively related to the said 
disclosure. Despite the involvement of so many criteria however, the suffered some 
limitations of weak identification of the committee, endogeneity problem.  
 
In United States (US), Cowen, Ferari & Parker (1987) embarked on social 
responsibility disclosure research. The CSD is categorised into seven, compose of 
energy, environmental, safety of products, community among others. Independent 
variables include the presence of at least a social responsibility committee, the firm‘s 
size, industry and profitability. The data used was that of 1978 with 134 samples 
drawn from fortune 500 lists of large firms in the US. Ordinary least squares is 
utilised and overall result proved that the presence of social committee is positively 
related to only one category of the disclosure i.e. human resources. While others 
were found not to have any relationship with the committee presence, the firm‘s size 
and industry are positively associated with all the categories of the disclosure.  
 
However, Rodrigue, Magnan and Cho (2013) examined the existence of committees 
especially environmental committee and pollution performance disclosure  of firms 
listed in US stock exchange for the period of 2003 & 2008. Data for the performance 
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of both environmental and pollution were extracted from those financial reporting 
firms listed by KLD ratings. The two techniques of analysis were conducted as 
logistic regression and pooled OLS. The result of the cross sectional data revealed 
that, there is no association between the presence of committee (environmental) and 
either of the environmental and/or pollution performance disclosure. But, the firm's 
size is negative, but not significant in relation to both pollution and environmental 
disclosure. 
 
Despite some studies established no relationship between the presence of committees 
and disclosure in general (including both social and environmental) and some 
negative relationship was established, however, Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) 
examined the presence of committees in relation to CSR and sustainability reporting 
in nine countries compose of eight European countries and US. A stakeholder and 
legitimacy theories were used and content analysis is employed to measure the CSR 
and sustainability using a checklist the study utilised cross sectional data of 114 
samples for the analysis with OLS regression as a tool of analysis on the association. 
Among the variables used in the study in addition to board size is board 
independence. The study could not establish any relationship between the presence 
of committee and Sustainability reporting including CSR. In other words, no 
relationship exists between the social committee presence and CSR.  
 
Hassan and Ibrahim (2012) examined environmental management system in the form 
of committee and environmental disclosure among firms listed by FSTE 100 in 
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United Kingdom. All the firms were used for the study. Content analysis is 
employed to measure the environmental disclosure with seven sectors of industries 
using stakeholder theory. Descriptive statistics are used for the cross sectional data 
and the result yield signified that environmental management system i.e. the 
committee improves environmental disclosure. Which they have a positive 
relationship. The study could not take account of the quality of the disclosure and it 
used a cross sectional data, therefore, time factor was not included. In addition, only 
limited variables were included. 
 
3.5.6 Audit Committee Independence  
 
The involvement of audit committee promotes not only the standard but the quality 
of such disclosure. Hence, there are studies that are conducted on audit committees 
and disclosure, be it social and environmental disclosure, especially in advance 
countries (see Cormier, Ledoux, & Magnan, 2011; Ho & Wong, 2001; Nelson, 
Gallery, & Percy, 2010) with very few and limited studies in Africa (Barako, 
Hancock, & Izan, 2006). As indicated earlier, there are few studies on audit 
committee and disclosure generally in Africa. The reason as discussed earlier could 
be attributed and not limited to, lack of data availability, weak policy, inadequate 
publicity and constrain on proper documentations of social and/or environmental 
disclosure (Okeagu, Okeagu, Adegoke, & Onuoha, 2006; Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, 
& Onumah, 2007). Therefore, there need for more studies on audit committee and 
CSED in Africa especially in Nigeria. To overcome these problems, so many 
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literatures are reviewed in respect of an audit committee and disclosure in general 
with social and environmental disclosure in particular.  
 
Arcay and Vazquez (2005) examined audit committee and voluntary disclosure in 
Spain. Board independence, firm size and board size were among the independent 
variables used by the model. Using a sample of 91 from an initial sample of 119 
Spanish firms in 1999 and 2001 financial year, the study employed one way Analysis 
of Variance (otherwise called ANOVA) and Kruskall Wallis test in addition to 
structural equation modelling (also known as the SEC) for the measuring the 
relationship. Pooled OLS was also employed and it was disclosed that the audit 
committee is positively associated with VD. Meanwhile, board size is negatively 
related to VD with all other variables proved to be positively related to VD. The 
study, witness some deficiencies as cross sectional data is used and time is not 
considered. 
 
Furthermore, Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan (2011) investigated audit committee in 
relation to  both social and environmental disclosure in Canada. The study used 
samples of 137 quoted firms in Toronto Stock Exchange for the individual year 2004 
and 2005. Stakeholder theory is applied in order to reduce information asymmetry. 
In addition, board independence, firm size and board size were among the variables 
examined in relation to social and environmental disclosure. The disclosure is 
measured using coding as used by Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes (2004) and 
OLS is utilised as the techniques of analysis. The result showed that, there is positive 
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and significant relationship between audit committee and social and environmental 
disclosure in Canada. All the result in the years under consideration turned to be in 
agreement with existing findings. The study suffered some deficiencies as the study 
used cross sectional data instead of panel data since the data for 2004 and 2005 were 
available. In addition, the use of OLS in the study is another weakness of this 
research. 
 
The study is also conducted in Africa, for example Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006) 
empirically investigated audit committee and voluntary disclosure in Kenya for the 
year 1992 to 2001 inclusive. In the process, larger firms were compared with smaller 
firms in the Nairobi Stock Exchange. To determine voluntary disclosure, a checklist 
was developed and used with 47 items. Therefore, a scoring system was employed 
with coding ranging from zero to four. With an initial sample of 54 firms, at least 38 
firms are used as the final sample representing 70% of the initial sample. A panel 
regression is utilised and the result showed the existence of a positive and significant 
relationship at 5% between the audit committee and voluntary disclosure.  However, 
board independence proves to be negatively and significantly associated with the 
disclosure as opposed to profitability that has no any relationship with the disclosure. 
Moreover, large firms tend to disclose more information voluntarily than their 
counterpart. 
 
Nelson et al. (2010) also studied the relationship between audit committee 
independence and the disclosure of executive stock option in Australia from 2001 to 
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2004 inclusive. Board meetings and board independence were also examined along 
with the audit committee independence. The disclosure is coded using an un-
weighted disclosure index of 0 to 3. The sample used is 115 firms out of 300 as 
initial sample. With a panel regression analysis, audit committee independence is 
positively associated with the executive stock option disclosure. Board meetings 
proved to be positively and significantly related with the disclosure while board 
independence is found to be negatively and significantly associated with the 
disclosure of the executive stock option. 
 
However, Cormier, Ledoux, Magnan and Aerts (2010) investigated the relationship 
between audit committee and governance disclosure composed of board 
independence, firm size and board meetings in Canada. The firms are composed of 
ten categories of industries with an initial sample of 155 firms of which 131 firms 
were drawn as final sample. Governance disclosure is measured using 17 checklists 
constructed by United Nation 2005. Panel regression analysis is applied and 
Huasman test is carried out on the panel data ranging from 2004 to 2005. 
Empirically, a negative relationship exists between the audit committee and 
governance disclosure. The remaining variables with the exception of board 






3.5.7 Non-executive Director’s Ownership  
 
Board ownership could be seen as the either an amount or the number of shares 
owned by the board of directors (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007). The more the board 
members own stock, the more have an interest in the activities of the company, thus, 
disclosure changes based on that interest (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008). Board 
ownership could be inside directors or outside directors (Mak & Li, 2001). 
Depending on the circumstances, outside directors who have shares tend to play a 
significant role on the disclosure, in other words, they will protect the image of the 
company in the eyes of the stakeholders via the push of transparency in the 
disclosure (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010). Therefore, literature on board ownership is 
in abundance with limited research in relation to CSED, however, pending the 
situation on the floor in addition to the variables used for the analysis. Board 
ownership is also part of CGM and is composed of executive director's ownership 
and non-executive director‘s ownership (Lu & Abeysekera, 2014). Therefore, this 
study reviews literature in respect of non-executive director‘s ownership and social 
and/or environmental disclosure.  
 
For example, Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain and Yao (2009) examined the 
association between outside board ownership which include non-executive director‘s 
ownership and voluntary disclosure in Malaysia listed firms. Voluntary disclosure is 
measured using a modified checklist from Chau and Gray (2002). Corporate 
governance variables used by the study include, board independence, audit 
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committee and board size. While control variables were profitability and firm‘s size. 
A sample of 105 firms is drawn from 562 listed firms as categorised into six 
industries.  An OLS and sensitivity analysis is employed on the cross sectional data 
and the result shows that outside board ownership is positively and significantly 
associated with the VD at 1%. All other variables in the study were positively and 
significant in explaining changes in the disclosure with the exception of audit 
committee that has no relationship with the disclosure,  
 
However, Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) conducted a study in Malaysia on the 
association between board ownership and financial disclosure also known as 
voluntary disclosure in 2003. Board ownership considered in the study as 
independent non-executive directors‘ ownership, is introduced on the said 
relationship. Other variables examined were audit committee and firms size as 
control variable. The sample included in the study was 124 and agency theory is 
utilised with hierarchical regression techniques employed in addition to the 
sensitivity analysis on the cross sectional data. The result showed that, board 
ownership is negative in relation to the disclosure and is significant. The empirical 
result supports the hypothesis so formulated, However, other variables were found to 
be positively associated with the financial disclosure. 
 
On corporate social responsibility (also known as CSR) disclosure, Said, Zainuddin 
and Haron (2009) examined the association between managerial ownership also 
considered as one aspect of board ownership in their study, and CSR disclosure in 
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Malaysian firms obtain from web sites and financial reporting. The disclosure of 
CSR is measured using content analysis. In addition, board independence, audit 
committee and board size were among the variables examined with profitability and 
firm size as control variables in the model. A sample of 150 firms compose of seven 
sectors drawn from an initial sample of 250 firms is used for the study. To arrive at 
the estimation, hierarchical regression is employed on the cross sectional data of 
2006 and the result showed the existence of a positive relationship, but not 
significant between managerial ownership and CSR disclosure, However, other 
variables were found to be positively associated with the CSR and audit committee is 
the most significant variables that explained the CSR disclosure. 
 
On the contrary, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) empirically investigated the 
relationship between managerial ownership, also seen as part of board ownership in 
this study, and voluntary disclosure in Ireland for the year 2002. Ownership is 
measured using scoring system and board independence, firm‘s size and board size 
were included in the study. A sample of 51 firms out of 62 firms were used using 
OLS regression on the cross sectional analysis. The result supported the fact that, 
while managerial ownership happen to have no relationship at all with disclosure, 
board independence, firm‘s size and board size are positively and statically 
significant at 5% in explaining changes in voluntary disclosure among Irish firms. 
The study suffered some set back as multicollinearity exists among the independent 




Ahmed and Duellman (2007) used sample of 306 largest firms listed among S&P 
500 in United States to examine the relationship between outside directors ownership 
or non-executive director‘s ownership and accounting conservatism measured as 
market value base. Board size was also included in the model with twelve categories 
of industries in the year 1999 to 2001 inclusive. The aim was to measure the strength 
of corporate governance in respect of conservatism and accruals. OLS regression 
coupled with fixed effects regression was employed on the pooled data analysis. A 
strong evidence of a positive relationship exists between non-executive director‘s 
ownership and the conservatism, therefore, suggesting strong indication that non-
executive director‘s ownership is one of the strongest explanatory variable of 
corporate governance. Meanwhile, the board is positively associated with the 
conservatism, however, is not significant. 
 
3.5.8 Firm Size 
 
Literature on firm size are in abundance (see Abeysekera, 2010; Cheng, Courtney & 
Courtenay, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Huang & Kung, 2010; Lim, Matolcsy, & 
Chow, 2007), however, pending the situation on floor in addition to the variables 
used for the analysis. Firm size is one of the characteristics of company that portray 
the image of a company which could have effect on disclosure (Arcay & Vazquez, 
2005). This disclosure could be in the form of voluntary disclosure, financial 
disclosure, non-financial disclosure, intellectual capital disclosure, social disclosure 
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and environmental disclosure among others. Therefore, this study reviews some 
literature in respect of firm size and social and environmental disclosure.  
 
For example, Eng and Mak (2003) in 1995, conducted an empirical study on the 
relationship between firm size and voluntary disclosure with four models. Sample 
used was 158 firms composed of nine industries. Disclosure is measured using a 
checklist of 84 items on the cross sectional data. An OLS regression was utilized on 
the estimation. Other variable in the study is board independence measured as 
proportion of outside directors on board.  In model one and model three, firm size is 
positively related with disclosure and significant at 1%. Model two and model four 
also, firm size proved to be positively associated with the disclosure at 5%. But 
board independence is found to be negatively and significantly associated with 
disclosure at 5%, 1%, 10% and 5% for model one, two, three and four respectively. 
Despite the various industries involved, there is still inadequate of sample in the 
study. Another issue is time is not considered in addition to the weak techniques 
used (OLS). 
 
Moreover, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) empirically investigated firm size and 
voluntary disclosure (social & environmental inclusive). Firm‘s size is measured in 
the study total assets at the end of the financial year. Survey of 167 in 1995 was 
conducted to establish the relationship among the variables in Malaysia. Regression 
analysis is applied and the result established that, firm size is positively and 
significantly associated with disclosure. Therefore, the more the increase in the size 
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of firms the more the disclosure. However, while accounting education is positively 
related with disclosure, the result also signified that finance education is negatively 
related with disclosure. Other variables examined in this study are, board 
independence and industry which are both negatively associated with the voluntary 
disclosure. The study faced weakness of data, technique of analysis and low number 
of observations in comparison to the population of the study. 
 
On environmental disclosure however, Huang and Kung (2010) examined the nature 
of the relationship between firm size and CED firms using a panel data drawn from 
an initial sample of 1680 firms. With the final sample of 759, thus, 951 were not 
used due to insufficient data among other reasons from 2003 to 2005 financial years, 
it was indicated that, firm size is positively associated with CED.  The study is in 
agreement with Cheng, Courtenay and Krishnamurti (2006), where they also found 
firm size to be positively and significantly related to voluntary disclosure in 
Singapore. This could be ascertained even though they differ in terms of sample, 
measurement, techniques of data analysis, time, place and the model of their studies. 
 
Lim, Matolcsy and Chow (2007) conducted a study on the relationship between firm 
size and voluntary disclosure (CSED inclusive) in Australia. Other variables 
included in the study were board independence, board size and industry among 
others. Initial sample of the study is 324 with final sample of 181 firms. Voluntary 
disclosure is seen as forward looking and strategic disclosure and is measured with 
checklist of 67 items. A two stage least square is applied on the cross sectional data. 
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Findings of the study showed that, firm size is positive and statistically significant on 
the relationship with both forward looking and strategic voluntary disclosure. Both 
board size and board independence happen to be positively and significantly 
associated with the disclosure. However, industry is negative and significantly 
related with the disclosure of both forward looking and strategic. The study is 
conducted in 2001 with an agency theory to support the hypothesis. However, is 
suffered some set back as it did not take account of time in addition to weak 
observations. 
 
Furthermore, Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan (2011) conducted a study on both social 
and environmental disclosure using Canadian firms. The study utilised the sample of 
137 quoted firms in Toronto Stock Exchange for the independent years of 2004 and 
2005. Stakeholder theory is applied in order to reduce information asymmetry. Firm 
size, board size and board independence were among the variables examined in 
relation to CSED. The disclosure is measure using coding as used by Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen and Hughes (2004). The study used OLS as techniques of analysis. The 
result showed that, there is positive and significant relationship between firm size 
and CSED in Canada. Both the years under consideration turned to be in agreement 
with existing findings. The study suffered some deficiencies as the study used cross 
sectional data instead of panel data since the data for 2004 and 2005 were available. 
In addition, the use of OLS in the study is another weakness of this research since 




Cheng, Courtenay and Krishnamurti (2006), examined firm size and voluntary 
disclosure in Singapore. It used sample of 104 firms out of 115 in the year 2000. 
OLS regression is utilised on two different models formed by the researcher. The 
empirical study on the cross sectional data found firm size, measured as return on 
assets, to be positively and significantly related to voluntary disclosure in Singapore. 
Other test conducted on the study is Wilcoxon Paired test of difference.  This could 
be ascertained even though they differ in terms of sample, measurement, techniques 
of data analysis, time, place and the model of their studies. 
 
Arcay and Vazquez (2005) also used cross sectional studies in 1999 to examine the 
relationship between firm size and voluntary disclosure. The study is conducted in 
Spain with initial sample of 117 out of which 91 firms quoted on Spanish Stock 
Exchange. Using one way ANOVA and Kruskall Wallis test as non-parametric 
analysis, the study found firm size to be positively and statistically significant in 
explaining changes in VD. Therefore, the study concluded that, the more the increase 




Type of industry plays a significant role on environmental disclosure. So many 
studies categorized industries into, sensitive or environmentally friendly industries 
and non-sensitive or non-environmentally friendly industries and is based on their 
environmental harm, wastages and pollution (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008). Thus, 
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there are limited studies that are conducted on industry type and social and 
environmental disclosure in Africa (Barako & Brown, 2008). This could be 
attributed to lack of data availability, weak policy, inadequate publicity and constrain 
on proper documentations of social and/or environmental disclosure (Tsamenyi, 
Enninful-Adu, & Onumah, 2007). Therefore, there is need for more studies on type 
of industry and CSED in Nigeria. Literature is reviewed in respect of industry and 
CSED to overcome the existing problem.  
 
For instance, in Africa, Abeysekera (2010) examined industry and capital disclosure 
in Kenya with dependency theory as theoretical framework of the research.  The 
years covered were 2002 and 2003 individually with sample of 26 firms among the 
population of 52 firms. The disclosure is categorised into internal, external and 
human disclosure. The disclosure is measured using 0 and 1 for non-disclosed and 
disclosed respectively. The study used logistics regression to estimate the 
relationship and found industry to be associated positively and significant with all 
the categories of the disclosure. Abeysekera also found that larger firms disclosed 
more than their counterpart. Other variables used in this study are size of the firm, 
board independence and board size. Despite the outcome of the study, it suffered 
some setback as the sample is inadequate, measurement of disclosure is weak and 
audit members are not included in the analysis. 
 
However, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) empirically investigated industry and voluntary 
disclosure (social & environmental inclusive) in Malaysia. Other independent 
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variables used in the study include qualification, seen in the study as those directors 
with accounting background and those with finance background and board 
independence. Survey of 167 in 1995 was conducted to establish the relationship. 
Regression analysis is applied and the result established that, industry type is 
negatively and significantly associated with disclosure. In the case of qualifications, 
therefore, it was found that the more the directors with accounting background the 
more the disclosure. However, the result also signified that finance education is 
negatively related with disclosure while board independence is negatively associated 
with disclosure and firm size is positively related to voluntary disclosure. The study 
faced weakness of data, technique of analysis and low number of observations in 
comparison to the population of the study among others. 
 
In the same vein, Lim, Matolcsy and Chow (2007) conducted a study on the 
relationship between industry type and voluntary disclosure (CSED inclusive) in 
Australia. Other variables included in the study were firm size, board independence, 
board size and industry among others. Initial sample of the study is 324 with final 
sample of 181 firms. Voluntary disclosure is seen as forward looking and strategic 
disclosure and is measured with checklist of 67 items. A two stage least square is 
applied on the cross sectional data. Findings of the study showed that, industry is 
negative and statistically significant on the relationship with both forward looking 
and strategic voluntary disclosure. Firm size, board size and board independence 
happen to be positively and significantly associated with the disclosure. The study is 
conducted in 2001 with an agency theory to support the hypothesis. However, is 
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suffered some set back as it did not take account of time in addition to weak 




Profitability, also known as return on assets, is paramount in an industry for decision 
making which lead to performance in any firm (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008). Thus, 
there are limited studies that are conducted on profitability and disclosure, be it 
social and environmental disclosure in Africa (Barako et al., 2006) but enough 
especially in advance (see Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Cheng, Courtenay, & 
Krishnamurti, 2006) with very few on disclosure in Africa (Barako et al., 2006). The 
reason for the few studies on disclosure in Africa could be attributed and not limited 
to lack of data availability, weak policy, inadequate publicity and constrain on proper 
documentations of social and/or environmental disclosure (Amaeshi et al., 2006a; 
Okeagu et al., 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Therefore, there is need for more studies 
on profitability and CSED in Nigeria and in Africa generally. To overcome these 
problems, so many literatures are reviewed in respect of profitability and disclosure 
in general including social and environmental disclosure.  
 
For example, Brammer and Pavelin (2008), examined the association between 
profitability and the quality of CED in United Kingdom from 1999 to 2002 inclusive. 
Board independence and firm‘s size were also in the study.  The quality of CED is 
measured based on checklist of PIRC 2000 in addition to the five categories so 
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divided. Out of the population of 700 firms, 450 considered to be largest firms were 
extracted and used as sample of the study. Two models were used as static and 
dynamic model. The dynamic model is the lagged variable by period of one year. 
Panel regression is applied and result obtained showed that, profitability is positively 
associated with the quality of CED. That means the more the profitability, the more 
the disclosure of environmental information the more the quality of such disclosure. 
While firm size seems to go in line with the profitability as has positive relationship, 
however, the authors could not established any relationship between board 
independence and one category of the CED quality and established a negative 
relationship with the remaining four categories. The study failed to explain PIRC but 
recognized it as a body that responsible for survey and shortlisting of firms in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
In addition, Cheng et al. (2006) conducted a study in Singapore on the relationship 
between profitability considered in their study as return on assets, and voluntary 
disclosure in 2000. Disclosure is measured using a checklist developed by the 
authors. The study developed two models composed of, in addition to the 
profitability, board size and board independence. Test of independence and 
differences is conducted on the disclosure using Wilcoxon paired test of differences 
and OLS regression for estimating the relationship is employed. Profitability is found 
to be positively associated with the VD in both model one & two. While board size 
is positive in model one with no relationship established in model two. However, 
board independence also took the same shape with profitability as it has appositive 
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relationship with the disclosure in all the models. The study suffered weakness of 
techniques and data as endogeneity may exist as a result of utilization of OLS and 
time frame is ignored on the data collected. 
 
However, Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan (2011) examined the association between 
profitability and both social and environmental disclosure in Canadian. The sample 
of the study is 137 firms quoted firms in Toronto Stock Exchange for the year 2004 
and 2005. Stakeholder theory is applied in order to reduce information asymmetry. 
Firm size, board size and board independence were among the variables examined in 
relation to CSED. The disclosure is measure using coding as used by Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen and Hughes (2004). The study used OLS as techniques of analysis. The 
result showed that, there is negative and significant relationship between profitability 
and CSED in both the years. The study suffered some deficiencies as the study used 
cross sectional data instead of panel data since the data for 2004 and 2005 were 
available. In addition, the use of OLS in the study is another weakness of this 
research since not suitable for categorical data and may suffered endogeneity 
problem. 
 
Furthermore, Liao, Luo and Tang (2015) conducted a study on the relationship 
between profitability and greenhouse gas emission (henceforth called GHG) 
disclosure, as listed in Carbon Disclosure Projects (CDP), in United Kingdom. Other 
variables includes environmental committee, board independence, board size, firms 
size and board meetings. The disclosure of GHG is measured as dummy variables. 
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The study used a sample of 329 largest firms in the year 2011. A stakeholder theory 
is applied and probit coupled with logit regression was also utilised on the cross 
sectional data. Going by the result, profitability measured as ROA is found to be 
negatively related to such disclosure. While, no relationship exists between board 
meetings and the GHG disclosure, board independence, environmental committee, 
firm‘s size and board size were positively associated with GHG disclosure. But the 
logit regression result disagrees with the probit regression result only on board 
independence that proves to be insignificant. 
 
Finally, in Kenya, Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006) examined profitability and 
voluntary disclosure for the year 1992 to 2001 inclusive. In the process, larger firms 
were compared with smaller firms in the Nairobi Stock Exchange. To determine 
voluntary disclosure, a checklist was developed and used with 47 items. Therefore, a 
scoring system was employed with coding ranging from zero to four. With an initial 
sample of 54 firms, at least 38 firms were used as final sample representing 70% of 
the initial sample. A panel regression is utilised and the result showed the no 
relationship exist between profitability and voluntary disclosure.  However, board 
independence prove to be negatively and significantly associated with the disclosure. 






3.6 Corporate Governance and the Quality of CSED  
 
In the process of establishing the relationship between CGM and CSED quality 
therefore, Adams (2002) studied internal factors in relation to CSED. These include 
ethical issues. While factors consist of the procedure on reporting, its behaviour, 
effects, audit and legislation others do not. These include, firms‘ framework, 
technique, attributes of stakeholders, level and attributes of accountant. Others are 
attitude and opinion for disclosure increase, disclosure of bad information, future 
disclosure and control.  
 
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) conducted a study in United Kingdom about the quality 
of CED using 450 firms in 2007. To determine the quality, environmental policy, 
target and environmental audit were used. Other variables examined were the size of 
the firm as larger or otherwise, the business nature and environment and the 
characteristics of the industry. The findings using logit regression showed that, those 
firms considered as large, disclosed quality information on CED than its 
counterparts. Other factors such as media exposure were found to be no relationship 
with the CED. 
 
The study used interviews and is conducted in the United Kingdom and Germany in 
1998. Samples of seven companies were chosen from United Kingdom and four 
companies in Germany. The result shows that internal factors affect the 
extensiveness, the quality, the quantity and completeness of CSED. The research 
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discovered that the procedure of disclosure related to the foundation of the country, 
firms dimension and the firm's culture. While accountant has no relationship with 
the engagement on CSED, the study suffers some setback on a limited sample. 
 
However, Cormieir, Magnan and Van Velthoven (2005) studied the determinants of 
environmental disclosure and its quality. The study is conducted in Germany with 
337 sample size. Using institutional theory, all variables used in the study composed 
of ownership, risk and age of fixed assets were found to be significant determinants 
of environmental disclosure quality in German firms. 
 
Prado-Lorenzo, Gallego-Alvarez, and Garcia-Sanchez (2009) used stakeholder 
theory to examine shareholders power and dispersed ownership on CSR details in 
Spain. The study is conducted in 2009 with a total of 99 firms as a sample. The 
framework of the study followed the Ullmann‘s (1985) pattern and it used some 
checklist in GRI (2002) guideline to confirm the report of CSR was in compliance 
with guideline. The findings revealed that shareholder power as theorised by 
stockholder, is significant and positive in explaining changes in CSR. However, the 
control variables used in the study found to be of zero value to CSR. The research 
also recommends the use of GRI guideline for all the firms as it was a contributory 
factor of good reporting. 
 
In a related development, Brammer and Pavelin (2006) analysed voluntary CED 
using sample of large United Kingdom firms. The population of the study was 700 
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of which 447 was extracted and used as sample. Variables examined in the study 
were, size of the firm and type of industry. Others were ownership structure and 
voluntary CED. Using probit regression, it was found that firm size is positively 
related to CED and statistically significant. While large companies in the United 
Kingdom tend to disclose more information on CED than those characterised as not 
large firms. The study also considers not only the disclosure, but the quality of 
such disclosure. Yet, larger firms found to have quality disclosure than its 
counterparts. 
 
In their study, Boesso and Kumar (2007) analysed the drivers of both quality and 
quantity of voluntary disclosure using 72 samples size and ordinary least square was 
utilised. Variables such as stakeholder management and intangible assets were 
examined using content analysis in two countries, Italy and United Sates. In addition, 
complexity of the market is also considered in the analysis. The findings revealed 
that all the factors into consideration above affect both quality and quantity of the 
disclosure and gives more emphasis on stakeholder management. The study 
recommend for an increase on sample size and the study suffered from time 
constraint as only one year is considered. 
   
Accordingly, O‘Sullivan, Percy, and Stewart (2007) examined the company‘s CGM 
in relation to forward looking disclosure in Australia. Sample used include 300 firms 
in the year 2000 and year 2002 annual report separately. CGM include the 
independence of audit committee, the meetings of the committee, independents of 
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auditors and the big 6 auditor‘s usage. The study found all the factors to be positively 
and significantly associated with the disclosure of forward looking in the year 2000. 
However, in 2002, the factors have no relationship with the disclosure. The study 
lacked sufficient samples and the use of logit regression has some weakness on the 
measurement used.  
 
Wegener, Elayan, Felton and Li (2013) investigated the relationship between carbon 
related project and CED using firms characteristics in Canada. The period covered is 
four years and the sample of the study is 319 with both local and international 
investors. Theory of institution is applied while a regression technique was used. The 
findings indicated that the decision of management on carbon disclosure is positively 
associated with CED in local investors than foreign ones. It further revealed that 
firm‘s characteristics played a significant role on CED. Within that period it was 
found that those firms that release low pollution disclosed more on environmental 
than others. In conclusion, stockholders activities may not alter the firm‘s behaviour 
on environment. 
 
Moreover, on the disclosure quality, Office and Elvet (2010) examined the 
determinants of corporate social responsibility (henceforth CSR) disclosure and its 
framework using legitimacy theory. It considered both quality and quantity of the 
disclosure. The variables covered include, economic level, level of CG, culture, 
social pressure and corporate characteristics. Using annual and standalone report for 
the year 2005 and 2006 with a sample of 350 firms of high reputation, the result 
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showed that all the variables including board size and corporate size determine CSR. 
Therefore, companies that response to social pressure is bound to disclose more on 
both quality and quantity of CSR. Finally, the consequences of CSR affect the 
corporate reputations of the firms. 
 
3.7 Social and Environmental Disclosure Quality: Meaning and Dimensions  
 
Usually information is derived from processed data for the consumption of end users 
(Lee, Strong, Kahn, & Wang, 2002) and then disclose for the purpose of the 
transparency and the need of various stakeholders (Guo, 2009). That could lead to 
some arguments about disclosure quality. These arguments is associated and not 
limited to, quality meaning and dimension (Hazlett, McAdam, & Murray, 2007), the 
measurement and accepted proxy for quality (Berens, Van Riel, & Van Rekom, 
2007), an accepted framework for disclosure quality (Lee, Kim, Lee, & Li, 2012) 
and reliability of the information in addition to the accuracy of such information  
(Hammond & Miles, 2004). For the reasons above, quality is depending on the study 
and its meaning which will lead to the dimension and finally framework and/or 
methodology. 
 
As stated earlier, depend on the area and discipline, quality may be interpreted 
differently. For example, in their study Gorla, Somers and Wong (2010) seen quality 
in terms of value, excellence in service provision including the information, meeting 
the requirement of a particular standard and best practice and to meet the need of 
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customer in terms of satisfaction and expectations. While Dranove and Jin (2010) 
see quality in terms of disclosure as variability of information, systematic 
measurement of information by certification agency and availability of report about a 
quality of a product in a given market. Therefore, quality of information and 
standard of best practice is the one that is relevant to this study. 
 
Based on that several studies is conducted for not only disclosure but its quality. For 
instance, Grüning (2007) conducted a study on disclosure including its quality and 
corporate characteristics in Europe using a cross sectional analysis in a country and 
across countries. The items included in the measurement of quality of the disclosure 
include 118 checklist measured in a categorical data ranging from ―1‖ as least 
information to ―5‖ as the maximum information disclosed. Five points indicate 
highly qualitative information in that regards. 
 
Whereas, Wiseman (1982) empirically examined the quality of CED using a sample 
of 26 environmentally sensitive firms in relation to its performance environmentally. 
A content analysis is employed on the annual reports of those firms categorised into 
four with an index and scoring system ranging from 1 to 3. All measurements were 
adequately and expressed in qualitative form with enough information. 
 
However, Gamble, Hsu, Kite and Radtke (1995) conducted a survey study involving 
all the stakeholders on not only environmental disclosure but its quality. In the 
process of the study, they reviewed the policies on CED by firms which include the 
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claims and the amount among others. Using a weighted index, it ranks the 
information on environment on the scale of seven points. The rating was in 
ascending order meaning the higher the rating the higher the quality of the 
disclosure. 
 
Raar (2002) also examined the quality of environmental disclosure on the sample of 
500 large firms in Australia. The disclosure of environmental quality is measured 
with a comprehensive GRI guideline. The purpose of using GRI guideline is because 
researchers on social and environmental studies believed that GRI is quite 
recommendable in terms quality and adequate disclosure information to various 
stakeholders. Therefore, the study used the ranking procedures to measure the 
environmental disclosure quality as identified by GRI in addition to triple bottom 
line procedures. 
 
In addition, Guthrie and Farneti (2008) conducted a study on sustainability including 
social disclosure in Australia. The study use GRI guideline for disclosure quality 
measurement. While it used an indicator of sound and poor reporting, it also 
categorised them in accordance with GRI priority. In the process of measuring the 
quality, location, amount and evidence were considered. 
 
In an effort to identified quality signal on accounting disclosure, Toms (2002) 
primarily formed and distributed questionnaires on CED to professionals as well as 
the supervisors of disclosure in United Kingdom.  The information were categorised 
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into six and the ranking is based on high and low criterion. The study involved the 
quality of information on environment and the reputation of firms on environmental 
issues. It was found that the quality of disclosure played a significant role on 
environmental reputation of firms in United Kingdom. 
 
However, Hughes, Anderson and Golden (2001) examined the quality of 
environmental disclosure in relation to environmental performance of firms. The 
quality of CED is measured using coding system with scores attributed to each 
disclosure item. Items scored on the determinants of quality were rated based on 
descriptive, quantitative, vague and finally immaterial. A weighted disclosure index 
is formed to arrive at the aggregate disclosure quality based on the ratings earlier 
stated in the study. 
 
In New Zealand, Milne, Tregidga and Walton (2003) investigated environmental 
disclosure using triple bottom line as contained in United Nation Environmental 
Projects. This project is managed by a sustainability group. In the triple bottom line, 
quality is measured using a checklist of 50 items categorised into five. Out of the 
fifty items forty eight were used to arrive at the disclosure quality. The items were 
rated from 0 to 4 with a mutually exclusive disclosure score of 0 and 1. That means 





 In addition, Hooks, Coy and Davey (2002) expressed information gap to examine 
the quality of reporting among listed firms in New Zealand.  The study used the 
yardstick as well as an index explored by some experts composed of varieties of 
stakeholders. Moreover, a weight is allocated to each items disclosed using 
accountability as guideline. Six categories of reporting are derived ranging from 0 to 
5 inclusive. The said quality is assumed in this study as stakeholder oriented, hence, 
all factors considered are coined by the stakeholders. 
 
Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari (2008) used a hard and soft disclosure found 
in GRI guideline to arrive at the quality of environmental disclosure in Australia. 
Both hard and soft disclosure were extracted from indicators of environmental 
information in the GRI, however, is adjusted to suit the study and the environmental 
situation. An index was developed with the input of professionals and the area of 
environmental accounting couple with some inputs from committee members of the 
GRI. Hard disclosure is categorised into four while sort disclosure is categorised into 
three. Finally using un-weighted index disclosure they arrived at the quality. 
 
In the same vein, Clarkson, Overell and Chapple (2011) used a method similar to 
that of Clarkson et al. (2008) with little adjustments to examine the CED quality and 
environmental performance of 51 firms reported by National Pollutant Inventory in 
2002. Disclosure quality is arrived at using an index on checklist derived from GRI 




However, Bozzolan, Trombetta and Beretta (2009) measured the quality of voluntary 
disclosure of forward looking using contents analysis. The number of sentences in 
the forward looking disclosure and the amount of forward looking information 
contain in a given sentence specifically are considered for quality disclosure 
measurement. The information is further categorised into five and each category is 
measured based on three perspective of measurement. The sub-category disclosure is 
considered as (0,0,0), (1,0,0), (1,1,0), (1,0,1) and finally (1,1,1) and is expressed in in 
terms of each sentence scores. 
 
Meanwhile, Delmas and Blass (2010) studied an aspect of social reporting which 
include environmental performance and the quality of the performance disclosure 
using a procedures implemented by Brammer and Pavelin (2006). The quality of the 
disclosure is calculated using a serial of questions organised by the researchers in 
line with bets practice. The questions compose of the of the issue of sustainability 
reporting, publication of environmental issues, guideline procedures such as GRI, 
policy implementation and endorsed by CEO, issue of transparency on related to the 
policy, goals and targets, issues of performance reporting and verifications of data so 
disclosed by the organisations. An index was utilised using a yardstick of both 
quality and quantity disclosure design by Roberts Environmental Centre.  
 
Glaum, Baetge, Grothe and Oberdörster (2011) investigated earnings and disclosure 
quality with International Accounting Standard. With 300 set of criterion, firms were 
selected from German firms for quality assessment. The disclosure took account of 
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the amount and the volume disclosed. In addition, the quality of the disclosure is 
assessed in line with the International Accounting Standard. One of the reason for 
the measurement of disclosure quality is for the fact that the study is forecasting base 
on the earnings of the firms. 
 
Finally, in order to meet up the quality signalling as  hypothesized by Siddique, 
Sciulli and Faux (2011), it comes with the reporting pattern on what to or not to 
disclose. The disclosure quality in this situation includes the effect of the disclosure 
and its community involvement in the activities of the firm. Climate Global Standard 
frame work is used as a guide to environmental disclosure quality. Other information 
attributed to this is the technique of disclosure and performance disclosure in terms 
of environment. These include water, emission and waste among others. 
 
In contrast, the literature review are summarised and attached to Appendix 1 of the 
study. Therefore, in the process of reviewing the literature, this research derived 
some gaps which lead to the contributions of this study.  
 
3.8 Literature Gap and Contribution 
 
Previous literature regarding the association between CSED and CGM is affected 
with a number of restrictions that result to inconclusiveness of the result found. In 
the process of reviewing the literature, some gaps were identified which guide this 
study on its contributions. These gaps include, low CSED in Nigeria, due to 
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inconsistencies there is need for moderator. Others are weak measurement of 
variables, weakness on sample size and the type of data used and weakness on 
techniques on data analysis. 
 
3.8.1 Limited Studies on CGM and CSED in Nigeria  
 
There is limited research on CSED in Africa even though other countries recorded a 
significant amount of studies on CSED (see Eng & Mak, 2003). According to 
KMPG (2011) and GRI (2011) statistics, CSED have increased in advance and the 
developing countries in the last twenty years. For example, majority of CSED are 
from Europe which is (45%), with Latin and Northern America (28%), that of Asia 
(20%), with few from Oceania (4%), and the least is Africa (3%) (GRI. 2011).  
Among the African countries, Okeagu et al. (2006) disclosed that Nigerian firms are 
among the least that disclosed social and environmental information. Thus, this study 
deemed it necessary to conduct a study in Nigeria in this area. 
  
Therefore, this study tries to overcome the challenges facing African countries in 
respect of CSED as to empirically evaluate the moderating effect of non-executive 
director‘s ownership on the relationship between CGM and the quality of CSED in 





3.8.2 The Need for Moderator 
 
Another significant criticism of previous literature on CSED is that the results seem 
to be not consistent and/or not conclusive. The irregularity can said to linked to, 
availability of data and its type, weakness of framework, problem appropriate 
theories and application of wrong techniques on data analysis (Cormier & Magnan, 
1999; Monteiro & Aibar-Guzmán, 2010).  
 
Gray et al. (2001) attributed these inconsistencies to the inappropriate and accurate 
theory in respect of the CSED. Others may also be linked the differences on the use 
of different samples and firms (Hazlett et al., 2007), the concentration on different 
periods and different time lengths (Acerete, Llena, & Moneva, 2011), inadequate 
control variables and the size of the firms (Kabir & Akinnusi, 2012). Other studies 
revealed that, lack of research of the relationship within only one conceptual 
framework plays a significant role in the mixture of the outcomes (Orlitzky, 
Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003).  
 
To support this claim, Halme and Huse (1997) found board composition to be 
positively and significantly associated with CED. In contrast, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) discovered that composition of board is negatively associated with 
voluntary CSD with other researchers found no relationship among the board 
compositions and CSED (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008). Therefore, the need for 
moderator arises hence this study argued that ownership of non-executive 
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directors could moderate the relationship. This is because, the larger the ownership 
of the board, especially non-executive directors, the more they disclose additional 
information in their annual report for transparency (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, 
& Jiang, 2008). In the same vein, the larger the ownership of non-executive directors 
the more they paid attention to internal governance mechanisms (Ahmed & 
Duellman, 2007; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Mak & Li, 2001) which in turn could 
lead to more disclosure and its quality thus, address the stakeholders conflicts. 
 
3.8.3 The Measurement of CSED  
 
Another important weakness found in the previous studies is most of them utilised 
and measured CSED in terms of its volume and not necessarily the quality of CSED 
(Cowan & Gadenne, 2005; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; 
Patten, 2002). Some researchers on CSED were on the view that, the volume of 
disclosure does not in any way depicts its quality (Cho & Patten, 2007). Meanwhile 
many of them used few CGM for explaining the changes in CSED and as broader as 
it should be (Haniffa & Cooke 2000). In addition, Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell (1998) 
identified the weakness of quantity of disclosure as it failed to recognised the 
techniques and process of management decisions. Based on those reasons, this study 
conclude that the use of volume did not mean disclosure quality and since 
disclosure quality is scanty globally, there is need for additional studies on 
disclosure quality especially CSED quality. This is in line with the information 
found by (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008). Base on the above issues raised on the quality 
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of the disclosure, the current research overcome the weakness of other research on 
the quality disclosure issue by using scoring system and checklist in line with GRI 
guideline and researchers like  Mio (2010).  
 
3.8.4 The Weakness on Samples 
 
Sample size is an important aspect of research as so many studies were criticized 
simply because of their sample size. The sample of a study can be small and 
homogenous in nature with regards to its population. So many studies complained 
and identified sample size as their limitations of their studies (Bacchetti, Wolf, Segal, 
& McCulloch, 2005; Dell, Holleran, & Ramakrishnan, 2002; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; 
Krzywinski & Altman, 2013). According to Zahra, Neubaum and Huse (1997) the 
low sample could reduce the disclosure of boards participation considering various 
firms into consideration based on their operations and sensitivity. In addition, there 
were increase in consideration of large firms (see Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Dranove 
& Jin, 2010; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; Guidry & Patten, 2012) or those 
organisations that belong to environmentally sensitive such as high profile industries 
(see Clarkson et al., 2008; Freedman & Jaggi, 1982, 1988).  
 
Since there are discrepancies on the firm‘s type and category, the outcome of so 
many studies cannot be generalised simply because of the sample size weaknesses. 




3.8.5 The Weakness on Type of Data  
 
Data is said to be cross sectional, time series and panel in nature (Gujarati, 2004). It 
was further emphasized by Gujurati that, while cross sectional bear no time, the time 
series has time horizon with no cross section. In addition, the panel is composed of 
both cross section and time series. Therefore, relevance of time seems to be 
neglected in past studies. Almost all previous research analysing the factors of CSD 
or CED utilised cross sectional data  (see Abu-Baker & Naser, 2000; Adams, 2002). 
Even though some studies used time series is still limited (Lu & Abeysekera, 2014). 
 
Gray et al. (2001) emphasized that, the relationship that is to be exposed over time 
cannot be ascertain by cross sectional analysis, hence there is need to overcome the 
weaknesses that may arise as result of the data used. According to Hassan (2012), the 
time series could also tackle the issue of trend on environmental analysis. This is also 
confirmed by Haniffa and Cooke, (2005). 
 
While undergoing current study, there is still difficulties in assessing literature to 
date that conducted any efficient longitudinal analysis on CGM and CSED in the 
context of Nigeria. In an effort to deal with the empirical shortfall in Nigerian 
CSED research, the current study used panel data, over 2010-2014. The reason for 
the use of panel data is line with the investigation of Brammer and Pavelin, (2006) 
that panel investigation would assist to solve the problem of causality and give more 
information on the growing pattern of disclosure.  
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3.8.6 The Weakness of Techniques 
 
Many studies use a technique of evaluation, generally called OLS. This technique 
has some weaknesses as identified by Gurati, (2004). For example, OLS could 
sufficiently solve the problem of the data is censored or categorical in nature as is 
common to content analysis research (Cormier et al., 2005). Furthermore, OLS 
cannot take account of time variant of data. For that reason, Feasible Generalised 
Least Square is utilised for further analysis. This is done to overcome the weaknesses 
of the OLS especially for the issue of time variant and the presence of 
heteroskedaticity.  
 
3.9 Theories on Corporate Governance and Corporate Social and 
Environmental Disclosure 
 
There are so many literature social and environmental disclosure which reveal a lot 
of differences in the theoretical point of view implemented in the study (Urquiza, 
Navarro, & Trombetta, 2010). The differences could be attributed to inadequate 
framework (Deegan, Rankin, & Voght, 2002), lack of suitable theory on social and 
environmental disclosure (Cho, Freedman, & Patten, 2012) and poor theories in 
respect of the research on social issues (Campbell, 2000). Nevertheless, some 
theories played a significant role on CSED which include stakeholder‘ theory and 
legitimacy theory. Both legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory have their origins 
from political economy theory (Deegan, Rankin, & Voght, 2002). These said 
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theories could be linked to issues on environmental disclosure and the role of 
company on its stakeholders relationship, since firms are accountable to its 
stakeholders (Lu & Abeysekera, 2014). Therefore, it has been suggested that they are 
the actual and supporting theories (Gray et al., 1995).  
 
In the same way, corporate governance does not have theories in isolation (Parum, 
2005) but has guided theory known as agency theory. The theory is paramount on 
corporate governance mechanism especially for their role on disclosure issues as it 
reduces some conflicts among the firms and their stakeholders (Darus, 2011). 
 
Summary of the different theoretical viewpoints are discussed hence, a framework is 
formed for this study based on the reviewed theories.  
 
3.9.1 Legitimacy Theory  
 
According to Zelditch (2006) the proper way of things to be done naturally with a 
general acceptance by not only the beneficiaries but others who may not gain from it 
is termed legitimate. Therefore, legitimacy theory could be seen as proper and 
acceptable way of action, presentation as well as lawful activities by firms in a social 
judgement (Bitektine, 2011). In terms of disclosure, however, legitimacy theory 
offered prominent ideas. According to Clark (2003) the value of firms are in 
agreement to that of the system of the society with social justice as the firm is part 
of, thus, any conflict on the values so agreed could lead to legitimacy risk. 
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Therefore, firms are sustained based on their relationship with the society in terms of 
their norms and value if could be respected based on this theory. Consequently, the 
disclosure of information on social and environmental issues by firms will enhance 
its legitimacy (Brønn & Vidaver-Cohen, 2009; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000). For that 
reason, to be legitimate is to disclose both social and/or environmental information 
in line with the societal norms and values which they operate.  
 
Hence, the theory could be seen as a response of firm or organisation to societal 
pressure in respect of their social and/or environmental performance (Onkila, 2009). 
In reaction to these pressures, companies respond by revealing more social and 
environmental details to be able to protect their integrity in the eyes of the society 
which could have a negative impact on their operational activities (Bitektine, 2011; 
Charl de Villiers & van Staden, 2006). 
 
For that reason, one can deduce that the theory focused on significance of firms on 
the society and their approval which could assured the existence of a firm 
(O‘Donovan , 2002). In this case, companies tend to authenticate issues on their 
actions via numerous ways, such as interaction among the society and appropriate 
stakeholders (Ghazali, 2007; Treviño, den Nieuwenboer, Kreiner, & Bishop, 2014). 
Social and environmental legitimacy may affect company environmental dedication 
and, hence, management‘s choices regarding environment (Archel, Husillos, 




Several researchers have employed this theory in both social and/or environmental 
disclosure literature (e.g Archel, Husillos, Larrinaga, & Spence, 2009; DeVilliers & 
Vanstaden, 2006; Deegan, 2002; Ivory, 2013). Nevertheless, a lot of studies could 
not provide a proper solution to the theory on the side of the firms, instead several 
question were unanswered about the social and environmental disclosure issues 
(Archel et al., 2009; Deegan, 2002; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006).  
 
Past research prove that legitimacy theory was insufficient to describe CSED on 
relationship between legitimacy and disclosure which was partially reinforced for 
environmental concerns and the community (O‘Donovan , 2002). Furthermore, 
Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) reliably disclosed on the past analysis inadequately 
offered no reliable solution on the theory deficiency on environmental details. 
Additionally, Campbell (2003) insist on the inappropriate measures by the 
legitimacy theory proponents on the disclosure of environmental issues to the society 
and their related activities.  
 
3.9.2 Stakeholder Theory  
 
The theory of Stakeholder also known as stakeholder theory, is emphasised on the 
involvement of the relevant stakeholder concern before taking a decision, be it on 
disclosure as the case may be (Jensen, 2002). Accounting discipline usually uses this 
theory on CSD and CED more often than not. The theory comprises the 
acknowledgement and recognition of the association between the organisation's 
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behaviour and that of the stakeholders (Ackermann & Eden, 2011). Consequently, 
there must be harmony between the organisations and the stakeholders on the 
activities of those organisations. Gray et al. (1995) emphasize that, stakeholders 
influence on an organisation play a significant role in the adaptation by the 
organisation concern. In addition to that, Gray still insists that, due to the availability 
of stakeholders and their pressure around organisations therefore, the organisations 
have to account for every action taken that could have an adverse effect on the 
environment. Moreover, as the importance of the stakeholders to the corporations is 
increasing, the management of such organisation will increase their positive 
relationship through the improvement of disclosure on CSED. The theory prevailed 
that for a business to prosper, there must be a corresponding value to it and the moral 
principles cannot be separated from economy (Freedman & Patten, 2004). Therefore, 
Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar (2004) insist that supervisors communicate the shared 
feeling and concerned of the stakeholders on the value relevance of the information 
generated from the firms. This is in addition to the managers concern about the need 
for business to succeed provided they meet up the stakeholders aims by 
strengthening their relationship. (Jensen, 2002). Stakeholder theory is built on two 
streams: (1) interpreting the stakeholder idea, and (2) identifying stakeholders' 
understanding of its relationships (Fassin, 2012). 
 
Several efforts have been made as to stakeholders' meaning. Freeman et al. (2004) 
describes it as an individual or group of persons that has direct bearing on an 
organisation as a result of their normal activities. While Magness (2006) explained 
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the theory as people who one way or the other have direct benefit and/or claim on the 
organisations surrounding their environment. 
  
Stakeholders are composed of among others as stockholders, clients, debtors and 
creditors, workers, opponents, interests of the public, government, stock markets, 
industries, society as well as public. The stakeholders always put their interest first 
before any of the organisation  (Friedman & Miles, 2002; Hill & Jones, 1992). The 
primary benefits of stakeholder theory are different, inconsistent interests. Therefore, 
the theory accommodates more perception in view of CSED analysis, which means, 
the interest of shareholders and stakeholders must be addressed and harmonised since 
they have mutual relationship (Burchell & Cook, 2007). Thus, the theory is useful in 
this study simply because there is provision of structures in the CSED system (Snider, 
Hill, & Martin, 2003). According to Snider et al. (2003), the theory is further classified 
into two groups. The first classification associates to the moral value known as 
normative division and the second classification associates to the managing division. 
They all termed as prescription and description respectively. 
 
The first classification considered disclosure of information, be it social or 
environmental, as right and not a privilege for the stakeholders, thus, they should 
be informed on the daily activities of the firms in respective of the negativity of 
such information. This is also in agreement with social justice, where all 
stakeholders were required to be given information, regardless of the importance of 
such information on them provided it has some effects on the stakeholders (Jensen, 
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2002). This is also supported by Gray et al. (1995) where they insist that 
accountability is a responsibility to offer account (not necessarily financial) and 
estimate total activities that an organisation is responsible. The accountability 
includes the obligations of, performance of some actions and bearing responsibility 
for it, and the obligation to account for those actions taken. 
 
The second classification is the managerial aspect. Compared with the normative 
of stakeholders theory, the managerial viewpoint claims that companies will seem 
to fulfil the information requirements of the stakeholders that become essential on 
the organisation's success even though stakeholders varies on their impact on the 
organisation (Magness, 2006). Therefore, the availability of information to a 
stakeholder in isolation depends on how extremely effective the stakeholder seem 
to be on the matter at hand (Mainardes, Alves, & Raposo, 2011).  
 
For the reason above, it becomes clear that CSED could be referring to under the 
managerial stakeholder theory; however, CSED utilised this theory as dialogue 
between the company and the relevant stakeholders in the organisation (Gray et al., 
1995). Thus, it plays a role of acceptability on a firm‘s activities and to disturb 
stakeholders' resistance rather than to launch accountability (Deegan, 2002). 
Therefore, stakeholder theory can curtail the stakeholder concerned and their 
grievances in relation to the effectiveness of the company in terms of their corporate 




The theory identifies and involve so many stakeholders that are fascinated more 
often on social and environmental trends of organisations and, as a result, need more 
details in respect of the effect on daily movement on the their closest environment 
(Acerete et al., 2011). To the level that companies identify the rights of their 
stakeholders' interests, they usually willingly review all their social as well as the 
environmental disclosure in order to fulfil their demands (Huang & Kung, 2010). 
 
There are pressure on the demand for social and environmental disclosure by so 
many stakeholders as a result of their concern on the responsibilities of firms in 
respect of environmental issues coupled with its associated cost and responsibility 
(Elijido-ten, 2004). In respond to this requirement, many organisations are providing 
separate voluntary CSED in addition to the conventional reporting system. 
Furthermore, in the process of improve CSED, all associated risk including the 
return for stakeholders are taking care of  (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). Also, 
stakeholders challenged the fact that CSED symbolizes firm' previous and 
forthcoming success (Stieb, 2009). Thus, the theory offers framework for the 
disclosure of social and environmental problems in respect of firms and its 
stakeholders (Joseph, 2007; Stieb, 2009). 
 
3.9.3 Agency Theory  
 
In line with the general definition of agency theory, it could be seen as action by an 
individual or group of individuals that act on behalf of another party (Shapiro, 2005). 
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The theory of agency has been dominantly used in accounting literary to describe and 
evaluate corporate governance. The theory was presented during the nineteen 
seventies as a phenomenon that involve firms or organisational consent that involve 
both principal and agent between investors and managers of the firms (Heath, 2009). 
This is in addition to the extent of maximisation of stockholders wealth and equity 
(Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010). 
 
In this regards, there high possibility of consumption of the theory by governance 
structure of the firms that could lead to dissolution of conflicts that may arise among 
the principal (shareholders) and the agent (managers) (Devilliers et al., 2011). The 
relationship in agency usually result from one or more individuals (also known as 
principal) interact with other individual (called agent) for execution of some duties 
which includes assigning some decision and power to the agent (Charles, Hill & 
Jones, 1992; Shapiro, 2005). The main ingredient of this relationship is the divergent 
of interests by both parties. Some of the unique attributes of such relationship is the 
inconsistency of both principal and agent objectivity in addition to the high 
tendencies for principal and agent to  agree in the situation of  threat (Hill & Jones, 
1992). Moreover, the author recommended two factors for agent failing to effectively 
take part in the principal interest, that of adverse selection and finally, the moral 
hazard. For example, while adverse selection prevails that agent go against the 
principal in some cases, the latter prevails the failure of agent to follow the principal 




In the process of separation and division of duties among the parties that has to do 
with ownership and management, agency expenses arose which could be monitoring 
expenses, bonding expenses and residual reduction expenses (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Therefore, the theory could resolve issues of information asymmetry which 
could cause conflict of interests among the parties involved (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000). 
Thus, there is a need for management to make sure of their initiatives take full 
advantage of the wealth of shareholders. The agency expenses mostly suffered in the 
process of decreasing or removing the consequences of agency disputes, which is 
unavoidable especially when agents execute activities that are opportunistic in nature 
for their selfish interests. Thus, agency theory played a significant role on corporate 
board studies in addition to other governance attributes studies (Singh & Davidson 
III, 2003).  Thus, in line with corporate governance context, the theory is in the 
support of managers perspective and not stockholders in respect of social and 
environmental issues as a result of  their neutrality on company's earnings (Graves & 
Waddock, 1994). In some instances, issues might be displayed and resolved by agents  
on social and environmental concerns  since they are not the investors (Halme & 
Huse, 1997). Additionally, compare with their counterpart, the said agents may 
participate fully on non-profit objectives, for example environmental safety, to be 
able to protected their roles (Wang & Coffey, 1992).  
 
Hence, agency theory is paramount on CSED since it is expressed through CGM 
simply because managers of an organisation have more accessibility on company's 
details than shareholders and they are responsible for reliable disclosure in order to 
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improve company worth, this is done via the decreasing of agency expenses 
(Craswell & Taylor 1992). 
 
3.10 Summary of the Chapter 
  
This chapter presents relevant literature reviews to explain CGM and CSED. It also 
discussed on quality of CSED, development of CSED in Nigeria. It further discused 
the development of corporate governance in Nigerian. In addition, it reviewed the the 
relationship between CGM and CSD, CED, VD and CSED quality. Furthermore, 
CSED meaning and dimensions were reviewed. In the same vein, literature gap is 
established. Theories on CGM and CSED are reviewed in this chapter which 
compose of, the legitimacy, stakeholders and agency theory. The next chapter 








This chapter proceeds from previous chapter, which reviewed relevant literature on 
CGM and CSED quality. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to discuss and 
established the theoretical framework as well as development of hypotheses. The 
development of the hypotheses is based on the theoretical perspective and empirical 
research is also discussed in this chapter. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
Review of past literature on CSED showed that so many factors are responsible for 
the low level of CSED among which CGM is key factor (Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009). 
Previous studies found a positive relationship between board independence and 
CSED (Higgs, 2003; Ho & Wong, 2001; Webb, 2004; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010). In 
related development, board size is also found to be positively related to CSED 
(Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Leblanc, 2007; Lim et al., 2007). In the same vein, other 
researchers (Chou, Chung, & Yin, 2013; Khanchel, 2007; Shivdasani & Yermack, 
2014; Vafeas, 1999) found that board meetings is related to CSED. Literature review 
also found that directors qualification, audit committee independence are related to 
CSED. Some found positive, some negative and some no relationship between CGM 
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and CSED (Brick & Chidambaran, 2010; Gul & Leung, 2004; Welford, 2007). Based 
on the stakeholder and agency theory, a theoretical framework for this study is 
constructed showing the moderating role of non-executive director‘s ownership on the 
relationship between CGM and CSED quality. In this study, CGM is composed of 
board independence, board meetings, board size, audit committee independence and 
corporate environmental responsibility committee presence. While size, industry and 







































From the framework shown theoretically in Figure 4.1, the stakeholder theory 
support the disclosure as the proponents of the theory assert that, as the quality and 
volume of disclosure of firms improved, it could address the agitations of various 
stakeholders since they relied on the information disclosed while the CGM is 
supported by agency theory as the CGM is the representations of the firm and can 
therefore stand for the company to address any conflict that may arise between the 
company and its stakeholders as a result of low disclosure (Watson, Shrives, & 
Marston, 2002; Ayuso & Argandoña, 2009; Maharaj, 2008). The disclosure also 
include corporate social and environmetal disclosure. 
 
Based on the framework developed in Figure 4.1, corporate social and environmetal 
disclosure (CSEDQL) is the dependent variable while board independence (BI), 
board size (BS), board meetings (BM), directors qualifications (DQ), board 
committess (BC) and audit committess independence (ACI) are the independent 
variables which are also the corporate governance mechanisms (CGM). In addition, 
non-executive directors ownership is a moderating variable as indicated in the 
framework. The control variables include size (SIZ), industry (IND) and profitability 
(PROF). 
 
The framework clearly indicates the moderating effect of non-executive directors‘ 
ownership on the relationship between CGM and CSEDQL. The direct relationship 
between CGM and CSEDQL is to address objective two while the moderating 
relationship is to address objective three of the study. 
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One of the main distinctions of this framework is the presence of non-executive 
ownership as moderator. This is in addition to the use of two theories Stakeholder 
and agency theory on the framework. Another important distinction is the 
consideration of varieties of CGM components. Thus, the study can be said to be 
distinguished on the highlighted reasons above.  
  
4.3 The Underpinning Theories 
 
Examining relevant past literature shows a variety of frameworks were formulated 
and utilised in the process of description as well as evaluation of corporate 
governance with social and/or environmental disclosure. Studies on CGM and CSED 
is inadequate so far due to the application of various thought on different displace 
that may not be unconnected to the background of the researchers (Jiang, Habib, & 
Hu, 2011). It is important to note that, theory can only guide studies on the process 
of what ought to be done and not what could be done. Therefore, it eliminates a lot 
of factors when we are faced with selection or decision (Orlitzky et al., 2011).  
 
Even though differences exist on the theories, it was however, clear that, so many 
research of different theoretical background has recognized that good CGM 
improved disclosure which lead to transparency (Cormier, Ledoux, Magnan, & 
Aerts, 2010; Griffin, Lont, & Sun, 2009). Hence, CGM is regarded as an essential 
tool in identifying the ingredients of  disclosure needed to meet up the expectation of 
numerous stakeholders since the board controls the information for both financial 
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and non-financial reports (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007).  The 
current research investigates the relationship between CGM and the quality of CSED 
in Nigerian listed firms‘. CSED can be seen as technique implemented by an 
organisation to fulfil the social and environmental objectives of different 
stakeholders. According to stakeholder theory, social and environmental reporting 
allows companies to interact with its stakeholders about the size of their 
environmental and its related activities on its products in addition to the services 
rendered. Therefore, the disclosure of  environmental issues is considered to be 
aspect or process resolving conflicts among the parties involve i.e organisations, 
firms and stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995). On the other hand, agency theory could be 
seen as a mechanism of resolving principal-agent disputes via good CGM. 
 
Focusing on stakeholder-agency theory therefore, the study argued that organisations 
are progressively committed to social and environmental issues, via the presentation 
of social and/or environmental disclosure in a manner that could manage any 
relationship with the stakeholders. In the same vein, good CGM are used for 
accounting techniques and transparency, for firms most response to the needs of 
stakeholders by reduction on information asymmetry and this could be enhanced if 
such disclosure meet up the best practice, in other words, the quality of such 
disclosure. Thus, the quality of CSED to stakeholders is improved when CGM is put 
in place to monitor managers‘ opportunistic adjustment. For that reason, this study 
used stakeholder-agency theory. 
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4.4 Stakeholder and Agency Theory  
 
The stakeholder-agency theory is theoretical development that has a wider point of 
view than stakeholder theory or agency theory alone (Hill & Jones, 1992). The 
incorporation of the stakeholder theory with agency theory will increased the 
principal-agent commitment on CSD or CED. This could describe the nature of the 
relationships that can be found between a companies and stakeholders. Hill and 
Jones, further disclosed on this strategy and regarded it as a modification of agency 
theory that represents competent markets and denies the concept of differences on 
power that exist among managers and the stakeholders.  
 
In addition, stakeholder-agency theory controls management and stakeholder 
conflicts of interests. For proper management of the conflict, there  is need for more 
disclosure, mostly CSED, by the promoters in connection with the stakeholders with 
their assistance on issues raised on the environment (Watson, Shrives, & Marston, 
2002). Therefore, efficient use of disclosure plan, with regards to disclosure quality, 
could be seen as a tool of developing confidence among the shareholders. Thus, 






4.5 The Theories on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure Quality 
 
Based on the discussion of various theoretical point of views, this study found that 
stakeholder-agency theory is an appropriate conceptual framework for the analysis 
anticipating CGM to have an impact on CSED in Nigeria. Therefore, stakeholder-
agency theory is used as the theoretical framework for this study. This is as a result 
of the fact that, the analysis tries to comprehend the magnitude of the variables and 
their impact on organisational activities in respect of stakeholder response. 
Therefore, stakeholder-agency theory could be paramount to the present study. 
 
This study examines the relationship between CGM and CSED quality. In the 
process, the study argues for the need to consider the association among companies 
and its stakeholders, as described in CGM, once developing an environmental plan 
of a company. CGM play a significant role on CSED by dealing with different 
stakeholders. Hence, CGM is regarded as an essential mechanism for identifying the 
disclosure needed to fulfil needs of stakeholders in terms of information disclosure, 
since, is the board that controls the disclosure of information (Ayuso & Argandoña, 
2009; Maharaj, 2008). 
 
The disclosure of social and environmental issues is regarded as technique 
implemented by firms in order to fulfil the social and environmental objectives for 
different stakeholders. In line with stakeholder theory, reporting on environmental 
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issues allows companies to express and interact regarding their activities about the 
society and/or environment. Therefore, social and environmental disclosure could be 
seen as that aspect of negotiation between firms and stakeholders of the particular 
environment (Gray et al., 1995). However, agency theory used to maintain the peace 
and control the conflicts among principal and agent in the presence of CGM. 
 
Thus, stakeholder-agency theory could argue on progressiveness of companies 
regarding their disclosure of social and/or environmental issues. If firms disclosed 
information on either social or environmental, then the firm is said to be socially and 
/or environmentally responsible. This could be enhancing the establishment and 
enforcement of quality CSED. Therefore, the relationship between the firms and its 
stakeholders is maintained if not improved. For that reason, it is agreed that 
comprehensive CGM could provide accountability and that could help to meet the 
needs of stakeholders. This is done when an information asymmetry is minimized. 
Consequently, this study argued in favour quality of CSED as this could improve the 
managers' opportunistic adjustment which in turn, could create good relationship 
with stakeholders as checked by sound CGM. 
 
Since stakeholder-agency theory promulgates accountability therefore, the actions of 
management should be, in the interest of transparency, supported by disclosure, in 
the case of this study, the disclosure of social and environmental activities. Thus, 
could it be stakeholder-agency theory properly explains the disclosure procedure, 
then an efficient disclosure plan needs management to track and monitored the 
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information needs by various stakeholder; thereby, fulfil the needs of different 
stakeholder groups through customisation of CSED accordingly. Therefore, 
stakeholder-agency theory shows that business success and its survival is conditional 
on fulfilling both its economic gain and otherwise which include social and 
environmental performance, where the problems of stakeholders could be addressed  
(Pirsch, Gupta, & Grau, 2007). Under this point of view, CSED help the stakeholders 
to seek for support by the organisational commitment and their existence (Cormier et 
al., 2005) this is in addition to control of stakeholders' conflicts couple with 
disengagement on unlawful activities and to launch accountability on their 
environmental disclosure (Deegan, 2002).  
 
The same way, CGM is seen as a tool for proper accountability in the eyes of the 
stakeholders (Devinney, Schwalbach, & Williams, 2013). For that reason, the board 
functions as an intermediary between the organization and its related stakeholders. 
Therefore, board of directors as an aspect of CGM including other mechanisms, 
could be more accountable in terms of disclosure issues. 
 
One of the major contributor of accountability is transparency which is seen as an 
essential signal of good CGM in an economy (Devinney et al., 2013; Ho & Wong, 
2001) Agreeing with Gul and Leung (2004) point of view on transparency, is 
connected to effective and sound CGM developed to secured stakeholders interests 
thereby improving organization transparency and directors' accountability. For that 
reason, firms focus on stakeholder involvement impacts the quality of voluntary 
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reports (Boesso & Kumar, 2007). Therefore, CGM is more focus on the way outside 
stakeholders observe the management of organizations (Ho & Wong, 2001) and 
hence, improve company's disclosure. 
 
Since board of directors impacted significantly on environmental performance (Eng 
& Mak, 2003), through dedicating more time to the governance of CSED 
(Mackenzie, 2007), therefore, involving various CGM increases tracking the quality 
on disclosure and decreases the advantage of holding the information, thereby, 
enhances the quality of social and environmental disclosure (Mackenzie, 2007). 
 
Accordingly, offering quality disclosures is probably reliant upon sound CGM, as 
being tuned in to meet up stakeholder needs. Any organization that has efficient 
CGM, therefore, will offer accessible in addition to quality information thereby 
encouraging stakeholder involvement (Eccles et al., 2001). In conformity to this 
idea, Beekes and Brown (2006) discovered that an organisation with a good 
governance mechanisms disclosed more quality informative for the benefits of their 
users. Moreover, Salo (2008), discovered CED quality to be favourably associated 
with CGM. Thus, disclosure quality could have a direct bearing on asymmetry of 
information. This could be done after modification of the investors pattern of trading 
which could result to decreasing rewards on information issues in particular (Cheng 





However, a well sound and effective system of governance is expected to improve 
corporate reports organised by the management, and that indicates corresponding 
relationship on both the systems (Grüning, 2007). Therefore, literatures predict and 
explore a positive relationship between CGM and companies‘ disclosure. 
Alternatively, if the association can be replaced by other activities, CGM could not 
be associated with disclosure since one CGM may replace another one as an 
alternative. In this respect, a costs and benefits could be traded for one another in 
respect of the said disclosure (Grüning, 2007). Therefore, it can be suggested that 
utilising several CGM is essential to performance of an organisation and would 
eventually result in disclosure quality. 
 
For the reasons stated above, the current research asserts that CSED could stand as 
a function of CGM. Therefore, the study looks into the effect of CGM on the 
quality of CSED in all the listed firms in Nigerian.  
 
4.6 Hypotheses Development 
 
Literature shows that CSED is complicated concept which might be motivated by so 
many causes. This study examines a number of attributes of CGM as determinants of 
CSED and that include control variables, unlike prior studies, this study focused 
primarily on CGM to determine the capacity of firms on disclosure of social and/or 
environmental facts as well as the disclosure quality after taking consideration of the 
moderating effect on the relationship by non-executive director‘s ownership. 
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In order to achieve this objective, the supported mechanism called CGM, is compose 
of board independence (BI), board size (BS), board meetings (BM), directors' 
qualifications (DQ), audit committee independence (ACI), board committees (BC), 
as well as non-executive director‘s ownership (NBO) as a moderating variable. 
 
The main advantage of selecting these variables,  is because CGM monitor the 
disclosure of all information through the management whose activities portray 
stakeholders interest (Ujunwa, 2012). In totality, the mechanisms impact and focus 
on social and/or environmental issues couple with the manner at which firms relate 
to their stakeholders in a giving community. This, consecutively, is shown in CSED. 
Thus, all variables are discussed that lead to hypothesis development for test through 
establishment of a relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable. The variables include board independence, board size, board meetings, and 
qualification of directors, board committees and audit committee. Others are the 
moderating variable, non-executive director‘s ownership and control variables as, 
firm size, industry and profitability.  
 
4.6.1 Relationship between Board Independence and CSED Quality 
 
The percentage of independent non-executive directors on the firms board is 
considered as a significant aspect impacting firm disclosure in general (Ho & Wong, 
2001) and corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSED) in particular 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). The directors on who are independent usually paid more 
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attention to corporate social and environmental responsibility (Webb, 2004) hence, 
CSED. The concentrate of board independence is based on agency theory and in 
addition to stakeholder theory. Since they are represented in the stakeholders 
therefore, independent non-executive directors mostly are perceived by so many 
studies as a mechanism for monitoring and control management (Higgs, 2003; 
Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010), this could bring about more information on disclosure be it 
environmental or otherwise. For that reason, Hill and Jones (1992) revealed in his 
study that the more the increase of independent directors (non-executive) the better 
the performance of board to monitor managerial decisions and, as a result, the 
increase in voluntary disclosures which include social and environmental ones. In the 
same vein, Eng and Mak (2003) disclosed that if there are more of non-executive 
directors in the firms boards that could improves not only the disclosure but also, the 
quality of such disclosure be it financial or otherwise and decreases the gains of 
suppressing the information of the disclosure. Moreover, there could be more 
objectivity by the independent directors and may consider different stakeholders 
while making their consideration as well as recommendations in their report (Gao & 
Kling, 2012). For that reason, there is tendency to offer obvious facts in a broader 
perspectives to various stakeholders which will assist to accomplish the corporate 
planned goals and objective (Huang & Kung, 2010). 
 
Contrary to the believe for abundance studies on disclosure nevertheless, empirically, 
studies on board independence and CSED remain inadequate. Even though Brammer 
and Pavelin (2006) could not able to establish a significant association on board 
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independence and CED, other studies confirmed the presence of positive 
relationship between the ratio of non-executive directors and CED by Post, Rahman, 
and Rubow (2011). This is also confirmed by Huang and Kung (2010). From this 
reason above, this study deduced the relationship among board independence and 
CED is mixed and that triggered moderation. To prove it, while Barako et al. (2006) 
as well as Haniffa and Cooke (2002) established negative relationship between the 
independent non-executive directors and corporate disclosure (CSED inclusive), 
Cheng, Courtenay,and Krishnamurti (2006), Huafang and Jianguo (2007) and Lim, 
Matolcsy, and Chow, (2007) acknowledged and recorded positive relationship 
between the percentage of non-executive directors and corporate disclosure (CSED 
inclusive), with Ho and Wong (2001) failed to find any relationship among the 
variables . Therefore, in order to overcome the inconsistency in the result as 
stipulated above, this study introduces non-executive director‘s ownership to 
moderate the relationship. 
 
Some evidence from so many studies highlighted that non-executive directors are in 
a position to check and balance the activities of board which could improve board 
efficiency and more effective through the reduction of agency disagreements 
between managers of the firm and owners of the firm (Liao & Lu, 2009), they also 
assist to ensure that firms are chasing stakeholders' interests which is strongly aligned 
with their goal (Arena, Bozzolan, & Michelon, 2014; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). That 
result to better position with stakeholders' interests, which should in turn increase 
transparency, increase better prospect of quality social and environmental 
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information distribution (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Chobpichien et al., 2008). Based 
on that, the following hypotheses are formed: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the board independence and CSED 
quality. 
 
4.6.2 Relationship between Board Size and CSED Quality 
 
The dimension of the board is as vital CGM and this has been an area under 
discussion for financial reporting scholars. In accordance with agency thoery, a 
board with large members has superior and well monitoring competency (Eugene, 
Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007) hence, is considered as a powerful 
governance instrument in monitoring performance of management. The higher 
number board‘s members the more possibility to yield better demonstration of 
independent directors who are highly experienced (Leblanc, 2007) therefore, could 
affect opportunism of management negatively by altering interest on CSED (Sun, 
Salama, Hussainey, & Habbash, 2010). But from the perspective of stakeholder 
theory, however, it is argued that the larger the numbers of directors on board the 
higher the increase in the diversity of composition of board. Thus, the size of a board 
improves a corporation's capacity to comprehend and tackle the mixture of 
numerous interests of stakeholder (Welford, 2007), which in turn promotes better 
transparency in addition to more details for disclosure be it environmental or 
otherwise (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Gul & Leung, 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 
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2005). Furthermore, it improves decision and rising harmony among stakeholders 
(Abidin et al., 2000; Ho & Williams, 2003). In terms of processing of information, 
larger boards improve capabilities of information-processing in addition to the 
quality of recommendations set for firm‘s management, which results in good 
picture of various interest of stakeholder, since their performance may not be 
vulnerable to managerial supremacy compare to the board that is small in terms of 
size (Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain, & Yao, 2009). 
 
Many studies depicts that large boards usually assist in governance task of the 
organisational board which served as control mechanisms (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; 
Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). It is generally believed by scholars that, the size of the 
board has direct bearing on the composition of the board in terms of mixed 
professionalisms as the chance of having various professionals such as, financial 
experts, legal professional and environmentalist could be very high due to the size of 
the board (Welford, 2007; Xie, Davidson, & Dadalt, 2003). Moreover, large boards 
determine organisational commitments on vital issues that could result in control of 
social and/or environmental uncertainties (Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; 
Pfeffer, 1972), thereby enhancing corporate performance (Cheng, 2008; Dwivedi & 
Jain, 2005). 
 
Some studies suggested that, large boards can be dysfunctional (Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Khanchel, 2007). In line with that Raheja (2005) suggests 
that board size impedes the board‘s ability to chase long-term objectives due to 
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disputes that may arise in the process of performing their duty. In their studies 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) disagree with the previous studies as  they emphasize 
on agency disagreements, conflicts among parties and the problem of supervision as 
the major problem of larger board. Nevertheless, this could only be possible if the 
board is very large in size. The conflicts could be as a result of miss-coordination 
which in turn affects decision making negatively, thus, results in board inefficiency 
(Cheng, 2008; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Gonzalez & André, 2014). Nevertheless, the 
difficulties found could be offset by the increase in board‘s monitoring capability 
(Raheja, 2005) and they could significantly reduce problems via the creation and 
utilisation of subcommittees in order to improve the coordination especially that of 
disclosure issues (Rahman & Ali, 2006). 
 
Despite so many attempts by studies on board size and general disclosure, empirically, 
there is limited evidence on the relationship between board size and CSED. While 
Cormier et al. (2011), Huang & Kung (2010) and Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan 
(2011) established positive relationship between board size and CED, some could 
not establish any relationship between board size and sustainability/CED (see 
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Other studies also proved to establish a negative 
association between board sized and social and/or environmental disclosure (Arcay 
& Vazquez, 2005; Cormier et al., 2010). 
 
In relation to stakeholder and agency theory, this study therefore, argued that, the 
larger the size of the board the better the mechanism of disclosure thereby resulting 
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in CSED increase (Halme & Huse, 1997; Ho & Williams, 2003) therefore, increase 
high expectation of CSED diffusion. In line with this view, this study argued that 
the more the number of directors on board the better the flow of communication and 
information with diverse stakeholders through quality CSED. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are derived: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between board size and CSED quality. 
  
4.6.3 Relationship between Board Meetings and CSED Quality 
 
In process of measuring the effectiveness of board, the frequencies of annual meetings 
by board members play a vital role. According to Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui, (2006) 
the number of board meeting could be seen as the persistence and watchfulness of 
board in discharging their functions and duties as monitoring mechanisms. This is 
in consistent with agency theory, which signifies that frequent meeting by board 
members is a sign of good and sound CGM (Khanchel, 2007). According to Brick 
and Chidambaran (2010) the more the firm efficiency in setting the number of its 
board meetings, the better the control of agency costs. That means, board activities if 
represented by frequency of meeting, affects the decision of the board that perform 
as an active watching mechanism in controlling the conflict that may arise from 
agency (Xie et al., 2003). This is because, an increase in monitoring mechanism is 
expected to reduce information asymmetry in addition to reduction of agency costs, 
which will in turn increase disclosures (Chou et al., 2013). In that regards, is 
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recommended that the frequency of meetings by boards should be encouraged in the 
events of  persistent monitoring and control is needed for disclosure improvement 
(Shivdasani & Yermack, 2014; Vafeas, 1999). 
 
In line with stakeholder however, having board meetings frequently would improve 
the effectiveness of the board (Conger, Finegold, & Lawler, 1998) in addition to its 
ability to tackle interest of various stakeholders of an organisation, thus, this could 
impact disclosure positively. According to Hoque, Islam and Azam, (2013) frequent 
board meetings would enhance communication among directors and that would 
facilitate good distribution of responsibility and the assignments of committees, 
which lead to increase in effective decisions of board and increased transparency 
among the stakeholders (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010). Some scholars argued that 
frequency of board meetings could improve the quality of reporting in addition to the 
to its positive impact on disclosure (Chobpichien, 2008). Furthermore, a board that 
meets frequently mostly concentrates on social and/or environmental issues among 
other issues. Consequently, the lower the number of board meetings the high chance 
that board effectiveness could not be compromised. According to Demb and 
Neubauer (1992) lower board meetings frequency affects the boards negatively on 
their mission for building the strength and effort of an organisations collectively. 
 
There were evidence empirical findings on board which provide those points that are 
responsible for the effectiveness of board among which board meetings is included 
(Berghe et al., 2004) even though it was not, on the aspect of CSED research, 
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previously addressed. However, Laksmana (2008) conducted a study on board 
meetings and found that, the more the meetings of the board the high the chance of 
transparency of an organisation. In other words, there is sufficient evidence of 
positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings and voluntary 
disclosure (CSED inclusive). Nevertheless, in their analysis, Cormier et al. (2010) 
found no evidence of relationship between board meetings regularly and voluntary 
CED. Similarly, Nelson, Gallery, and Percy, (2010) established an insignificant 
association among the frequency of board meetings and the nature of, including its 
extent, executive stock option disclosed in the financial reports of firms in Australia. 
 
Considering the argument established from the literature above, it could be argued 
that, the frequency of board meetings regularly, has direct bearing on board 
watching, improves the effectiveness of board, stimulates transparency, enhances 
and straightening the stakeholder‘s relationship, reduces conflict between the 
stakeholders and finally decreases information asymmetry. This could be done by 
provision of additional time in order to address social and/or environmental issues 
which in turn promote the quality of disclosure. It is therefore argue that, the boards 
of directors who increase the frequency of their meetings have high chance of 
provision of quality CSED. In line with this argument, this study, anticipates that 
the frequency of board meetings could impact positively on CSED quality. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H3: There is a positive association between the board meetings and CSED quality. 
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4.6.4 Relation between Directors’ Qualifications and CSED Quality 
 
The qualification of directors on board, represented by the education of the 
directors, could affect the disclosure and behaviour of reporting firms. Some 
researchers like Gray (1988) emphasised that education is one of the major 
ingredients of the system of accounting and might reflect on the disclosure of 
accounting issues. For example, a manager that is highly educated will certainly 
understand various stakeholders interest due to his exposure that arise from 
educational background (Gul & Leung, 2004; Welford, 2007). In their study 
Merchant, Chow and Wu (1995) claim that, a manager or director who obtained 
western education could implement new thinking in addition to values in an 
organisation which could impact positively to the disclosure of such organisation. 
Meanwhile Wallace and Cooke (1990) similarly maintained that the more the level of 
education of directors in a given organisation, the more the increase of responsiveness 
on corporate organisational accountability, thus improve on disclosure and this is 
supported by Bushee and Noe (2000).  
 
According to Haniffa and Cooke (2000) those directors that have accounting and/or 
business qualification as their background of study could report information 
adequately than those who do not have such qualifications. In addition, Peters and 
Romi (2014) disclosed that the qualification of directors in terms of education could 
play a significant role in their attitude and methodology on CED be it re-active or as 
pro-active in their decision. Thus, this study argued that, the more the percentage of 
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directors with accounting, finance and/or business, or any combination of both 
background, the more the improve on CSED quality. Even though research on this 
area is at primitive stage however, there is a difficulty on establishing empirical 
evidence on the education of directors and the quality of CSED. Nevertheless, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2000) conducted a study in Malaysia but on voluntary 
disclosure generally and established an insignificant association, Barako, Hancock 
and Izan (2006) also found the relationship between the number of board members 
with accounting and/or business with voluntary disclosure to be positive. Therefore, 
this study prose that: 
 
H4: There is a positive association between the number of directors with 
accounting, finance and/or business qualifications and CSED quality. 
 
4.6.5 Relation between Board Committees and CSED Quality 
 
One of the key elements of CGM is the board of directors. It plays a significant role 
in corporate governance among which is the delegation of duties to board 
committees for more efficiency and effectiveness. Researchers are on the view that, 
the committees set up by board be it audit, risk management, compensation, 
remuneration and even on social or environmental or both (if there is any) could be 
an indication of seriousness by board members on corporate responsibility be it 
social or environmental responsibility. The committee is expected to strike the 
balance on the variation of interests among the stakeholders and their respective 
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organisations (Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2015). Among other things, the committee is 
normally responsible for look over the overall issues which include CSER; 
identification of non-financial risks including its management related risk; 
establishment standards in addition to policies; watching the compliance of standard 
and policies of the firms on disclosure which include CSER; studying and adjustment 
of organisational disclosure on CSER and supervision of humanitarian activities 
(Mackenzie, 2007). Other researchers assert that, the presence of committees ought 
to deliver a message to the organisation about the interest, reputation and the 
significance of disclosure which could improve social and environmental matters 
(Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Devilliers et al., 2011; McKendall, Sánchez, & 
Sicilian, 1999) including environmental disclosure practices (Cowen, Ferari, & 
Parker, 1987). 
 
Consistent with agency theory, Peters and Romi (2014) documented that the 
committees will carry out positive tactics which have positive impact on 
environmental issues. The committee could play a vital role on identification and 
control of the determinants of the major social and environmental apprehensions 
which could influence the entire performance of an organisation (Frias-Aceituno, 
Rodriguez-Ariza, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2013). Thus, any failure to have these 
committees essential could lead to a decrease in social and environmental 
responsibility role which may undermine shareholders' long-term interest (Orlitzky, 
2008). Furthermore, companies with more committee tends to reveal enough on 
environmental details than those who does have less, since the committee will ensure 
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that the management of the organisation establish accountable method of reporting 
system via an organised and planned disclosure guidelines which include 
environmental disclosure coupled with its related  recommendations. Consequently, 
the more the committees in firms  the more the effectiveness and watching 
mechanisms for enhancement of disclosure include CSED in relation to its 
stakeholders (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). This is in line with some researchers 
whose sees board committees as a tool of board efficiency and effectiveness, which 
is the more the boards the more the effectiveness of the board (Cohen et al., 2014; 
Engel et al., 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, from the stakeholder point of view, provide that, the presence of 
committees shows a commitment on planned attitude of an organisation towards 
stakeholders interest (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Ullmann, 1985). The committee 
most at time among other things ensure good and quality of both policies and 
regulations of firms in respect of  disclosure which include both social and 
environmental disclosure and this is coupled with the fulfilment of stakeholders 
expectations (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Peters & Romi, 2014). Likewise, 
Hajkowicz (2008) insist that, the presence of committees promotes public 
enlightenments among the stakeholders which in turn, shows how strong is the 
governance of the board on disclosure hence, could be positively linked with the 





There are a lot of difficulties on finding some empirical studies on the association 
among the presence of committees include CSER and CSED. For instance while, 
McKendall et al. (1999), Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) could not establish an 
association between the presence of social responsibility committee and disclosure, 
Peters and Romi (2014) reported a positive relationship between the CER 
committee presence and CED among other committees. In addition, Hassan and 
Ibrahim (2012) documented a positive linked between the presence of committees 
and quantity and the quality of CSD. 
 
Due to the literature establishment on the subject matter however, in line with the 
agency and stakeholder‘s theory, this study argue that the presence of committees of 
at least three, could monitor and address the conflicting interest among the 
stakeholders of an organisation through the board effectiveness. Therefore, this study 
argued that, the more the presence of committees, the more the CSED quality. Thus, 
this study formulates the hypotheses: 
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the board committees and CSED 
quality. 
 
4.6.6 The Relationship between Audit Committee Independence and CSEDQL 
 
Audit is a process of confirmation of accountability and compliance of both financial 
and non-financial  procedures couple with due process of an organisation which also 
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portray transparency in such organisation (Choi, Kim, Kim, & Zang, 2010; Goodwin-
Stewait & Kent, 2006). For proper accountability and compliance, many organisations 
form a committee of auditors that will ensure compliance and transparency. This 
committee of auditors is one aspect of governance mechanism that monitor disclosure 
of an organisations which include CSED (Goodwin-Stewait & Kent, 2006; Weir, 
Laing, & McKnight, 2002). The said committee is in charge of the procedures of 
reporting standard of financial and non-financial issues on an annual report of 
companies (Abbott et al., 2004). The committee may comprise of both executive 
and non-executive directors. The ratio of non-executive directors in the committee 
indicates the level of independency of the committee (Lennox & Park, 2007). 
There is also believe that the more the audit committee independence the more the  
performance and effectiveness of the committee (Xie et al., 2003). This is because, 
the committee could performed better to accomplished  its objectives, hence better 
transparency and increase in standard  (Abbott et al., 2004). For avoidance of doubt, 
Robinso and Owens-Jackson (2010) disclosed that, any committee that is effective 
could contribute positively for the achievement of the board  in discharging its 
responsibilities.  
 
From the stakeholders and agency perspective however, it could be argue that 
committee of audit could play a significant role on proper financial reporting system, 
since it is governance mechanisms that monitor the functions of audit (Piot & 
Thornton, 2009),this in turn reduce the cost of agency (Ho & Wong, 2001) thereby, 
promotes  the disclosure quality and proper reporting guidelines (Cotter & Silvester, 
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2003; Nelson et al., 2010). Consequently, the committee of auditors should be able 
to develop the standard and quality of the information movement among the 
managers, shareholders and the stakeholders (Barako et al., 2006). It is also expected 
to promote transparency via the credible information so revealed (He, Labelle, 
Piot, & Thornton, 2008) , thus maintain and protect the interest of stakeholders. 
Moreover, Forker (1992) believed on the independence of audit committees, this is 
because, it possibly will make internal control more effective thereby the quality of 
the organisation disclosure will definitely improve. 
 
Limited studies empirically could be in existence so far regarding the connexion 
between the independence of audit committee and CSED quality. Nevertheless, some 
studies empirically shows that there is positive relationship between audit 
committee and the disclosure but voluntary disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Ho & 
Shun Wong, 2001). In the same way, O‘Sullivan, Percy and Stewart (2007) disclosed 
that the presence of audit committee, the independence of such committee as well 
impact the forward looking details of disclosure positively. However, in terms of 
stock option statutory disclosure of the executive, Nelson et al. (2010) investigate the 
relationship between the two in Australia and documented positive association 
between them. 
 
For the reason specified above, it could be deduced that, independence of audit 
committees could reduce the conflicts that arise from agency, control of large 
interest of stakeholders and improvement on the credibility of disclosure in terms of 
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practice and procedures. Therefore, this study argued that audit committee 
independence is positively related to CSED quality. Thus, the hypothesis is 
formulated as: 
 
H6: There is a positive relationship between audit committee independence and 
CSED quality. 
 
4.6.7 Non-Executive Directors Ownership as a Moderator 
 
Researchers from different various field of disclosure argued that the ownership 
of a firm is expected to eradicate agency problems that exists between managers 
and shareholders of the company (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Dey, 2008; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Singh & Davidson III, 2003). For example, Ang et al. 
(2000) suggested that, even though non-executive directors are expected to be the 
highest controlling mechanism on the board, their roles would be more effective 
if they have significant shares in the company. Thus, the more the shares held by 
non-executive directors of a firm, the more they monitor the firms‘ management and 
performance thereby, resulting into increase on disclosure (Conyon, 2000; Zattoni 
& Cuomo, 2010). According to Mohd, Ghazali and Weetman (2006), the larger 
the amount of equity interests by the non-executive directors the greater the incentive 
for the directors to monitor the management. As long as the stakeholders rely on 
published financial statements, in the case of this study refer to CSED, non-
executive directors with stock in the firm are expected to be more serious in ensuring 
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that the quality of the disclosure is high, so that it will be valuable to all the 
stakeholders in addition to the resolution of conflicts among the firms and 
stakeholders. 
 
According to Pergola (2005), the directors on board with high shares have more 
influence on internal control systems, under audit committee watch. Therefore, the 
more the audit committee effectiveness, the more the board will monitor the CSED 
(Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010), that served as an important role of the board. 
 
In the empirical studies by Chau and Gray (2002) documented that board ownership 
is positively and significantly connected with disclosure. In addition, Akhtaruddin 
et al. (2009) disclosed a significant positive association between shareholdings 
owns by directors on board and disclosure of listed firms in Malaysia. Other studies 
found that board ownership is connected to a higher chance of conservatism in 
accounting (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Lara, Osma, & Penalva, 2007), and positively 
associated with CED (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006). In addition, the independent 
directors promote the effectiveness of audit committee for reduction of information 
asymmetry and this is done through decreasing the negative impact of director‘s 
ownership on voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010). 
 
Theoretically, non-executive director‘s ownership is expected to address stakeholders 
concerned and conflicts as postulated by stakeholder‘s theory since they paid more 
attention to financial disclosure which include corporate social and environmental 
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disclosure, this is in addition to the role it may play on CGM since effectiveness of the 
non-executive directors can reduce information asymmetry attributed with agency 
problems (Acerete et al., 2011). This is real as they have power to oversee financial 
reporting practice and procedures. The argument also reveal that they will have 
influence positively on executive directors on board, positive influence on board 
meetings by encouraging and attending meetings frequently, have positive influence 
on the qualification of directors, positive influence on presence of CER and finally, 
positive influence on the audit committee independence as discussed above. Thus, 
non-executive director ownership of a company increase disclosure practices in 
financial reporting. Since the non-executive director‘s ownership is an important 
element to ensure adequate oversight of managements‘ disclosure procedures and 
practice, hence the CSED enhancement, therefore it is hypothesized that: 
 
H7a: Non-executive director‘s ownership moderates the relationship between board 
independence and CSED quality.  
H7b: Non-executive director‘s ownership moderates the relationship between board 
size and CSED quality. 
H7c: Non-executive director‘s ownership moderates the relationship between board 
meetings and CSED quality. 
H7d: Non-executive director‘s ownership moderates the relationship between 
directors‘ qualification and CSED quality. 
H7e: Non-executive director‘s ownership moderates the relationship between board 
committees and CSED quality. 
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H7f: Non-executive director‘s ownership moderates the relationship between audit 
committee independence and CSED quality. 
 
4.7 Summary of the Chapter 
 
The chapter discussed and established the theoretical framework as well as 
development of hypotheses. The chapter also presents the framework of the study. 
Hypotheses are also developed base on the objectives of this study. Based on this, 







Previous chapter discussed and established the hypotheses in line with the objectives 
of this study. Considering the main objective of this study, therefore, this chapter 
discussed the methodology, the research design, the population and the sample of the 
study. In addition, the chapter defined and discussed the measurement of all the 
variables. Technique of data analysis, expression of model and model specification 
also are detailed in this chapter.  
 
5.2 Research Design 
 
According to Toledo-Pereyra, (2012) research design is a strategy that involve 
gathering of data for examination in line with the objectives of the research. There 
are so many research design it depend on the objectives of the study (Stapleton, 
2005). Among which are: survey research design, experimental research design, case 
study research design, descriptive research design, historical research design and 
correlational research design among others (Nieveen et al., 2006). However, this 
study utilized descriptive and correlational research design to examine the 
relationship between CGM and CSED quality with non-executive director‘s 
ownership as a moderator. This study used documented data extracted from annual 
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financial report from Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). The choice of the design is as 
a result of justifiable research on investigational purpose while using secondary data.  
 
5.3 Method and Sources of Data 
 
The type of data to be used on CGM and CSED is secondary type. This is extracted 
from annual financial report of listed firms in NSE. This is considered for a period of 
five years, ranging from 2010 to 2014 inclusive. The selection of this period is as a 
result of the following. The period is a post financial crisis period where so many 
companies collapse. The period is also a period of merging so many financial 
institutions like banks in Nigeria (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2013). In addition, 
specifically, the time frame was the time of stakeholder‘s agitation against social 
and environmental hazard as reported by the Nigerian Minister of Environment. 
Furthermore, the period was where so many firms paid more attention to CGM 
practices in order to protect the interest of all the parties including stakeholders 
(Central Bank of Nigeria, 2013). At the same time, it was the period that regulatory 
authorities in Nigeria carried out so many reforms in order to strengthening the 
firm‘s practices to avoid failure from the past. In addition, it was the period where 






5.4 Population of the Study 
 
The population of the current study composes of all listed firms in Nigeria. In other 
words, all firms listed on NSE. This is because; the firms are required by law to 
publish their financial statement annually. As at 31st December, 2014, the population 
of the listed firms in Nigeria was 203 companies. The listed companies are 
composed of financial and non-financial companies. These include consumer goods, 
industrial goods, oil and gas industries, financial and services, telecommunication 
industries, natural resources industries, conglomerates industries, construction/real 
estate industries, healthcare and agricultural industries as seen in Table 5.1 
 
Table 5.1 
Population of the Study 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange 
 
The inclusion of finance is as a result of the social responsibility issues. The issue of 
CSR involved all the firms irrespective of the type of firms provide it operates in the 
                     





1  Agricultural 5 3 
2  Conglomerates 8 5 
3  Construction/Real Estate 10 5 
4  Consumer Goods 27 18 
5  Financial Services 58 28 
6  Healthcare 14 5 
7  Industrial Goods 24 10 
8  Information/Communication  12 4 
9  Natural Resources                                              6 2 
10  Oil and Gas 14 7 
11  Services 25 13 
  Total 203 100 
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environment. In addition, it is argued that all the companies in Nigeria irrespective of 
its mode of operation pollute the environment. This is because in Nigeria, there is no 
24 hours electricity, thus, compelling the companies to use generators for their 
operations to be successful and the generators also emit carbon which destroy the 
atmosphere and it is not environmentally friendly. Unless a firm is not listed in NSE 
in between 2010-2014 or absence of data on CGM and CSED in the years under 
consideration, all listed firms were considered. Out of the 203 mentioned only 100 
have financial statement available from 2010 to 2014. Therefore, this study utilised 
the available 100 companies that have their financial report at the time of 
conducting the research. 
 
5.5 Data Collection and Measurement Process 
 
The annual reports of the companies were accessed from Nigerian Stock Exchange 
Commission office in Abuja capital city of Nigeria. This is because majority of the 
companies have limited softcopies thus, not fully available. The period of the data 
collection was nine months and all the variables measurement were obtained from 
the annual reports of the companies. 
 
The dependent variables, which is the quality of CSED, is measured on three steps 
as follows; i- an organised checklist driven from GRI guideline as quality 
indicators are constructed; ii- after the checklist then the coding system which is 
‗0‘ and ‗1‘ is used; iii- finally, the disclosure quality of the social and 
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environmental information is calculated on content analysis basis with a simple un-
weighted average formula. Thus, an index is formulated from the three steps above 
which are used as measurement for quality of CSED in this study. This is in line 
with GRI guideline using annual financial reports of listed firms in Nigeria.  
 
5.5.1 Content Analysis 
 
The content analysis is a major technique in social sciences studies especially in 
disclosure issues (Forman & Damschroder, 2007). It is seen as a technique in 
research which make reproductable as well as effective interpretations extracted 
from data and in accordance with their context (Harwood & Garry, 2003). Thus, 
accounting discipline is not in isolation as content analysis is generally utilised in 
either determining the measurement of social disclosure and/or environmental 
disclosure (see Cormier et al., 2005; Gray et al., 1995; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
Magness, 2006). According to Duriau, Reger and Pfarrer (2007) definition of 
content analysis, data is said to be gathered through codification of qualitative 
information into quantitative form of scaling which could be allow for inferences.   
 
It has so many advantages among which objectivity and reliability are core in 
addition to the validity and consideration of the volume of the data used. One of 
distinguished characteristic of content analysis is that information is measured and 
coded in a systemic and reliable way (Krippendorff, 2004). White and Marsh (2006) 
describe content analysis method of measurement as the most objective form of 
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qualitative information measurement. In addition, Campbell (2003) revealed that for 
proper quality measurement, content analysis is recommended due its numerous 
advantages over other methods.  
 
5.5.2 Companies’ Annual Reports 
 
This is generally a document formally available annually produced by firms that serve 
as message and communiqué for investors, stockholders and customers. This is also 
served as a sampling unit. Due to its content however, majority of CSD and CED 
studies utilised the annual report for their analysis as a source of information (Gibson 
& O‘donovan, 2007; Gray, 2010). According to Zahra, Neubaum, and Huse (1997) an 
annual report is a secondary source of data. Thus, an annual report is utilised in this 
research to survey the CSED in Nigerian listed firms for the period of five years 
ranging from 2010 till 2014. The years under considerations is attributed to some 
changes on CGM made by Nigerian SEC. In addition, it is the years where the 
Nigerian Ministry of Environment complained on firms social and environmental 
issues. The period is also post financial crisis period where so many companies 
collapsed. The period is also a period of merging so many financial institutions like 
banks in Nigeria (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2013). At the same time, it was the period 
that regulatory authorities in Nigeria carried out so many reforms in order to 




5.5.3 Checklist of the Dependent Variable 
 
Disclosure checklists are usually extensive that are disclosed in annual reports of 
firm. A checklist which includes expected social and environmental specifics 
information is usually prepared based on prior research. This has extensively been 
confirmed in CSD and/or CED practices (e,g Berthelot, Cormier, & Magnan, 
2003; Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008). However, GRI checklist is 
utilise by the current study (Global Reporting Initiative, 2011). Consequently, this 
study identified operational measures of GRI guidelines which will help in covering 
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Checklist CODE No. of 
Items 
   

















   














Security Practices HR8  1 
Indigenous 
Rights 
HR9  1 
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PR8  1 
Compliance PR9   1 
 Sub-Total 2  22 
  Total (Sum of Sub-Total 
1&2) 
 29 
Source: GRI-G3, 2011 
 
Table 5.2, is the social and environmental checklist extracted from GRI-G3 2011 
guideline. The code is for each of the items under social and environmental 
checklist. For example, environmental check list has 7 items coded from EN1 to 
EN30. Where EN stand for environmental checklist. Meanwhile, social checklist 
is categorized into four. These are Labour Practice and Decent Work, Human 
Rights, Society and Product Responsibility with checklist of fourteen items ranging 
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from LA1 to LA14, nine items from HR1 to HR9, eight items from SO1 to SO8 and 
nine items from PR1 to PR9 respectively. The items for environmental and are 
carefully selected to suit the Nigerian situation as some of the checklist are not 
recognized in Nigerian corporate organisations.  
 
After carefully studied the GRI guideline with full consideration to Nigerian context, 
therefore, the study arrived at total checklist of 29. This is because, other items are 
not suitable to Nigerian context. For example, Nigeria is not involved on the terms of 
the Basel Convention Annex I, II, III, and VIII, and percentage of transported waste 
shipped internationally which is in the GRI guideline and checklist. This can be 
attributed to the fact that, the country consumed and not produced, therefore, the 
condition set internationally is not relevant to Nigeria context, but for those countries 
that produce and export and not import which is the case of Nigeria. 
 
5.5.4 Process of Coding 
 
The study employed coding process which assigned a value on each of the social 
and/or environmental disclosure checklist found in the annual report of the listed 
firms in Nigeria. The coding captured all the information as identified in the 
disclosure, thus, a value is then assign to the items for meaningful analysis 
(Campbell, 2004). The decision for environmental disclosure items is based on 
performance indicators developed by GRI (GRI, 2011). This is because, an organised 
decision processes improve the objectivity and reliability of the study, therefore, 
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allow for replication by other researchers  as explained by Krippendorff (2004). One 
of the methods of measuring content analysis is scoring system based on checklist 
(Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). Others include counting number of words (see 
Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000), counting number of sentences (see Milne & Adler, 1999; 
Jose & Lee, 2007) and taking the proportions of pages (Gray et al., 1995; Guthrie 
& Parker, 1989). 
 
This study however, employs scoring system based on GRI-checklist, in which a 
scale of coded items is used. The reason for the use of such scale is because the 
method suits the study purposes than counting of words, sentences or proportion of 
pages (Cormier et al., 2010). 
 
5.5.5 The coding of CSED Quality  
 
The quality of social and environmental disclosure is coded using checklist derived 
from GRI guideline as earlier stated. To be  in  consistent with Clarkson et al. 
(2008) and Cormier et al. (2004) approach, CSED quality in this study is define in 
line with information acknowledged by GRI guideline for each of the social and 
environmental indicator, and the rating of the quality is allocated as 0 = 
nondisclosure (represent non-disclosure); and 1 = disclosure (represent disclosure) 
(Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008). It can be argued that the 
information above may improve stakeholders‘ perspective, hence, increased the 
credibility of a firm‘s reporting. 
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5.6 Measurement of CSED Quality and their Indices 
 
The disclosure index is derived from the checklist for the quality of total CSED. 
These indices mostly is applied in accounting studies, especially those researches 
involve financial reports. In getting the indices it comes out with single figure as a 
summary indicator which could be the entire contents of firm‘s reports or a specific 
aspects such as CSED (see Coy & Dixon, 2004; Hooks, Coy, & Davey, 2002). 
According to Haniffa and Cook, (2005) the index disclosure is a proportion of the 
actual scores assigned for disclosure in a given firm as percentage up to the 
expected maximum disclosure required. 
 
There are two types of disclosure indexes which include weighted and un-weighted 
indexes (Cormier et al., 2005). According to Hooks, Tooley, and Basnan (2012) 
disclosure indexes is common in voluntary disclosure literature. They are weighted 
(see Cormier et al., 2005) and un-weighted (e.g Ghazali, 2007). According to Barako, 
Hancock, and Izan (2006) weighted index seem to be biased since it considered 
weight base on each category while un-weighted index is non-bias as it considered all 
the items of the same weight simply because,  to give weight to all the checklist is not 
justifiable as one cannot differentiate them on their importance, thus, a values of ―0‖ 
and ―1‖ for disclosure and nondisclosure are normally used. Therefore, un-weighted 




5.6.1 CSED Quality Index 
 
This study formulates a framework for the analysis of CSED quality. Specifically, 
CSED quality is measured based on GRI (2011) guidelines, on an allocated scale of 
zero as non-disclosure and one for disclosure. After consideration of scoring scale, a 
summation of quality score is awarded to CSED in the checklist. This is done by 
summing the total scores available in the disclosure of the firms and divided by 
total expected score which is 29 in the case of this study. Hence, total CSED quality 
index is calculated as the proportion of total available scores attributed to the 
maximum scores which a firm could earn to meet up the quality of CSED.  
 
Therefore, CSED quality index of a firm is calculated using the equation below: 
                            
 CSEDQ   = ∑
   
    
 
                                
Where: - 
CSEDSQ  = Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure Quality, 
SEQ          = Social and Environmental Quality Scores,  
MX DQ    = Maximum disclosure quality scores for this study is 29.  
 
5.6.2 Validity of CSED Quality Measurement 
 
According to Joseph and Taplin (2011) there are need for various tests to assess the 
validity of the index of any disclosure. The validity means the instrument which is 
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used for the measurement of a concept represent the intended concept (Polit & 
Beck, 2006). There are two types of validity disclosure indices which are content 
validity and construct validity. 
 
According to Saitta, Raphael, and Smith (2007) content validity guarantees on the 
measurement as a true representation of the concept in question. Meanwhile 
Sekaran (2006) disclosed that, for construct validity, correlation analysis is a proper 
method to be applicable in this scenario. Therefore, due to the fact that correlation is 
common in previous studies on disclosure for validity analysis (Botosan, 1997; 
Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Richardson & Welker, 2001), it will proper for this study 
to also employ such for consistency. Therefore, correlation analysis is employed on 
the total CSED variables. In line with this, the correlation between the indices of 
CSED quality and all independent variables is investigated as seen in Table 6.3.  
 
5.7 Definition of Variables and Measurement  
 
The following portrays the variables definition and their measurement from the 
quality of CSED and CGM relationship.  
 
5.7.1 Social and Environmental Disclosure Quality 
 
Social and environmental disclosure is define in this study in line with GRI, (2011), 
as the disclosure of labour practice and decent, human right, society and products, 
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material, energy, water and emission on the company‘s annual financial reporting. 
Quality has different meanings to different people. Gao (2010), argues that the 
quality definition should be set by standard setters or professionals on established 
frameworks so that it portray the image of quality in the eyes of the users of the 
disclosure. Consistent with Clarkson et al. (2008) approach, CSED quality is 
measured in line with GRI guideline. 
 
Disclosure quality is defined in terms of their quantification nature, be it quantitative 
and declarative (Raar, 2007) which include the monetary and non-monetary 
disclosure, declarative disclosure is expressed in qualitative terms or descriptive in 
nature. The dependent variable, CSED quality, is measured with un-weighted 
disclosure index that is established in line with GRI to assess the informational 
content. Hence, total CSED quality index is ascertained as the proportion of total 
quality score obtained from the firms to total available scores awarded.  
 
5.7.2 Corporate Governance Variables 
 
The governance variables is compose of board independence, board size, board 
meetings, directors' qualifications, board committees and the independence of audit 
committee. Meanwhile the moderating variable is non-executive director‘s 




5.7.2.1 Board Independence 
 
According to Ayuso and Argandoña (2009) board independence as an extent to 
which members of the board are dependent from firms‘ CEO currently. This is 
considered as outside directors in so many studies. That means they are not in any 
way part of  managers of an organisation, (Laux, 2008). According to Lim, 
Matolcsy, and Chow (2007) the independent directors should be free from the usual 
activities of the company in line with management issues rather be a professional 
and a watch dog on an organisational management issues. In addition, Chen, Firth, 
Gao and Rui (2006) attributes their role to be the dissolution of agency conflicts that 
may arise from various interest of managers and shareholders which could be 
replacements of senior managers among others. Therefore, board independence is 
measured as the number non-executive directors to total number of board.  
 
5.7.2.2 Board Size 
 
According to Zahra and Pearce (1989) board size is refers to the total number of both 
executive and non-executive directors who serve on the board of an organisation. 






5.7.2.3 Board Meetings 
 
In this study board meetings is considered to be frequency or rate at which meeting 
is held annually as organised by the board. According to Sahu and Manna (2013) the 
number of meeting mostly shows how dedication and control of the board in 
discharging their duties and functions. Therefore, in consistence with Liu and Li 
(2008) the board meeting frequency is measured as the total number of meetings by 
firms annually (Liu & Li, 2008). 
 
5.7.2.4 Directors' Qualifications  
 
Directors‘ qualifications reflect the educational background of directors. This is seen 
in this study as education of the directors base on their various specialisations. Is said 
to be the background of the directors that has some consequences in accounting 
profession (Ismail, 2009). Consequently, education of directors could play a positive 
and significant role on CSED (Peters & Romi, 2014). This study used the 
measurement of directors‘ qualification as the total number of directors with 
accounting or business and/or finance qualification and any other related discipline. 
 
5.7.2.5 Board Committees 
 
The number of committees found on board is also an indication of commitment in to 
quality of disclosure (these include social and environmental) and the behaviour of 
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an organisation with respect to disclosure (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Upadhyay et 
al., 2014). According to Peters and Romi (2014) the presence of the committees 
could contribute on determination and identification of various issues on social and 
environmental disclosure of an organisation. As the board use to control and monitor 
the activities of the company in respect of social and environmental concerns which 
could be in the form of review of policies and reporting guideline and standards in 
line with the current challenges facing the organisation (Mackenzie, 2007). 
Therefore, board committee is measured in this study as ―1‖ if an organisation has at 
least three committees on board with ―0‖ if the organisation has less than three 
committees on board (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007). 
 
5.7.2.6 Audit Committee Independence 
 
As one of the CGM, audit committees is seen as been responsible to oversee the 
reporting process of firms finance thereby confirming the objectives of the external 
audit conducted on a firm (Uzun, Szewczyk, & Varma, 2004). The said committee be 
duty-bound to assist the board on their role and responsibilities bound on them 
(Sharma, 2004; Weir et al., 2002). To be in consistent with Ayuso and Argandoña 
(2009) this study sees audit committee independence as the level at which the 
members of audit committee are not dependent on their chief executive officers 
(hence forth called CEO). It is also requirements set by Nigerian SEC that, firms 
must have more non-executive auditors on audit committee where by the Nigerian 
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SEC portray  that, it determines the  level of independency of the board or 
committee. 
 
Therefore, the independence of audit committee is used as the proportion of non-
executive directors in the committee. Table 5.3 is the summary of the variables, 




















 Table 5.3 
Operationalization of the Variables 






CSED quality is define as 
the qualities of information 
identified by GRI guideline 
for social and environmental 
indicator specified in the 
GRI (2011) guidelines 
Based on GRI social 
and environmental 
checklist, for each 
checklist, 1 represent 
disclosure and 0 non-
disclosure. Finally, the 
total items disclosed 
divided by total 
possible items as 








    
Board 
Independence 
Board independence is the 
number of non-executive 
directors which refers to 
outside directors. 
This is the ratio of 
non-executive 
directors to total 
board of directors 
Ayuso & 
Argandoña




    
Board Size Board size refers to the total 
number of both executive and 
non-executive directors on 
board 
This is the total 





    
Board 
Meetings  
Board meetings refer to the 
frequency of meeting held by 
board members annually 
This is the total 
number of meetings 
held in a year 
Liu and Li, 
(2008) 




refers to the specialization in 
terms of education of the 
directors 
This is the number of 
directors with 
business, accounting, 
finance and other 







This is the presence of 
committees on board which 
include audit, risk, 
remuneration among others 
This is measured as a 
dummy variable with 
the value of ―1‖ if the 
company has at least 
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This is the degree to which 
audit committee members are 
not dependent on the CEO 
This is a proportion 
of independent non-
executive directors in 









This is the stock own by non-
executive directors among the 
board of directors. 
 
This is the total 











This is the total monetary 
worthiness of a firm in terms 
assets size of the company  
Corporate size is 








Industry This is the type of the 




This is measured as a 
dummy variable with 
the value of ―1‖ for 
environmentally 
sensitive company 







Profitability This is the profit yield 
annually from the operation of 
the company‘s business  
The measurement is 







5.7.3 Non-Executive Directors’ Ownership  
 
Non-executive director‘s ownership means the shares of the company that are owned 
by the non-executive directors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to Mohd, 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006), the larger the amount of equity interests by the either 
executive or non-executive directors the greater the incentive for the directors to 
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monitor the management. Thus, non-executive director‘s ownership is measured in 
line with previous studies as the total number of shares owned by non-executive 
directors of a firm (Chau & Gray, 2010; Gul & Leung, 2004).  
 
5.8 Other Variables 
 
The other variables of the study is composed of all the control variables which 
include size of the firm in terms of total assets, the type of industry as 
environmentally sensitive industries and otherwise and the profitability of the firms. 
 
5.8.1 Size  
 
The size of a firm is paramount in CSED studies, simply because, most of the 
companies that are considered large tend to put more resources on getting well trained 
employees or even trained the employee for a particular task like that of disclosure 
(Monteiro & Aibar-Guzmán, 2010). The size of the firm is seen as the total amount 
or value of the firm which many studies considered that as total assets of the firm 
(Monteiro & Aibar-Guzman, 2010; Peters & Romi, 2014). In line with agency 
theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) disclosed that there is high possibility of agency 
costs as a result of large recruitment which could contribute immensely on disclosure. 
As a result, the theory foresees a positive association between CSED the size of firms. 
However, stakeholder theory insist on the size of firms determine the availability of 
information to be disclosed (Cowen, Ferari & Parker, 1987).  
 
 166 
Therefore, normally company size is measure as total assets (see Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2008; Gul & Leung, 2004; Monteiro & Aibar-Guzman, 2010; Peters & 
Romi, 2014). For the purpose of this study, corporate size is measured as total assets. 
 
5.8.2 Industry  
 
The type and nature of industry is use to be considered as contributor of CSED by 
firms. In line with Stakeholder theory, nevertheless, claimed that corporations 
functioning in an as environmentally-sensitive, also known as high profile industries, 
firms could disclose more information about their social and environmental activities 
than non-environmentally sensitive firms. The high profile industries also seen as 
environmentally sensitive firms are firms that have high tendency of polluting 
environment due to their operation through the release of high carbon emission, oil 
spillage, and high radiation in the environment among others. In this regard, 
environmentally sensitive firms are expected to disclose more social and 
environmental details than others (Cormier et al., 2005; Patten, 2002). The high 
profile industry include, oil and gas industries and natural resources industries. This 
is because, booth oil and gas industry and natural resources industries have high 
negative impact on the environment due to their operation in the community. 
 
So many studies on industry type and the CED reported a significant positive 
relationship (see Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Cormier et al., 2005; Pahuja, 2009). 
Thus, industry type is commonly measured as a dummy variable in previous 
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literature, (see Campbell, 2004; Reverte, 2009). Therefore, this study measured 
industry type as a dummy variable. This means ―1‖ is for environmentally sensitive 
firm and ―0‖ for others.  
 
5.8.3 Profitability  
 
Empirical evidence shows positive relationship between profitability and CED 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005. While, Ho and Taylor (2007) found negative relationship 
with some studies showing no association between profitability and CSD (Brammer 
& Pavelin, 2008; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2010; Peters & Romi, 2014). Base on the 
theoretical evidence, this study predicts positive association between profitability 
and CSED quality in Nigerian listed firms. 
 
The measurement used by this study for profitability is return on assets (ROA) (see 
Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Cormier, Ledoux, & Magnan, 2011; Lim et al., 2007) 
Therefore, profitability is measured in this study as return on assets. 
 
5.9 Model Specification 
 
The model below is formed to estimate the relationship between CGM and the 
quality of CSED as well as the moderating effect of non-executive directors‘ 





CSEDQLit = ß0 + ß1 BIit + ß2 BSit + ß3 BMit + ß4 DEit + ß5 BCit + ß6 ACIit + ß7 
NBOit + ß8 BIit×NBOit + ß9 BSit×NBOit + ß10 BMit×NBOit + ß11 DEit×NBOit + 
ß12 BCit×NBOit + ß13 ACIit×NBOit + ß14 SIZit + ß15 INDit + ß16 PROFit + Єit 
Where: 
CSEDQL   = Total CSED Quality;  
ß0                = Intercept; 
ß1 to ß7       = Coefficient of the independent variables; 
ß8 to ß13     = Coefficient of the interacting variables; 
ß14 to ß16   = Coefficient of the control variables; 
Є                 = Error term; 
it                 = Subscript for Panel Data 
BI               = Board Independence; 
BS               = Board Size; 
BM             = Board Meetings; 
DE              = Directors Education; 
BC               = Board Committees; 
ACI             = Audit Committee Independence; 
NBO            = Non-executive director‘s ownership; 
BI×NBO      = Interacting Term between Board Independence and Non-executive 
                          Director‘s Ownership; 
BS×NBO     = Interacting Term between Board Size and Non-executive Director‘s 
                           Ownership; 
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BM×NBO   = Interacting Term between Board Meetings and Non-executive 
                           Director‘s Ownership; 
DE×NBO   =Interacting Term between Directors Qualifications and Non- 
                          executive Director‘s Ownership; 
BC×NBO   =Interacting Term between board Committees and Non-executive    
                          Director‘s Ownership; 
ACI×NBO  =Interacting Term between Audit Committee Independence and Non- 
                          executive Director‘s Ownership; 
SIZ             = Size; 
IND            = Industry; 
PROF             = Profitability. 
  
5.10 Model Statistical Tests 
 
The tool of statistics used by the study is STATA simply because, STATA is more 
effective in handling panel data in addition to the speed and compatibility (Newton et 
al., 2010). This is used for performing the statistical analyses which include 
descriptive statistics, correlations and multiple regressions.  
 
5.11 Summary of the Chapter 
 
The chapter expresses the research methodology of the study. In addition, the 
descriptive research design that is used. Using secondary data, quantitative analysis 
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methods is considered. The research required panel data, using content analysis for 
CSED quality. The variables measurement and their respective definition are 
explored. Finally, the study substantiates the need for content analysis method. The 
population, sample and the domain of the study is discussed. Furthermore, checklist 
of CSED items is developed in addition to the CSED indices. Therefore, the next 
chapter is devoted to data result and analysis on the relationship between CGM and 
the quality of CSED, along with moderating effect of the relationship by non-











This chapter proceeds from previous chapter, which established the theoretical 
framework as well as development of hypotheses on the relationship between CGM 
and CSED quality. Therefore, this chapter discussed the trend of the disclosure, the 
descriptive statistics of the study, which include minimum value, maximum value, 
mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, the correlation and 
multicollinearity test. Others analysis discussed are the correlation and regression of 
the study. This is in addition to heteroskedacity, autocorrelation/serial correlation, 
linearity, OLS and FGLS of the model. This is to determine the estimation of the 
study that could explain the moderating effect of NBO on the relationship between 
CGM and CSEDQ.  
 
6.2 Industries Classification of the Population  
 
As earlier stated, the population of the current study composes of all listed firms in 
Nigeria which was 203 companies as seen in Table 6.1. Due to absence of data on 
CGM and CSED by some of the companies 2010-2014 therefore, out of the 203 
mentioned earlier, only 100 have financial statement available from 2010 to 2014. 
Therefore, this study used 100 companies that have their financial report at the 
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time of conducting this research. The percentages of the companies used are 
agricultural industries 3%, conglomerates 5%, construction/real estate 5%, consumer 
goods 18%, financial and services 28%, healthcare 5%, industrial goods 10%, 
information/communication 4%, natural resources 2%, oil and gas 7% and services 
13%. As seen in the table, oil and gas industries is among the least which looks 
insignificant, thus, the study could not focus on oil and gas industries as earlier 
discussed. In totality, this implies that, the study used 500 observations. 
 
Table 6.1 
 Classification of the Companies 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange 
 
6.3 Trend of the Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure Quality 
 
Trend analysis is a presentation of movement of an event over time, which will 
permit the prediction base on the past data obtained (Gujurati, 2004). This means 
that for a study to perform trend analysis, therefore, time most be considered as it 






Agricultural 5 3 3 
Conglomerates 8 5 5 
Construction/Real Estate 10 5 5 
Consumer Goods 27 18 18 
Financial Services 58 28 28 
Healthcare 14 5 5 
Industrial Goods 24 10 10 
Information/Communication  12 4 4 
Natural Resources                                              6 2 2 
Oil and Gas 14 7 7 
Services 25 13 13 
Total 203 100 100 
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will indicate the level of the product concerned over time. Going by the definition of 
Gujurati therefore, the first objective of this study could be addressed using the trend 
analysis. Recall the first objective of the study where it was stated to determine the 
trend of corporate social and environmental disclosure quality among Nigerian listed 
firms. Thus, Figure 6.1 shows the trend of the corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality derived from the checklist of the Global Reporting Initiative for 
100 listed companies from 2010 to 2014 inclusive. 
 
 
Figure 6.1  
Trend of CSEDQL  
 
As seen in Figure 6.1 above, the overall corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality (CSEDQL) for the year 2010 is 29.76. This indicates the low 
disclosure in addition to the low quality of the said disclosure on social and 
environmental issues. Going by the year 2011 however, there is slide falls in the 
social and environmental disclosure quality. The CSEDQL decline almost 

















insignificant as the said disclosure value for the year stood at 29.72. Since 2011 
CSEDQL is 29.72 therefore, there is a fall of 0.04 of the disclosure as compared to 
2010 value. This could be attributed to the high level of vandalization of the firms‘ 
facilities in Nigeria by Niger Delta militants coupled with the insecurity in the North 
Eastern part of Nigeria. This is because, most of the firms in Nigeria are 
concentrated in the southern part where the militants operates and most at times the 
militants shut down the operation of the companies for quite sometimes which could 
definitely affect the profitability as well as the disclosure of the companies since it is 
only when the companies operate before it has information to report. 
 
In a related development, the level of the disclosure is improved slightly in 2012 as it 
has an incremental value of 0.07 as compared to 2011. This is because, the value of 
CSEDQL as of 2012 is 29.79 while, that of 2011 is 29.72. This indicates a little 
improvement from the previous year. Comparing the two values, this study found 
that 2012 firms disclosed more in their financial reporting as compared to 2010 
which has a disclosure value of 29.76.  
 
However, in 2013 there is a sharp increase on the disclosure as the value rose from 
29.79 in the year 2012 to 31.83 as of the year 2013. This has a difference of 2.04 as 
compared to the year O2012. This increase could be due to the stakeholders 
awareness, increase on the agitation by the stakeholder for example Niger Delta 
Militants in the South-South region of Nigeria as those places have highest 
companies due to their oil production and availability of raw materials.  
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In the same vein, there is yet another sharp increase on the overall disclosure in the 
last year 2014 as the value rose from 31.83 in the year 2013 to 32.28 as at 2014. This 
means that there is a difference of 0.45 of the CSEDQL when compared to 2013. 
The increase could also be attributed to increase in stakeholder‘s awareness and the 
boost of the economy during the year. Comparing the disclosure of CSEDQL for the 
year 2010 and 2014 however, this study found an improvement on the overall 
CSEDQL. This is because, it started with a smallest value of 29.76 as at 2010 of the 
overall disclosure and end up with 32.28 of the total CSEDQL in the year 2014. On 
average, there is total increase of 2.52 disclosures as at 2014 as compared to 2010. 
Thus, this study can conclude that, the trend of the CSEDQL in Nigeria is improving 
over time. Going by this trend the study can predict more corporate social and 
environmental disclosure quality in nearby future. 
 
6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The dependent variable of the study is corporate social and environmental disclosure 
quality represented in this study as CSEDQ while the independent variables include 
board independence (BI), board size (BS), board meetings (BM), directors 
qualifications in terms of education (DE), Board committees (BC) and audit 
committee independence (ACI). The moderating variables of the study are non-
executive directors‘ ownership (NBO) and the control variables are firm size (SIZ), 
type of industry be it environmentally sensitive and otherwise (IND) and profitability 
of the company (PROF). 
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The result shown on Table 6.2 shows the descriptive statistics on individual as well 
as the summary of the statistics on the explained and explanatory variables. This is 
considered based on the mean and the standard deviation. Others are the minimum 
and maximum values, the skewness and the kurtosis of the data including their 
respective standard errors. The major important of descriptive is to observe the 
behaviour of the data in terms of variation and the deviation from the mean which 
could result to comparison from what is obtained and what is required by the 
standard of law of an organization averagely (Lawless & Heymann, 2010).  
 
In the case of this study, the standard guideline of the corporate governance is the 
one issued by Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria (SEC). The variables 
of this study include corporate social and environmental disclosure quality as 
explained variable while board size, board independence, board meetings, audit 
committee independence, board committees and qualification of directors as 
explanatory variables. Others include type of industry, firm size and profitability of 
the firms as a control variable while non-executive ownership is moderating variable 











Summary of Statistics 
Variables Min Max Mean Sd Skewness Kurtosis 
CSEDQL 0.1724 0.4483 0.3068 0.0496 -0.3432  2.8657 
BS 5 20 9.6340 2.9293  1.0506  4.1604 
BI 0.1667 0.9231 0.6506 0.1414 -0.4426  2.9645 
BM 2 10 4.444 1.0663  1.5557  6.6297 
ACI 0.5 0.8333 0.5647 0.0960  1.1097  2.8286 
BC 2 7 3.4800 1.1710  0.5410 -0.3260 
DQ 1 18 4.9000 2.2565  1.8799  8.8954 
NBO 19969 184000 43200 157000  7.6991  7.6258 
IND 0 1 0.3700 0.4833  0.5385  1.2900 
SIZ 512634 3870000 2130000 5360000  3.7257  8.5946 
Prof -18400 1600000 748000 215000  2.1410  3.6124 
Table 6.2 is based on sample size of 100 companies 
 
For example the corporate social and environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQ) is 
ratio where its value falls from 0 and 1. It could also be expressed in percentage. 
Looking at the mean of CSEDQ presented in Table 6.2 therefore, it is clear that the 
averagely a listed firm in Nigeria has CSEDQ of 0.3068. This means that at least 
each firm reported CSED in its annual report by the said value and the quality of the 
report is 30.68%. The minimum value a firm report about its CSED is 0.1724 while 
the maximum value reported is 0.4483. Since the standard deviation with the value 
of 0.0496 is not far away from the mean, the value can be relied upon as it has low 
 
 178 
risk of being false. In addition, the skewness shows the distribution of the data in 
terms of favouring either the right or the left of the normal curve while the kurtosis 
shows the peakness of the said data (Oja, 2016). From the value of the skewness of -
0.3432 obtained in Table 6.2 therefore, it means the data is expected to be normally 
distributed even though it shown as negatively skewed. The kurtosis value of 2.8657 
as seen in Table 6.2 also means the peakness of the distribution is expected to be 
normal. This is in line with the so many studies which shows how distribution of the 
data should be expected through the use of skewness and kurtosis as testing the data 
could reveal whether the said data is skewed or the kurtosis is abnormal (Bai & Ng, 
2005; Barato & Seifert, 2015; Blanca, Arnau, Lpez-Montiel, Bono, & Bendayan, 
2013; Kollo, 2008; Maruyama, 2007; Ryu, 2011). 
 
There is no any standard law regarding corporate social and environmental 
disclosure in Nigeria (Adelopo, 2011) therefore, the disclosure of CSED is 
voluntary. Thus, any company that disclose information regarding the social or 
environmental issues in Nigeria does that to enhance its relationship with the 
stakeholders of the environment as it has been predict by researchers that the more 
the disclosure the more the performance of the company and the less the conflicts 
between the company and the stakeholders (Yusoff, Mohamad, & Darus, 2013).  
 
Looking at the board size (BS) as it is measured as discrete data where the minimum 
board members are 5 and the maximum board members are 20. The size of the board 
is expected to impact either positively or negatively on CSEDQ. Going by the mean 
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of BS as presented in Table 6.2 therefore, it becomes clear that on average a size of 
the board by the listed company in Nigeria is 9.634 approximately around 10 
members on board. This means that at least each firm has 10 members on board 
which is in line with the standard set by SEC of Nigeria where it requires a company 
to have at least 2 members on board thus, averagely, a listed firm in Nigeria meet a 
minimum requirements regarding the size of their board. The standard deviation with 
the value of 2.9293 indicates an accommodated variation from the mean. In addition, 
the skewness shows the distribution of the data around the normal curve while the 
kurtosis shows the peakness of the said data (Oja, 2016). The skewness of the BS 
which has value of 1.05060 shows that, the data is expected to be normally 
distributed regardless of the signs of the distribution. This is in addition to the 
kurtosis of the BS with has value of 4.1604 as seen in Table 6.2 This indicate that, 
the peakness of the distribution of the data is expected to be normal as recommended 
by many researchers (Barato & Seifert, 2015).  
 
In related development, the board independence (BI) is measured as ratio of non-
executive members to executive members on board. The BI has minimum ratio of 
0.1667 non-executive members and the maximum ratio of non-executive members is 
0.9231. It is expected that board independence will have a positive impact on 
CSEDQ even though that depends on the ratio. The mean of BI as presented in Table 
6.2 consequently, turn out to be obvious that on average a board independence of a 
listed company in Nigeria is 65% of the total board. This means that at least each 
firm has at least 65% non-executive members on board which is in line with the 
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standard set by the SEC of Nigeria, where it requires a company to have at least one 
Non-executive members on board thus, averagely, a listed firm in Nigeria meet a 
minimum requirements regarding the presence of non-executive members on board. 
Considering the standard deviation with the value of 0.1414 also reveals relatively 
normal variation from the mean (0.6506) this is in addition to the skewness of the BI 
where it shows a value of -0.4426 which shows that, the data are expected to be 
normally distributed regardless of the sign of the distribution. Moreover, the kurtosis 
of the BI with has a value of 2.9645 indicates the peakness of the distribution of the 
data is expected to be normal.  
 
Another important aspect of CGM is board meetings (BM) and is seen as the 
frequency of meetings held annually by the board of a company (Al-Najjar, 2012; 
Brick & Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 1999). Each firm in Nigeria has a minimum of 
2 numbers of meetings and the maximum number of meetings is 10. BM is expected 
to improve CSEDQ as stipulated in this study. The mean of BM accordingly, shows 
that on average the meeting of board by listed company in Nigeria is 4.444. This 
means that at least each firm held a meeting 4 times annually which is in line with 
the standard set by SEC of Nigeria where it requires a company to have at least 2 
meetings annually. On average, it can be said that a listed firm in Nigeria meet a 
minimum requirements in respect of the frequency of meetings. The standard 
deviation which has value of 1.0663 also reveals relatively normal variation from the 
mean. In addition, the skewness of the BM with the value of 1.5557 shows that, the 
data are expected to be normally distributed regardless of the sign of the distribution. 
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Moreover, the kurtosis of the BM with the value of 6.6297 indicates that, the 
peakness of the distribution of the data is expected to be normal as well.  
 
Meanwhile the corporate governance of Nigeria is really concerned about the audit 
committee especially the number of non-executive directors on board as it was assert 
that the higher the non-executive on board the better the disclosure of both financial 
and non-financial aspect of disclosure (Ahunwan, 2002). The number of non-
executive on audit committee board determines the independence of the said 
committee therefore is measured as ratio of non-executive members to all members 
on audit committee board (Ho & Wong, 2001). It requires by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Nigeria (SEC) that an audit committee should have at least 
one non-executive member. It is expected that audit committee independence (ACI) 
will have a positive impact on CSEDQ even though that depends on the ratio. As 
seen in Table 6.2 the minimum ratio of non-executive members in a firm is 0.5 while 
the maximum ratio is 0.8333. That means the requirements of the SEC of Nigeria is 
said to be mate since no listed firm in Nigeria has zero non-executive members on its 
audit committee. The mean of ACI as presented in the same table consequently, turn 
out to be obvious that on average ACI of a listed company in Nigeria is 56% of the 
audit size. This means that at least each firm has at least 56% of non-executive 
members on audit committee board which is in line with the standard set by SEC 
where it requires a company to have at least one non-executive members on audit 
board thus, averagely, a listed firm in Nigeria meet a minimum requirements 
regarding the presence of non-executive members on audit board. Considering the 
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standard deviation with the value of 0.0960 also reveals relatively normal variation 
from the mean this is in addition, to the skewness where it shows a value of 1.1097. 
Moreover, the kurtosis of the ACI with the value of 2.8286 indicates the peakness of 
the distribution of the data is also normal as expected.  
 
In addition, the corporate governance of Nigeria through its regulator SEC, mention 
the number committees a firm should have as the directors of the company should 
not exercise all their duties to the company alone rather to relegate their duties to 
committees. This is to enhance the disclosure of both financial and non-financial 
aspect. The number of committees determines the effectiveness of the firm therefore 
is measured as the committees on board. It requires by the SEC of Nigeria that a firm 
should have audit committee, remuneration committee, risk management committee 
among others. At least one committee must be presence in any listed firm in Nigeria 
as required by SEC of Nigeria. It is also expected that the more the committees on 
board the more the disclosure of both financial and non-financial which include 
corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSEDQ). As seen in Table 6.2 the 
minimum of committees a firm has is 2 while the maximum is 7. That means the 
requirement by the SEC of Nigeria is said to be mate since no listed firm in Nigeria 
that has zero committee. The mean of board committee (BC) as presented in the 
same table consequently, shows that on average a BC of a listed company in Nigeria 
is 3.48. This means that at least each firm has three committees on board on average. 
This is in line with the standard set by SEC where it requires a company to have at 
least one committee on board thus, averagely; a listed firm in Nigeria meets the 
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minimum requirements. In view of the standard deviation with the value of 1.171 
also signifies an average normality in the variation from the mean. The skewness and 
the Kurtosis where they possess a value of 0.5410 and 0.3260 respectively, shows 
that the data is expected to be normally distributed regardless of the sign of the 
distribution.  
 
In the same view, there is need for directors on board to have some expertise in 
terms of either accounting, finance or any other related discipline that is that shows a 
financial professionalism. This is required by the SEC of Nigeria that among the 
directors of the board there should at least one member that is professional in 
accounting or finance. In this study is called directors qualification (DQ) and is 
measured as the number of directors who have finance related discipline 
qualification on board. The maximum directors with such qualifications in this study 
are 18 members while the minimum directors who have finance related discipline is 
one. This means that the requirements of SEC is fulfilled since all listed firms in 
Nigeria has at least one director on board that is accounting or related finance 
discipline. It is also expected that DQ will have a positive impact on CSEDQ even 
though that depends on the number of those that have such qualifications among the 
firms. The average number DQ is 4.9. This means that at least each firm has 5 
members on board who have accounting or finance related discipline qualification 
which is in line with the standard set by SEC where it requires a company to have at 
least one member on board with such qualifications thus, averagely, a listed firm in 
Nigeria meet a minimum requirements regarding the presence of members with 
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accounting or finance related discipline on board. Considering the standard deviation 
with the value of 2.2565 also reveals relatively normal variation from the mean. This 
is in addition, to the skewness where it shows a value of 1.8799. This also shows 
that, the data is expected to be normally distributed regardless of the sign of the 
distribution. Moreover, the kurtosis of the DQ with has a value of 8.8954 indicates 
the peakness of the distribution of the data is also normal as expected. 
 
Since is required by law that at least there should be one or more non-executive 
members on board therefore, the decision is speak a lot as it will enhance 
transparency in terms of disclosure. Thus, if non-executive own shares in the 
company they are expected to be more vigilant as they have an interest in the said 
company. Even though is not required by law for non-executive member to own 
shares yet is improve the accountability and transparency of the company both 
financial and non-financial disclosure (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008). Therefore, the 
ownership of non-executive directors on board is measured as the total number of 
shares own by non-executive members on board. As seen in Table 6.2, it is clear 
that, non-executive member has a minimum of 19969 shares, while the maximum 
shares owned by non-executive members are 184000 (in millions). It is expected that 
non-executive members‘ ownership will improve corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality (CSEDQL) even though that depends on the number of ownership. 
The mean of non-executive members‘ ownership as presented in Table 6.2 indicates 
that on average a non-executive members‘ ownership of a listed company in Nigeria 
are 4320(millions). This means that at least each firm has at least non-executive 
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members‘ ownership of 4320(millions) shares on board. Considering the standard 
deviation with the value of 1500(millions) also reveals relatively normal variation 
from the mean this is in addition, to the skewness where it shows a value of 
7.699091 shows that, the data is expected to be normally distributed regardless of the 
sign of the distribution. Moreover, the kurtosis of the non-executive members‘ 
ownership with has value of 7.2258 indicates the peakness of the distribution of the 
data also to be averagely normal.  
 
Furthermore, the type of industry play an important role in determine the disclosure 
of environmental issues as those industries are categorized into two, environmentally 
sensitive industries and non-environmentally sensitive industries. There is 
expectation that, the environmentally sensitive should pay more attention to CSEDQ 
as the companies emit high carbon than their counterparts. For control measures, this 
study introduced the type of industry as a control variable. This is to enhance the 
disclosure of both financial and non-financial. There the type of industry could 
determine the disclosure of social and environmental issues that is CSEDQ. As seen 
in Table 6.2 the minimum of type is zero while the maximum is one. Zero represents 
non-environmentally sensitive industry while one represents environmentally 
sensitive industry. The mean of industry type (IND) as presented in Table 6.2 
accordingly, shows that on average the companies are environmentally sensitive in 
nature since the value is 0.37. It is important to note that, the closer to zero for the 
mean of the industry type, the more the companies are said to be non-
environmentally sensitive and if the mean is closer to one it means the companies 
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averagely are environmentally sensitive in nature. In view of this, the standard 
deviation with the value of 0.4833 also signifies an average normality in the 
variation from the mean among the industries. The skewness and the Kurtosis with 
the value of 0.5385 and 1.2900 respectively, show that, the data is expected to be 
normally distributed regardless of the sign of the distribution.  
 
Another important aspect of a firm is the size of the company. There are also 
expectations that the larger the size of the company in terms its assets the more the 
disclosure of on the financial and non-financial issues. The size (SIZ) in this study is 
introduced as control variable so as to improve the model of the study. As seen in 
Table 6.2, the size of the firm has minimum asset value of 512634 in Nigerian Naira 
while the maximum value own by firm in terms of size is 387000 (millions) Nigerian 
Naira since it is in monetary terms. It is expected that the size of a firm will improve 
CSEDQ even though that depends on the size. From the mean of the size of the firm 
as presented in Table 6.2 indicates that on average a listed company in Nigeria have 
assets with worth 213000 (millions) Naira value. The standard deviation with the 
value of 53600 (millions) also reveals relatively normal variation from the mean this 
is in addition, to the skewness where it shows a value of 3.7257 shows that, the data 
is expected to be normally distributed regardless of the sign of the distribution. 
Moreover, the kurtosis of the firm size with has value of 8.5946 indicates the 




Consequently, profitability is an important aspect of a firm as it is a measure 
functional form of the firm. There are also expectations that the better the 
performance of a company in terms of profitability the more the disclosure of on the 
financial and non-financial issues. The profitability (PROF) in this study is 
introduced as control variable so as to improve the model of the study in addition to 
other variables of the study. As seen in Table 6.2, the profitability of the firm has 
minimum value of 18400 (millions) Nigerian Naira as loss since it has negative sign 
while the maximum value of profitability is 160000 (millions) Nigerian Naira since 
it is in monetary terms. It is expected that the profitability of a firm will improve 
CSEDQ even though that depends on the profit of that company. From the mean of 
the profitability of the firm as presented in Table 6.2 indicates that on average a 
listed company in Nigeria have profitability with worth 74800 (millions) value. The 
standard deviation with the value of 21500 (millions) also reveals relatively normal 
variation from the mean this is in addition, to the skewness where it shows a value of 
2.1410 shows that, the data is expected to be normally distributed regardless of the 
sign of the distribution. Moreover, the kurtosis of the profitability with has value of 
3.6124 indicates the high peakness of the distribution of the data. This is followed by 
the correlation of the study. 
 
6.5 Correlation between CSEDQL and Independent Variables 
 
This study considered correlation analysis as keen to detect if a relationship exist 
between Corporate social and environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL) and 
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board size (BS), CSEDQL and board independence (BI), CSEDQL and board 
meetings (BM), CSEDQL and directors qualifications (DQ), CSEDQL and audit 
committee independence (ACI), CSEDQL and board committees (BC), CSEDQL 
and industry type (IND), CSEDQL and profitability (PROF), CSEDQL and firms 
size (SIZ) and finally, CSEDQL and non-executive directors ownership (NBO). 
Since zero correlation which indicates non-existence of relationship is a sing of no 
research  in the area under consideration (Bewick, Cheek, & Ball, 2003; Garcia, 
2011; Reimann, Filzmoser, Garrett, & Dutter, 2008). This is because there must be at 
least either positive or negative relationship between the dependent variable and each 
of the independent variables for a study to be considered worthy of research in the 
area of concerned where in the case of this study, the target is corporate social and 
environmental disclosure quality.  From the study, CSEDQL is the explained 
variable while BS, BI, BM, ACI, DQ and BC are the explanatory variables. 
Meanwhile, IND, PROF and SIZ are the control variables of the study in addition to 
the moderating variable called NBO.  
 
The correlational research is therefore, performed to identify a presence of a 
relationship between CSEDQL and each of the different CGM and corporate 
characteristics. This is done using product moment otherwise called Pearson‘s 
correlation. A parametric assessment is conducted to look at the needed connections 
in order to allow for other projections in respect of some of the factors under 
consideration. Moreover, correlation coefficients are also designed to testify the 
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strength and the direction of the disclosure measurement and to evaluate for 
multicollinearity where necessary.  
 
It could also determine the measurements of the variables. However, despite the fact 
there is need for existence of relation among the explained and the explanatory 
variables however, the correlation among the independent variables ought to be zero 
(Gujarati, 2004) but this is almost difficult to achieve as correlation normally exist 
among variables provided they are quantities in nature, thus, the value of the 
correlation among the explanatory variables is expected to  be weak, moderate or to 
some extend strong provided the coefficients of the correlation is not greater than 0.7 
(Butt, Shahzadi, Sharif, & Nasir, 2007). Where the coefficient of the correlation 
among the independent variables is greater than 0.7 then, there is likely that 
multicollinearity exist among the independent variables hence, the assumption of 
regression is violated (Gujarati, 2004).  
 
To achieved these issues raised in the above paragraphs therefore, a product moment 
or Pearson correlation coefficients for the listed firms that existed between the 
corporate social and environmental disclosure quality and each of the CGM 
attributes including the firms characteristics, the moderating variable for this 
research is conducted. This is because, product moment (Pearson) correlation is 
suitable for quantitative data analysis thus, where a measurement of a variable is 
numeric then this type of correlation is deemed necessary for the study (Vargha, 
Bergman, & Delaney, 2013). In addition, the significance of the said correlation is 
 
 190 
established in order to determine if there is sufficient evidence of the established 
correlation among the variables. The significances signifies the evidence for the 
existence of the correlation so established therefore, those correlation could not be 
disputed or did not happen by chance (Vargha et al., 2013). 
 
Even though this study is expecting positive relationships especially between the 
dependent variable and each of the independent variables, a negative correlation is 
almost meaningless provided the correlation is not significant or the regression of the 
model is positive then this study will assume the regression model is more 
authoritative than the established correlation. This is simply because, correlation is 
more of descriptive whereas regression is inferential  (Bewick et al., 2003). To infer 
means to make judgment therefore, regression result is more superior to the 








Correlational Matrix           
                  CSEDQL         BS           BI      BM                ACI              BC          DQ               NBO              IND                  SIZ                        PROF 
 
CSEDQL    1.0000  
              
BS              0.4889***  1.0000  
              
BI              -0.0159         -0.0239         1.0000  
              
BM            0.1726**     0.4236***  0.0663    1.0000  
                                
ACI            0.0458         -0.1042**   -0.1754**    -0.0608           1.0000  
                                
BC            0.1745**     0.3700***   0.1023**    0.1890***   -0.1856***    1.0000  
              
DQ           0.4123***    0.8269*** -0.0561     0.4432***   -0.1040**      0.3413***    1.0000  
              
NBO         0.0264         0.0008        -0.0469        0.0100           0.0082          0.0853*       -0.0124             1.0000 
 
IND         -0.0512        -0.1448**     0.0066       -0.0394           0.0004         -0.2069***   -0.1902***     -0.1214**       1.0000 
                   
SIZ           0.2324***   0.4466***   -0.0649        0.2680***    -0.1053**     0.2033***     0.4738***      0.0749*         -0.1891***    1.0000 
                       
PROF      0.0914*  0.1497**  -0.0507  0.0418   0.0006   0.1544**   0.1565**  0.0861*  -0.1933***  0.4487***    1.0000
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From Table 6.3 above the correlation coefficient between CSEDQL and BS is 
positive. This means that, CSEDQL and BS are going in the same direction whereby 
as CSEDQL is increasing, BS is also increasing even though is not in the same 
proportion. This is revealed from the sing of the coefficient of the correlation 
between the variables as seen in the table with a value of 0.4889. Since the value is 
going toward 0.5 in approximation, the correlation can said to be strong as the 
correlation (r) ≥ 0.5 (Vargha et al., 2013). The significant value of the coefficient is 
0.000 thus, is said to be strongly significant at 1% level of significant. The found a 
sufficient evidence to support the said correlation between CSEDQL and BS as 
strongly positively correlated. Base on the argument raised before therefore, the 
study can be conducted on CSEDQL and BS since there evidence of correlation 
between the variables. 
 
However, contrary to the expectation of this study, the correlation coefficient 
between CSEDQL and BI is found to be negative as seen in Table 6.3. This indicates 
that, CSEDQL and BI are going in the opposite direction whereby as CSEDQL is 
increasing, BI is decreasing even though is not also in the same percentage. This is 
discovered from the sing of the coefficient of the correlation concerning the 
variables. This can be seen in the table where is has a value of negative 0.0159. 
Unlike the previous correlation found, the value is less than 0.3 and is far away from 
0.5 thus, the correlation can said to be weak as the correlation (r) ≤ 0.3 (Aminu 
Hassan, 2012). In addition, it is not significant. Therefore, there is no sufficient 
evidence to support the said correlation between CSEDQL and BI as weakly 
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negatively correlated. As earlier stated in the discussion of correlation from the 
beginning, therefore, the study can be conducted between CSEDQL and BI since a 
correlation exists even though there is no evidence of correlation between the 
variables.  What is more important is the fact that the correlation between the 
variables is not equal to zero. As discussed earlier, this is only considered if the 
variables are dependent and independent in nature as the case of this study, the 
dependent is CSEDQL and the independent is BI.  
 
In the case of board meetings, the coefficient of correlation between CSEDQL and 
BM is positive. This indicates that, CSEDQL and BM are moving in the same 
direction whereby the more the CSEDQL the more the BM and the less the 
CSEDQL the less the later and this could not be in the same proportion. This is seen 
from the sign of the coefficient of the correlation between the two variables with a 
value of 0.1726. Since the value is going toward 0.3, the correlation can said to be 
weak as the correlation (r) ≤  0.3 (Vargha et al., 2013). The probability value of the 
coefficient is 0.0001 thus, this is said to be weakly significant at 1%. This is an 
indication of sufficient evidence to support the said correlation between CSEDQL 
and BM. Thus, the study can be conducted between CSEDQL and BM.  
 
In the same vein, the expectation of this study, the correlation coefficient between 
CSEDQL and ACI is positive as seen in Table 6.3. This indicates that the movement 
is in the same direction between CSEDQL and ACI whereby as CSEDQL is 
increasing, ACI is also increasing. This is discovered from the sing of the coefficient 
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of the correlation for the variables under considerations. The value obtained is 
represented in Table 6.3 where it has a value of 0.0458. Like other previous 
correlation so established, the value of the correlation is less than 0.3 and is far away 
from 0.5 thus, the correlation can said to be weak as the correlation (r) ≤ 0.3 (Bach & 
Bach, 2005). Since the probability value for the coefficient is 0.3072 accordingly, 
this is said to be not significant at all level of significances ranging from 1% to 10%. 
Therefore, there is no sufficient evidence to support the said correlation between 
CSEDQL and ACI as moderately positively correlated. As earlier stated in the 
discussion of correlation from the beginning therefore, the study can be conducted 
between CSEDQL and ACI since a correlation exist between them.  What is more 
important is the fact that the correlation between the variables is not equal to zero. 
As discussed earlier this is only considered if the variables are dependent and 
independent in nature as the case of this study, the dependent is CSEDQL and the 
independent is ACI.  
 
In addition, the correlation between board committees and CSEDQL is also 
computed and the coefficient of correlation is positive as stipulated in Table 4.6 
where it has a value of 0.1745. This designates that, CSEDQL and BC correlate in 
the same bearing where it means the more the CSEDQL the more the BC and the 
less the CSEDQL the less the BC and this could not be in the same proportion. This 
is can ascertain from the sing of the coefficient of the correlation obtained from the 
table. As the value is little bit above 0.3, the correlation is said to be weak as the 
correlation (r) ≤ 0.3 (Vargha et al., 2013). The probability value of the coefficient is 
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0.0001 hence, the correlation is said to be weakly significant at 1%. The study 
concludes that there is sufficient evidence to support the weak positive correlation 
found between CSEDQL and BC. Therefore, a research can be conducted between 
CSEDQL and BC.  
 
In related development and in line with the expectation of this study, the correlation 
coefficient between CSEDQL and DQ is positive as seen in Table 6.3. This indicates 
that variables move is in the same direction as the correlation between CSEDQL and 
DQ is positive. This is an indication that, as CSEDQL is increasing, DQ will also 
increase probably in an undetermined proportion. This is discovered from the sing of 
the coefficient of the correlation for the variables under considerations. The value 
obtained is represented in Table 6.3 where it has a value of 0.4123. In line with other 
previous correlation so established, if the value of the correlation is greater than 0.3 
and is less than 0.5 thus, the correlation can said to be moderate since the correlation 
(r) ≥ 0.3 (Bach & Bach, 2005). As the probability value for the coefficient is 0.000 
from the table, then the correlation is said to be significant at 1% level of 
significance. For that reason, there is sufficient evidence to support the said 
correlation between CSEDQL and DQ as moderately positively correlated. Based on 
the earlier discussion on correlation therefore, the study can be conducted between 
CSEDQL and DQ provided a correlation exist between the variables. What is 
paramount is the fact that the correlation between the variables is not equal to zero. 
As discussed earlier this is only considered if the variables are dependent and 
independent in nature. 
 
 196 
6.6 Multicollinearity Analysis  
 
One of the assumptions of linear regression is the issue of multicollinearity freee 
among the independent variables (Alin, 2010). The first step is to correlate among 
the explanatory variables and notice those with strong correlation of at least 0.7 
(Grewal, Cote, & Baumgartner, 2004). Where a strong correlation is found among 
the independent variables, then a further analysis is to be conducted to confirm the 
existence of multicollinearity. This analysis include Variance Inflation Factors VIF 
and the inverse of the VIF (Shieh, 2010). Even though the correlation of this study 
shows indicators of less than 0.7 with an exception of CSEDQL and DQ which is 
greater than 0.7 however, there is still need for further analysis to confirm the 
condition of the multicollinearity in the given data (Shieh, 2010). 
 
The demarcation of the VIF ranges from 1 to 9 as stipulated by some scholars and 1 
to 5 by other scholars. This study considered the range of 1 to 5 for the VIF of each 
of the explanatory variable thus, if VIF is greater than 5 then multicollinearity exist 
in the said variable and this is in line with Gujarati (2004). The variables involve 
include board independence (BI), board size (BS), board meetings (BM), directors 
qualifications (DQ), Board committees (BC) and audit committee independence 
(ACI). The moderating variables of the study are non-executive directors‘ ownership 
(NBO) and the control variables are firm size (SIZ), type of industry (IND) and 





















Table 6.4 is representation of variance inflation factor of each of the independent 
variable coupled with the inverse of the VIF almost similar to tolerance value as in 
Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS). However,  like a tolerance value, the 
smaller the inverse VIF the likely the multicollinearity existence in the variable 
concerned therefore, inverse VIF should be greater than 0.1 (Alin, 2010; Cox, 2010). 
For example, BI has VIF value of 1.07 and the inverse value of 0.94, since the VIF is 
not greater than 5 therefore, then no multicollinearity in BI. This is supported by the 
inverse VIF as it is far greater than 0.01. 
Variable                   VIF 1/VIF   
BI         1.07 0.9366 
BS         3.33 0.3000 
BM         1.29 0.7756 
ACI         1.08 0.9276 
BC         1.26 0.7947 
DQ         3.49 0.2868 
NBO         1.03 0.9678 
IND         1.11 0.8998 
SIZ         1.64 0.6105 
Prof         1.30 0.7681 
Mean VIF               1.66 
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Next explanatory variable is BS where this study reported high VIF value of 3.33 yet 
is also less than 5. Even though it has small VIF inverse yet is greater than 0.01 thus 
the BS is collinearity free. The independent variable BM in addition has small VIF 
and is still collinearity free since the VIF with a value of 1.29 and the inverse VIF of 
0.78 are less than 5 and greater than 0.01 respectively. This is also the same case 
with ACI which reported VIF value of 1.08 and inverse VIF of 0.93 therefore, found 
to be free from collinearity. The variable BC follow the same suit since its VIF and 
inverse VIF are 1.26 and 0.79 respectively. Thus, BC is also collinearity free since 
its VIF is less than 5. In a related development, DQ is found to be free from 
collinearity since the VIF attributed to it is less than 5 also even though is high as the 
value is 3.49 hence, having low VIF inverse as low as 0.29 is still greater than 0.1 
which is the yardstick. 
 
Other variables include the moderator which serves as explanatory variable also. The 
moderator here is NBO which has 1.03 VIF value as the lowest among the whole 
VIFs and the highest VIF inverse of 0.97 in relation to other VIF inverses. 
Consequently, NBO is collinearity free as its VIF and its related inverse meet up the 
requirements. This is not in any way different from IND since it has low VIF of 1.11 
and high VIF inverse of 0.90 nevertheless, the requirement for collinearity is fulfilled 
still is free from collinearity. The control variables SIZ and Prof have VIF value of 
1.64 and 1.30 respectively. Where their individual related VIF inverse are reported to 
be 0.61 and 0.77 respectively. From their values so reported therefore, it obvious 
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both SIZ and Prof meet the requirements for being free from collinearity, hence, SIZ 
and Prof is multicollinearity cleared.  
 
The mean VIF presented in the last table indicates that on average, each explanatory 
variable is having 1.66 and the overall average of the VIF is far less than 5 then this 
study can conclude that not multicollinearity among all the independent variables 
presented in this study. As a result the study can be conducted using regression 
analysis as the condition for conducting such type of analysis is fulfilled. The 
multicolinearity is no longer an issue in this study.  
 
6.7 Normality Distribution of the Data 
 
Normality distribution of the data is another paramount assupmtion of linear 
regression where it is considered as condition for parametric test analysis. This is 
because, one of the parametric test condition is that, the data most be normaly 
distributed across the variables for the test to stand for generalization (Park, 2008). 
However, it was argued that the normality is to be conducted on the residuals of the 
model and not the data where the dependent variable determine the parameteric 
analysis to be conducted (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012). Thus, this study conducted a 





Normality Distribution  
  
Figure 6.2 represents the normality distribution of the data on the residuals of the 
model as recommended by Schützenmeister, Jensen and Piepho (2012) where it was 
argued that it is more precise and reliable for regression analysis. From the above 
Figure 6.2 moreover, the distribution of the residuals presented is approximately a 
bell shape thus an indication of a clear normality on the distribution of the data on 
the residuals of the model. The normal distribution of data is bell shape hence, a 
normally distribution of data must be approximately bell shape (Ghasemi & 
Zahediasl, 2012; Park, 2008; Schützenmeister et al., 2012). 
 
In order to confirm the normality issue presented on Figure 6.2, a normality test 

















Jarque-Bera test is the skewness and the kurtosis is approximately equal to zero with 
kurtosis of 3. The value obtained must be compare to Monte Carlos simulation table 
where it indicates that for sample size of 100 and above, the significant value at 1% 
is 0.1560 and above or 5% which is 0.062 and above is an indication for normality of 
the distribution of the data (Koizumi, Okamoto, & Seo, 2009; Thadewald & Büning, 
2007).  In relation to the argument, the Jarque-Bera test for normality is conducted 




Jarque  Bera Test for Normality 
Jarque Bera normality test:  5.423    Chi (2) 0.0664 
Jarque Bera test for Ho: normality: 
 
 
The value of Chi (2) is 0.0664 as obtained in Table 6.5 for the Jarque–Bera. Since 
the value is greater than 0.05 as indicated on the table at 5% level of significant 
therefore, the null hypothesis that the data is normally distributed across the model 
cannot be rejected. For this reason this study conclude that, the residuals of the 
model is normally distributed which means the residuals has skewness of 
approximately zero and kurtosis of approximately 0 to 3. 
 
Base on the above test of normality as determine by Jarque-Bera as seen in Table 6.5 
and the normality distribution graph presented in Figure 6.2, therefore, the condition 
for the requirement on normality distribution of data is fulfilled. For that reason, the 
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study proceed on the regression analysis where the it determine the relationship 
between board size and CSEDQL, board independence and CSEDQL, board 
meetings and CSEDQL, audit committee independence and CSEDQL, board 
committees and CSEDQL and finally directors qualification and CSEDQL. Thus, 
regression analysis is followed. 
 
6.8 Pooled, Fixed and Random Effect Model 
 
Pooled regression is always the first step to determine the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables provided the data is panel. Thereafter, there is 
need post estimation test such as heteroskedacity, auto/serial correlation among 
others. Therefore, the study first conducted pooled regression followed by fixed 
effect regression before conducting random effect regression. After the random 
regression then Hausman‘s test is conducted to determine the policy implication of 
the model. At the end of the Hausman favoured model 3 and further test is conducted 
for hetersokedasticity to confirm if the selected model can be retain. It is important 
to note that, auto/serial correlation is not that important for a panel data that has few 
years such as the one in this study (Drukker, 2003; Gong, Li, & Wang, 
2011)(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). Thus the results of the 
pooled, random and fixed regression models are represented in Table 6.6 below as 





Table 6.6  
Pooled, Random and Fixed Regression Models  
Variables       (1)     (2)      (3)    
 CSEDQL CSEDQL CSEDQL    
    
BS 0.00781*** 0.01510*** 0.01090*** 
 (6.28) (9.96) (8.35)    
    
BI 0.00007 0.01430 0.02830   
 (0.00) (0.75) (1.70)    
    
BM -0.00174 0.00241 -0.0000824    
 (-0.80) (1.27) (-0.05)    
    
ACI 0.03100 -0.01910 0.01500    
 (1.40) (-0.74) (0.65)    
    
BC -0.00009 -0.00324 -0.00831    
 (-0.02) (-0.31) (-1.10)    
    
DQ 0.00091 0.00295 0.00200    
 (0.55) (1.74) (1.25)    
    
NBO -6.59000* -5.48000* -5.56000*   
 (-2.19) (-2.40) (-2.47)    
    
BSNBO 1.37000 2.24000 2.60000   
 (0.67) (1.47) (1.72)    
    
BINBO 1.63000 -6.19000 -9.59000  
 (0.84) (-0.42) (-0.66)    
       
BMNBO 6.78000 1.240000           7.41000  
 (0.04) (1.10) (0.65)    
    
ACINBO 6.13000* 5.66000** 6.02000**  
 (2.49) (2.96) (3.19)    
    
BCNBO 6.08000 5.96000 7.87000  
 (0.81) (1.08) (1.44)    
    
DQNBO 9.01000 -1.38000 -1.58000  
 (0.31) (-0.62) (-0.71)    
    
IND 0.00397 0.00543     
 (0.94)               . (0.66)     
    
SIZ 1.41000 5.24000*** 9.54000  
 (0.30) (5.02) (1.46)    
       
_cons 0.21400*** 0.13200*** 0.16900*** 
 (10.56) (5.19) (7.46)    
 
t-statistics in parentheses  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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After due consideration of the above models, the selection of the model is followed 
by the Hausman‘s test where the study proposed random effect CSEDQL 2. The 
result of the Hausman‘ test is represented in Table 6.7 below for the study to 
determine which model among CSEDQL 2 and CSEDQL 3 is appropriate. It is 
important to note that, the explanation of the models presented in Table 6.6 above 
depends on the selection of the appropriate model base on Hausman‘s test presented 
in Table 6.7 below. 
 
As seen from the Table 6.7, the chi-square value is 47.25 and its corresponding 
probability value is 0.0000. This implies that, there is sufficient evidence to reject the 
null which said that the random effect model is appropriate since is statistically 
significant at 1% as the probability value is less than the level of significant. Like 
any other hypothesis testing, when the null hypothesis is rejected that signifies the 
alternate hypothesis is true therefore, the model 3 is supported. Base on the 
Hausman‘s test therefore, CSEDQL 3 model presented in Table 6.6 above is to be 
considered in the absence of heteskedasticity. Whereby hetroskeadiasticity exist, 
then another model that could handle the problem is to be considered. While 
examining the CSEDQL 3 model board size (BS) is said to be strongly significant at 
1% with a positive parameter suggesting increase in BS will increase corporate 
social and environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL) with econometric 
assumption of other things remain constant. In contrary, non-executive directors 
ownership (NBO) has a negative parameter yet statistically significant at 10% level 
of significant. Other variable for direct relationship in the model such as board 
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independence (BI), board meetings (BM), audit committees independence (ACI), 
board committees (BC) and directors‘ qualifications (DQ) are individually not 
significant statistically in the model.  
 
Table 6.7 
Hausman’s Test  
          Coefficients  
Variables    (b)   (B) Standard  
  Fixed Random Error 
BI  0. 0159  0. 0282 0.0091 
BS  0. 0149  0. 0109 0.0008 
ACI -0. 0188  0. 0152 0.0112 
BC -0. 0031  -0. 0090 0.0073 
DQ  0. 0032  0. 0020 0.0006 
NBO -5.8000 -5.5500 3.7000 
BINBO -6.2800 -9.5600        7.9800 
BSNBO  2.3400  2.6000        1.6400 
BMNBO  1.5800  7.2400           . 
ACINBO  5.8200  6.0200    3.3500 
BCNBO  6.0800  7.8700         5.4600 
DQNBO -1.4500 -1.5700           1.4600 
SIZ  5.1300  9.4000           8.1400 
Prof -3.0100 -1.9600          4.4700 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(5)     =    47.25  
Prob > chi2     = 0.0000  
 
Base on the Huasman‘s test, this study can be considered for policy implication as 
indicate that, the model is correctly specified since is also testing for the functional 
form of the model. The discussion in the preceding paragraph before Table 6.7 is 
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before the moderation. When the moderation is introduced however, the result 
obtained after the moderation indicates that ACI is found to be significant at 5% and 
the parameter of the ACI changed from negative in the direct relationship to positive 
which is an indication of improvement. Therefore, the moderator is keen on the 
relationship between ACI and CSEDQL. But all other variables are not significant 
after the moderation on the fixed effect model. Consequently, some of the variables 
that have negative parameters in the direct relationship such as BC and ACI as 
earlier stated turn out to be positive after the moderation even though the moderation 
on the relationship between BC and CSEDQL is not significant yet is contribution to 
the study if CSEDQL 3 model is considered in this study. 
 
At this point, further test for auto/serial correlation is to be conducted to determine 
the retention of CSEDQL 3 model for where the auto/serial correlation exist in the 
model, which is likely, then another option must be employed for either i) to go for 
further analysis or ii) to change to an appropriate model that will correct or 
accommodate the auto/serial correlation among which FGLS is one (Hausman & 
Kuersteiner, 2008). 
 
6.9 Auto Correlation and Serial Correlation 
 
Auto correlation and serial correlation have something in common as the presence of 
one means the other also exists and absence of one also means none exist (Drukker, 
2003; Gong, Li, & Wang, 2011). Presence of either auto or serial correlation means 
 
 207 
the presence of noise in the time considered provided the data has element of time as 
in the case of panel where is combinations of cross section and time (Gong et al., 
2011). Auto/serial correlation is said to exist where the residuals of the model 
correlated over time since the assumption is they have zero correlation (Getmansky, 
Lo, & Makarov, 2004). For OLS or panel regression to be considered worth 
reporting, the model of the study must be free from auto/serial correlation. However, 
where a panel data has few times therefore, the issue of auto/serial correlation is not 
important (Hausman & Kuersteiner, 2008; Maekawa, Setiawan, & Mada, 2014) as 





Heteoskedasticity is a major issues when applying linear regression especially OLS. 
This is an indication of un-equal variance among the residuals that resulted from the 
heterogeneity of the data so collected (Gujarati, 2004). Assumption of linear 
regression required the residuals of the model to be heteroskedastic free otherwise 
called homoskedastic. When a model is homoskedastic however, there is need to 
bootstrap the model and if the bootstrapping failed then OLS and panel regression as 
the case maybe may not be suitable for the model thus, in the presence of 
hetersokedasticity in model other techniques of analysis other than OLS or panel 
regression is to be apply as recommended by Gujarati (2004) and Flachaire (2005). 
To identify the issue of heteroskedaticity in the model there is need to conduct a test 
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immediately after the panel regression in addition to the pooled regression in the 
case of panel data (Patriota, Lemonte, & Bolfarine, 2011).  
 
The test to be conducted is called Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity. In this case the null hypothesis proposed constant variance among 
the residual of the model or the model is homoscedastic however, the alternate said 
otherwise means the residuals of the model is not constant thus, the model is 




Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of CSEDQL 
         chi2(1)         =    10.29 
         Prob > chi2   =   0.0013 
 
From Table 6.8 the value of the chi-square obtained from the Breusch-Pagan and 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity is 10.29 and its associated probability 
values is 0.0013. Using the rule of hypothesis testing with probability value of less 
than either 1% or 5% or even 10% then the null hypothesis of that test should be 




Hence, considering 1% level of significant therefore, this study found sufficient 
evidence against the null hypothesis which said that the residuals of the model is 
homoskedastic thus is rejected. This is because the probability of the Chi-square 
found is less than 1% level of significant. This means that the residual of the model 
for this study is heteroskedstic. For that reason panel regression is not suitable for 
this study rather some techniques like Generalized Least Squares (GLS) or Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) is more suitable. This is because, in the presence 
of heteroskedaticity and/or autocorrelation, panel regression estimators is assumed to 
be biased thus, best linear unbiased estimates could not be achieved (Hausman & 
Kuersteiner, 2008; Maekawa et al., 2014).  
 
Therefore, after reporting the pooled regression model, there is need to conduct 
FGLS regression on the model to overcome the problem of heteroskedacity since the 
pooled regression may be biased on the said estimators which is against the 
econometric regression assumptions thus is not suitable in the condition of 
heteroskedasticity.  
 
However, before proceeding to utilisation of FGLS, fixed and random effect model 
is conducted on the said panel data so as to meet up the condition for the need to go 
for another model other than panel regression since it permit us to conduct serial 
correlation on the said model using F-test with the assumption that there is zero 




6.11 Regression Result and Model 
 
In econometrics, the general linear regression is a model that is generalized from the 
classical linear regression model.  From the classical assumption therefore, general 
linear regression can be obtained by altering some assumptions of classical linear 
model. This is done base on the assumption that the disturbances are non-spherical 
rather than spherical.  As a result the general linear regression model is used to 
handle data analysis with a data that is characterized by heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation problem.   
 
One of the assumptions the general linear regression model is that the errors are non-
spherical. In addition, the error term is uncorrelated with each independent variable. 
This is in contradiction to the normal classical linear regression model where in the 
classical assumption, the disturbance is required to be spherical.  
 
Unlike OLS estimator where the parameters are inefficient, not the maximum 
likelihood, incorrect thus, the estimates of the standard errors are biased and 
inconsistent rendering the hypothesis tests not valid in the presence of 
heteroskedacity and autocorrelation therefore, GLS is sound more appropriate 
estimator. However, GLS has some deficiencies this is because there is need to know 
the true values of the variances and covariances for the disturbances thus, making 
FGLS more appropriate. This is because FGLS Estimator is seen as Weighted Least 
Squares Estimator where it took a weight into considerations hence, it overcome the 
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heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problem. Even though FGLS has some steps 
in its computations, in STATA the steps are not necessary since the software used an 
expression which involve all the process in arriving at the FGLS estimators. 
 
After conducting several test as condition to use Cross-sectional time-series FGLS 
regression otherwise known as Feasible Generalized Least Square (henceforth called 
FGLS) the study find it suitable to utilize FGLS model for better, precise and 
accurate parameters. Most importantly is to maintain the un-biasness of the 
parameters as discussed earlier. Among the test conducted to prove the need for 
FGLS are heteroskedasticity test, auto/s correlation test. While those conditions are 
not satisfied then, FGLS is to be utilized against the use of other models. This is 
because, as mentioned earlier, the parameters obtained from those models are 
considered as biased in the presence of heteroskedasticity and auto/serial correlation 
(Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012; Page, 2009; Schützenmeister et al., 2012). Thus, this 
study found the need for FGLS model as all the condition for the use of other models 
failed. 
 
Table 6.10 below presents the result of the FGLS model which includes all the 
parameters of the variables, their associated standard errors, z-statistics and the 
probability values of the model for considerations. This is in addition to the R-square 
value, adjusted R-square, Wald test value for joint significant, probability of the 
Wald test, the type of the panel and the type of correlation among the error terms of 
the model. The coefficients also have indication of the level at which is significant 
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therefore, one star indicate 10% significant, two stars means is significant at 5% and 
finally, three stars means the parameter is significant at 1%. Thus, the model of the 
study can be expressed using the computed parameters shown in Table 6.9.  
 
Table 6.9 
 Coefficients:  feasible generalized least squares                                                                   
Variables   Coefficients. Std. Err. z-statistics p-value 
 
BI  0.0232** 0.0104  2.23 0.025 
BS  0.0079*** 0.0008  10.03 0.000 
BM -0.0025** 0.0013 -1.92 0.055 
DQ  0.0027*** 0.0010  2.67 0.008 
BC -0.0021 0.0038 -0.54 0.590 
ACI  0.0259* 0.0155  1.67 0.096 
NBO -7.4500*** 1.4500 -5.14 0.000 
BINBO  1.8200* 1.0600  1.71 0.088 
BSNBO  1.6100 1.1200  1.44 0.151 
BMNBO  2.2900 7.2500  0.32 0.752 
DQNBO  6.5400 1.5300  0.43 0.670 
BCNBO  7.7000** 3.7800  2.04 0.041 
ACINBO  6.7300*** 1.3200  5.09 0.000 
IND  0.0055** 0.0028  1.98 0.048 
SIZ -1.8900 2.3500 -0.80 0.421 
Prof  8.6400 7.0300  1.23 0.219 






















Statistics   Coefficients.   p-value 
 
Wald chi2(7)    372.9***                     
Prob > chi2                                                             0.000 
R-squared            0.2726    
Adj-R-squared     0.2485    
Panels:                heteroskedastic   
Correlation:         No autocorrelation   
 




CSEDQLit = 0.12 + 0.023 BIit + 0.008 BSit – 0.002 BMit + 0.003 DQit – 0.002 BCit + 
0.026 ACIit – 7.45 NBOit + 1.82 BIit×NBOit + 1.62 BSit×NBOit + 2.29 BMit×NBOit 
+ 6.54 DQit×NBOit + 7.70 BCit×NBOit + 6.73 ACIit×NBOit – 1.89 SIZit + 0.006 
INDit + 8.64 PROFit  
 
The first explanatory variables is board independence (BI) as represented in model 
above thus, this study will start explaining BI relationship with corporate social and 
environmental disclosure equality (CSEDQL) followed by Board size (BS), board 
meetings (BM), directors‘ qualification (DQ), board committees (BC), audit 
committee independence (ACI), non-executive directors‘ ownership (NBO) and 




6.12 Hypothesis One (Board Independence and CSEDQL) 
 
Board independence is seen in this study as the proportion of non-executive directors 
to total number of directors on board as define by Arena, Bozzolan and Michelon 
(2014), Haniffa and Cooke (2005). Followed by the argument previously in the 
literature, the study hypothesized that the more the non-executive directors on board 
the more the CSEDQL since it was proposed positive relation in line with 
stakeholders and agency theory. Therefore, the result of the study is expected to 
rhyme with the hypothesis so postulated as in hypothesis one. 
 
This is confirmed from the parameter ß1 as seen in the model. From model, the 
coefficient of BI is 0.023. This is clear indication of positive relationship as propose 
in hypothesis 1. This means the higher the independent directors on board the higher 
the CSEDQL as supported by stakeholders and agency theory. Thus, one increase in 
BI will bring about 0.023 increase in CSEDQL with the econometric assumption of 
other things remain constant. The relationship so established is said to be significant 
at 5% since the p-value of the z-statistics is 0.025 as seen in Table 6.9. The p-value is 
less than 5% hence, this study found a sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis 






6.13 Hypothesis Two (Board Size and CSEDQL) 
 
Thus, board size is perceived in this study as the total number of both executive and 
non-executive directors on board (Arena et al., 2014; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Base 
on the literature established on board size previously, this study hypothesized that 
the more the number directors on board the more the CSEDQL as it was proposed as 
positive relationship between BS and CSEDQL in line with stakeholders and agency 
theory. Hence, the result of the study is expected to rhyme with the hypothesis so 
postulated as in hypothesis two found in chapter 4 of this research. 
 
The proposed relationship is established in the parameter ß2 considered in the 
model. The coefficient of BS as seen in the table is 0.0079 which is positive. That 
signifies positive association as predicted by the study and proposed in hypothesis 
two. Thus, the more the number of directors on board the more the social and 
environmental disclosure quality base on the sign obtained from the coefficient of 
BS. This is an indication that, the higher the executive and non-executive directors 
on board the higher the CSEDQL as supported by stakeholders and agency theory. 
As a result, it means that one increase in number of board member will bring about 
0.008 increase in corporate social and environmental disclosure quality among 
Nigerian listed firms with the econometric assumption of other things remain 
constant. The relationship so established is said to be significant at 1% since the p-
value of the z-statistics is 0.000 as presented in Table 6.9. Since the p-value is less 
than 1% therefore, there is sufficient evidence to support the alternate hypothesis that 
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said there is relationship between board size and corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality. Accordingly, the proposed hypothesis 2 in chapter 4 which 
obviously postulates that there is positive relationship between board size and 
corporate social and environmental disclosure quality is supported.  
 
6.14 Hypothesis Three (Board Meetings and CSEDQL) 
 
The proposed relationship based on board meetings and CSEDQL is established as in 
parameter ß3 considered in model above. Form the result obtained, the coefficient of 
BM is -0.0025 which is negative. This implies that, a negative association as 
opposed to the predicted positive relationship proposed in hypothesis three. Thus, the 
more the number of meetings held by board the less the social and environmental 
disclosure quality base on the sign obtained from the coefficient of BM as negative. 
This is clear contradiction with the postulated hypothesis even though it was 
established that, there is mixed findings on the said relationship base on previous 
literature and that give this study an insight on moderation. Therefore, this outcome 
will be considered pending the moderating outcome. 
 
Base on the result obtained therefore, it is an indication that, the higher the numbers 
of meetings by board annually, the lower the corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality (CSEDQL). This means that one increase in number of meetings 
of the board members will bring about 0.0025 decreases in corporate social and 
environmental disclosure quality among Nigerian listed firms with the econometric 
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assumption of other things remain constant. The relationship so established is said to 
be significant at 10% since the p-value of the z-statistics is 0.055 as presented in 
Table 6.9 therefore, the said relationship is weak significant. This is because the p-
value is less than 10%, hence; there is sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis 
that said there is a relationship between board meetings and corporate social and 
environmental disclosure quality. Accordingly, the proposed hypothesis 3 in chapter 
4 which obviously postulates that there is positive relationship between board 
meetings and corporate social and environmental disclosure quality is supported 
subject to the moderating effect simply because of the negative parameter. In 
contrary, the study is inconsistent with Laksmana (2008). 
 
6.15 Hypothesis Four (Directors’ Qualifications and CSEDQL) 
 
The directors qualifications (DQ) is considered in this study as the total number of 
directors on board with accounting, finance and/or business and any other related 
qualifications as define by Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006). In line with the 
literature established on qualification of directors on board previously, this study 
hypothesized that the more the number of directors with accounting, finance and/or 
business qualifications on board the more the corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality in line with stakeholders and agency theory. Hence, the result of 




The proposed relationship is established as seen in the parameter ß4 found in model  
above. The coefficient of DQ is 0.003 which is positive that signifies positive 
relationship as predicted by this study and proposed in hypothesis four. Thus, the 
more the number of qualified directors on board the more the social and 
environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL) base on the sign obtained from the 
coefficient of DQ. 
 
This means that, the higher the number of directors with accounting, finance and/or 
business qualifications on board the higher the CSEDQL quality as supported by 
stakeholders and agency theory. As a result, it means that one increase in the number 
of directors with accounting, finance and/or business qualifications will bring 
about 0.003 increase in corporate social and environmental disclosure quality among 
Nigerian listed firms with the econometric assumption of other things remain 
constant. The relationship so established is said to be significant at 1% since the p-
value of the z-statistics is 0.008 as presented in Table 6.9. Since the p-value is less 
than 1% therefore, there is sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that said 
there is relationship between the number of directors with accounting, finance 
and/or business qualifications and corporate social and environmental disclosure 
quality. Accordingly, the proposed hypothesis 4 which obviously postulates that 
there is positive relationship between the number of directors with accounting, 
finance and/or business qualifications and corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality is supported. This is consistent with Haniffa and Cooke (2000) and 
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Peters and Romi (2014) where their study found positive relationship between 
directors qualifications and environmental disclosure.  
 
6.16 Hypothesis Five (Board Committees and CSEDQL)  
 
Board committees is considered in this study as the number of committees a 
company has (Upadhyay et al., 2014).  Followed by the argument previously, the 
study hypothesized that the more the numbers of committees on board the more the 
corporate social and environmental disclosure quality in line with agency theory. 
Therefore, the result of the study is expected to rhyme with the hypothesis five so 
postulated. 
 
This is however, opposed which is confirmed from the parameter ß5 as seen in 
model above. From the model, the coefficient of BC is -0.002. This is clear 
indication of negative relationship which opposes the hypothesis 6 proposed in 
chapter 4 of this study. This means the higher the number of committees on board 
the lower the corporate social and environmental disclosure quality. Accordingly, 
one increase in the number of committees on board will bring about 0.002 decrease 
in CSEDQL with the econometric assumption of other things remain constant. The 
establishment of the relationship is not significant at all level of significances since 
the p-value of the z-statistics is 0.59 as seen in Table 6.9. As the p-value is greater 
than 10%, then, this study does not have a sufficient evidence to support the alternate 
hypothesis that said there is positive relationship between BC and CSEDQL. Thus, 
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the proposed hypothesis 6 that proposed a positive relationship between audit 
committee independence and corporate social and environmental disclosure quality 
is not supported.  
 
6.17 Hypothesis Six (Audit Committee Independence and CSEDQL) 
 
Audit committee independence is considered in this study as the proportion of non-
executive auditors to total number of auditors in the committee in line with the 
definition of O‘Sullivan, Percy and Stewart (2007). Followed by the argument 
previously, the study hypothesized that the more the non-executive directors on audit 
committee the more the corporate social and environmental disclosure quality 
(CSEDQL) in line with agency theory. Therefore, the result of the study is expected 
to rhyme with the hypothesis so postulated as in hypothesis six. 
 
This is confirmed from the parameter ß6 presented in model above. From the model, 
the coefficient of ACI is 0.026. This indicates a positive relationship as propose in 
the hypothesis 6 in chapter 4 of this study. This means the higher the proportion of 
non-executive directors on board the higher the CSEDQL as supported by 
stakeholders and agency theory. Accordingly, one increase in ACI will bring about 
0.026 increase in CSEDQL with the econometric assumption of other things remain 
constant. The establishment of the relationship is said to be significant at 10% since 
the p-value of the z-statistics is 0.096 as seen in Table 6.9. As the p-value is less than 
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10% then, this study found a sufficient evidence to support the alternative hypothesis 
that said there is relationship between ACI and CSEDQL.  
 
6.18 Non-Executive Directors Ownership  
  
The non-executive directors ownership is seen in this study as the number shares 
own by the non-executive directors on board (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010). 
Followed by the argument in the literature therefore, the study expect that either 
positive or negative relationship provided it will enhance the relationship between 
the response variable corporate social and environmental disclosure quality 
(CSEDQL) and the explanatory variables which include board independence (BI), 
board size (BS), board meetings (BM), directors‘ qualification (DQ), board 
committees (BC) and audit committee independence (ACI).  
 
Base on the discussion therefore, the parameter ß7 as seen in model is the slope of 
non-executive directors‘ ownership (NBO). From model 2, the coefficient of NBO is 
-7.45. This is indicates a negative relationship. This means the higher the ownership 
of non-executive directors on board the lower the CSEDQL however, this is before 
the moderation. This study concerned is the moderation and not the direct 
relationship as seen in the model. The relationship so established is said to be 




6.18.1 Hypothesis 7a (The Interaction between Board Independence and 
CSEDQL) 
 
Thus, this study expects stronger relationship as postulated in hypothesis 7a of the 
study. Thus, the relationship between board independence (BI) and corporate social 
and environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL) is more effective when non-
executive directors‘ ownership (NBO) is introduced. Therefore, the result of the study 
is expected to rhyme with the hypothesis so postulated as in hypothesis 7a. 
 
This is confirmed from the parameter ß8 as seen in model above as the coefficient of 
BI*NBO is 1.8. This is clear indication of stronger positive relationship as compare 
to the previous parameter found in the direct relationship which is 0.023 as seen in 
hypothesis 1. This means the higher the interaction of non-executive director‘s 
ownership and independent directors on board the higher the corporate social and 
environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL) as supported by stakeholders and 
agency theory. Thus, one increase in the interaction of non-executive director‘s 
ownership and board independence (BI*NBO) will bring about 1.8 increase in 
CSEDQL with the econometric assumption of other things remain constant. The 
relationship so established is said to be significant at 10%. This is because, the p-
value of the z-statistics is 0.088 as seen in Table 6.9. Since the p-value is less than 
10% hence, this study found a sufficient evidence to support the alternate hypothesis 
that said that non-executive director‘s ownership moderates the positive relationship 
between independent directors on board and corporate social and environmental 
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disclosure quality. Thus, the hypothesis 7a which proposed non-executive directors‘ 
ownership moderates the relationship between board independence and corporate 
social and environmental disclosure quality is hereby supported.  
 
6.18.2 Hypothesis 7b (The Interaction between Board Size and CSEDQL) 
 
The proposed moderating relationship is established as in the parameter ß9 
considered in the above model. The coefficient of the interaction between board size 
and non-executive directors‘ ownership (BS*NBO) is 1.61 which is positive that 
signifies positive moderation as predicted by hypothesis 7b. This is an indication of 
stronger positive relationship as compare to the previous parameter found in the 
direct relationship which is 0.023 as in hypothesis 2. Thus, the more the interaction 
of non-executive director‘s ownership (NBO) and board size (BS), the higher the 
social and environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL) base on the sign obtained 
from the coefficient of BS*NBO as in Table 6.9 above. 
  
This is an indication that, the higher the increase in the interaction of non-executive 
director‘s ownership and board independence, the higher the higher the CSEDQL. 
Therefore, one increase in the interaction of non-executive director‘s ownership and 
board size will bring about 1.61 increase in corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality among Nigerian listed firms with the econometric assumption of 
other things remain constant. The relationship so established is not significant since 
the p-value of the z-statistics is 0.151 as presented in Table 6.9. Since the p-value is 
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greater than 10% therefore, there is no sufficient evidence to support the alternate 
hypothesis that said that the interaction of non-executive director‘s ownership and 
board size has relationship with corporate social and environmental disclosure 
quality. Accordingly, the proposed hypothesis 7b in chapter 4 is not supported.  
 
6.18.3 Hypothesis 7c (The Interaction between Board Meetings and CSEDQL) 
 
This study hypothesized that non-executive directors‘ ownership moderates the 
relationship between board meetings (BM) and corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality (CSEDQL). The empirical relationship is established in parameter 
ß10 as in model above. From the result obtained, the coefficient of the interaction 
between board meetings and non-executive directors‘ ownership (BM*NBO) is 2.29 
as against the direct relationship of -0.0025. This implies that, the moderation is 
effective on the negative association as opposed to the predicted positive relationship 
proposed in hypothesis three. Thus, the more the increase in the interaction between 
non-executive ownership on board and the number of meetings held by board the 
more the social and environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL) base on the sign 
obtained from the coefficient of BM*NBO as positive. The result obtained is in line 
with hypothesis 7c.  
 
However, the relationship is not significant since the p-value of the z-statistics is 
0.752 as presented in Table 6.9. This is because the p-value is greater than 10% 
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hence; there is no sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis. Accordingly, the 
proposed hypothesis 7c in chapter 4 not supported. 
 
6.18.4 Hypothesis 7d (The Interaction between Directors’ Qualifications and 
CSEDQL) 
 
It is argued by this study that, the non-executive director‘s ownership could 
moderate the relationship between the number of directors with accounting, 
finance and/or business qualifications on board and the corporate social and 
environmental disclosure quality in line with stakeholders and agency theory. Hence, 
the result of the study is expected to agree with the hypothesis 7d of the study.  
 
The proposed relationship is established as seen in the parameter ß11 found in model  
above. The coefficient of interaction between directors‘ qualification and non-
executive directors‘ ownership (DE*NBO) is 6.54 which is positive that signifies 
positive relationship as predicted by hypothesis 7b. Thus, the more the increase in 
the interaction between qualified directors on board and non-executive directors‘ 
ownership the more the social and environmental disclosure quality as supported by 
stakeholders and agency theory. As a result, it means that one increase in the 
interaction of DQ and NBO will bring about 6.54 increase in corporate social and 
environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL) among Nigerian listed firms however, 
the relationship is insignificant as the p-value is 0.675. Thus, this study conclude 
that, there is no sufficient evidence to support the alternate hypothesis that said the 
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relationship between the directors‘ qualification (DQ) and corporate social and 
environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL) is positively moderated by non-
executive director‘s ownership. Accordingly, the proposed hypothesis 7d is not 
supported.  
 
6.18.5 Hypothesis 7e (The Interaction between Board Committees and 
CSEDQL) 
 
This study hypothesized in hypothesis 7e that non-executive directors‘ ownership 
(NBO) moderates the relationship between board committees (BC) and corporate 
social and environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL).  
 
This is however, opposed which is confirmed from the parameter ß12 as seen in 
model above. From model, the coefficient of the interaction between board 
committees and non-executive directors‘ ownership (BC*NBO) is 7.7 as opposed to 
the direct relationship found with negative parameter of 0.002. This is clear 
indication of good moderation which gives an opposite of the direct relationship 
obtained and more importantly the said relationship so established is statistically 
significant at 5%. This result opposes the hypothesis 6 of the study. This means the 
higher the interaction between BC and NBO the higher the CSEDQL as supported 
by hypothesis 7e. As a result, it means that one increase in the interaction of BC and 
NBO will bring about 7.7 increase in corporate social and environmental disclosure 
quality among Nigerian listed firms. The relationship found is significant at 5% since 
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the p-value of the z-statistics is 0.04 as seen in Table 6.9. As the p-value is less than 
5% then, this study has sufficient evidence to support the alternate hypothesis that 
said there is moderation on the relationship between BC and CSEDQL. Thus, the 
proposed hypothesis 7e is hereby supported.  
 
6.18.6 Hypothesis 7f (The Interaction between Audit Committee Independence 
and CSEDQL) 
 
Followed by the argument previously, the study hypothesized that non-executive 
director‘s ownership (NBO) moderates the relationship between the audit committee 
independence (ACI) and the corporate social and environmental disclosure quality 
(CSEDQL). Therefore, the result is expected to rhyme with hypothesis 7f. 
 
This is confirmed from the parameter ß13 as seen in the model above. From model, 
the coefficient of the interaction between the audit committee independence and non-
executive director‘s ownership (ACI*NBO) is 6.73 and is statistically significant at 
1% where the direct relationship parameter is 0.026 and is significant also at 10%. 
This is clear indication of positive moderating effect of non-executive director‘s 
ownership on the relationship between ACI and CSEDQL as propose in the 
hypothesis 7f in chapter 4 of this study. This means the higher the interaction of ACI 
and NBO the higher the CSEDQL as supported by stakeholders and agency theory. 
Accordingly, one increase in interaction of ACI and NBO will bring about 6.73 
increase in CSEDQL. The establishment of the relationship is said to be significant 
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at 1% since the p-value is 0.000 as seen in Table 6.9. The study found sufficient 
evidence to support the alternate hypothesis. Thus, the proposed hypothesis 7f that 
proposed otherwise is thereby supported.  
 
6.19 Model Fitness and Overall Significance 
 
The fitness of the model is another yet, an important aspect of regression analysis as 
many researchers proposed better model which represent the true value of the 
research. In doing so, it was also argued that, the more the model is fit the more 
accurate is the precision of the parameters found from the model (Gill & Hevner, 
2011). It was also argued that, the fitness of the model determine the strength of the 
model, hence, the power of the said model to predict with high level of accuracy is 
seen as the mirror of the model fitness (Baltagi, 2011; Hansen, 2009). The model 
fitness can be measure using R-square value. 
 
Depends on the type of data used, the R-square can either be 5%-20% as weak 
model, 21%-50% as moderate and above 50 as strong however, as the model is 
getting stronger entails the study is about to be completed in the area of concerned 
(Cheng, Leung, & Yu, 2014; Israeli, 2007). This is because, the R-square is the 
percentage of the explained variables accounted for by the explanatory variables, 
hence, the maximum R-square is 100% (Baltagi, 2011; Hansen, 2009). It is 
important to note that, as R-square is getting low, the fitness of the model will also 
be less and the more the increase in the independent variable in the model, the more 
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the R-square increase thereby making the fitness of the model to be stronger 
(Flachaire, 2005; Grewal et al., 2004).  
 
Researchers recommend from 10% above for a panel data, thus, this study R-square 
is 27% hence the model fitness of the study is moderate and could be said to be fitted 
for the analysis. This means that board independence, board size, board meetings, 
director‘s qualifications, board committees, audit committees independence and non-
executive director‘s ownership jointly accounted for 27% changes in corporate social 
and environmental disclosure quality among the listed firms in Nigeria from 2010 to 
2014 inclusive. Unlike the R-square that concentrate on the independent variables, 
the adjusted R-square represents both the independent variables and the number of 
observations of the study. Thus, the adjusted R-square is normally less than the 
adjusted R-square due to some adjustment considered in process of its calculation 
where the number of observation is one (Baltagi, 2011). The adjusted R-square for 
this study is 25% which also moderate and explained the 500 observations for the 
study including the corporate governance variables accounted 25% of the CSEDQL 
and is thereby accepted as the model fitness. 
 
On the part of significances however, there is need to know if all the independent 
variables of the model are jointly significant in explaining changes in the explained 
variable. This is because, an independent variable can be individually insignificant 
and collectively insignificant thus, such variable need to be drop as recommended by 
Gujurati (2004). On contrary, where a variable is not significant individually but is 
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significant collectively, the variable must be included in the model provided is not 
collinear with other independent variables (Dougherty, 2007; Gujarati, 2004; 
Wooldridge, 2011). One of the way to identify the collective significances is either 
F-statistics Chi or  Wald Chi Statistics with their associated probability (Baltagi, 
2011). If the F-statistics or Wald Statistics is significant (p-value is less than 5%) 
therefore, the study can conclude that all the explanatory including the interactive 
variables are jointly significant in explaining changes in the dependent variable.  
 
Base on the result of Wald Chi Statistics including its associated probability obtained 
from Table 6.9 therefore, the study found that board independence, board size, board 
meetings, director‘s qualifications, board committees, audit committees 
independence and non-executive director‘s ownership including all the interaction 
between non-executive director‘s ownership and all the independent variables, the 
control variables are jointly significant in explaining changes in corporate social and 
environmental disclosure quality. This is because; the probability of Wald test is 
0.0000 which is significant with the Wald Chi value of 372.9. This signified that 
those hypothesis that were not supported individually cannot be drop hence they 
must be included in the model according the Wald test of the study. Therefore, the 
model of the study is fitted and all the independent variables are important in 




In conclusion the model of the study represents all the findings of the study since is 
fitted, and jointly the independent variables of the model are statistically significant 
in explaining changes on the dependent variable.  
 
6.20 Summary of the Chapter 
 
This chapter established relationship between CGM and CSEDQL. The chapter 
discussed the trend of the disclosure; the descriptive statistics, the correlation and 
multicollinearity test. Other analysis discussed include the regression result, 
heteroskedacity and autocorrelation/serial correlation. At the end of the regression 
result the summary of the findings is derived as follows: 
 
 Based on the result stipulated in Table 6.9, BI, BS and DQ are found to have 
positive and significant influence on CSEDQL. However, BM and NBO 
have negative and significant impact on CSEDQL. Meanwhile BC have no 
significant relationship with CSEDQL. 
 
 After moderation, NBO positively and significantly moderates the 
relationships between BI and CSEDLQ, BC and CSEDQL and ACI and 
CSEDQL. While the relationship between BS and CSEDQL, BM and 
CSEDQL and DQ and CSEDQL were not moderated by NBO. 





Table 6.10  
Summary of the Tested Hypothesis 
 Hypothesis Sign Findings Decision 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the 
percentage of non-executive directors on board 





H2: There is a positive relationship between board 




H3: There is a positive association between the 






H4: There is a positive association between the 
number of directors with accounting, finance 






H5: There is a positive relationship between the 





H6: There is a positive relationship between 






H7a: The relationship between board independence 
and CSED quality is moderated by non-





H7b: The relationship between board size and CSED 







H7c: The relationship between board meetings 
frequency and CSED quality is moderated by 










From the Table 6.10 above, four direct hypothesis were supported with one supported 
but opposite direction, and one is not supported. Meanwhile, three moderating 
hypothesis were supported and the other three were not supported. In total, for both 
direct and moderating hypothesis, seven hypotheses were supported and four were not 
supported. The study gives details of the factors that contributed to the corporate 
social and environmental disclosure quality among listed firms in Nigeria. 
Next chapter discussed the findings of the study, the implication of the study, the 











H7d: The relationship between the proportion of 
directors on board with at least accounting, 
business and finance qualification and CSED 







H7e: The relationship between the presence of board 
committee and CSED quality is moderated by 





H7f: The relationship between audit committee 
independence and CSED quality is moderated 












This chapter discussed about the summary and conclusion of the study where it 
started with the overview of the study, a summary of the findings, research 
implications and recommendations of the findings and the conclusion of the findings. 
In the process, it highlights the impact of BI and corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality (CSEDQL), BS and CSEDQL, BM and CSEDQL, DQ and 
CSEDQL, BC and CSEDQL and finally ACI and CSEDQL. In addition, the chapter 
discussed the role of NBO on the direct relationships. 
 
7.2 Overview of the Study 
 
There is a high level of environmental pollution in Nigeria since as mentioned earlier 
is considered among the largest polluted country in the world via the release of 
carbon from the company that operated in the Nigerian society. Even though this is 
mostly attributed to oil companies, however, all companies in one way or the other 
contributed negatively to the environment which raises the alarm by stakeholders. 
Despite this negative effect of the operating firms in Nigeria, they pay less attention 
to environmental issues in addition to social issues. Thus, so many agitations by 
stakeholders against the companies were raised, especially in Niger Delta, where it 
metaphors to militancy among other security and social injustice. This could be said 
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to arise as a result of poor reporting of social and environmental issues in the 
respective company‘s annual reports and account which could serve as a medium of 
communication with its relevant stakeholders.   
 
This attracts scholars on social and environmental studies to pay attention as to the 
factors that lead to the poor reporting and the agitations of the stakeholders through 
the agents of the companies called CGM. That led to the use of stakeholders and 
agency theories where this study focussed. This is done through the establishment of 
the relationship between CGM such as board independence, board size, board 
meetings, director‘s education, board committees, audit committee independence and 
corporate social and environmental disclosure quality. 
 
Since there is few studies in the area of social and environmental disclosure in 
Nigeria in addition to the mixed result found in the previous studies therefore, this 
study reviewed and investigate the moderating effect of non-executive ownership on 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and the corporate social 
and environmental quality among Nigerian listed firms from 2010 to 2014 years 
inclusive. Part of the contribution of this study is the moderator which plays an 
intensive role on the mixed result found previously.  In order to maintain the quality 
of the disclosure however, this study used Global Reporting Initiative to measure the 
quality of the disclosure of social and environmental issues using checklist measured 
by un-weighted index. This is in line with the argument of Cormier et al. (2005) 
where the study supported the measurement of quality as GRI checklist usage and 
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recommends the use of un-weighted index to avoid biasness on the checklist used. 
Other variables used in the study are the control variables which include firm size, 
industry and profitability. This is to provide more fitness of the model. 
 
7.3 Discussion of Findings 
 
The findings of the study are briefly discussed below. These include the relationship 
between board independence (BI), board size (BS), board meetings (BM), directors‘ 
qualifications (DQ), board committees (BC), audit committee independence (ACI) 
and corporate social and environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL). Others 
include the moderating effect of non-executive directors‘ ownership on the 
relationship between board independence (BI) and CSEDQL, board size (BS) and 
CSEDQL, board meetings (BM) and CSEDQL, directors‘ qualifications (DQ) and 
CSEDQL, board committees (BC) and CSEDQL, audit committee independence 
(ACI) and CSEDQL. 
 
7.3.1 Relationship between Board Independence and CSEDQL 
 
The result of this study shows that the relationship between board independence (BI) 
and corporate social and environmental disclosure quality (CSEDQL) is positively 
significant. This can be seen in Table 6.9 with the parameter value of 0.0232. The 
result prove that, the presence of non-executive directors on board improve corporate 
social and environmental disclosure quality. This is argued by many researchers such 
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as Ho and Wong (2001) and Haniffa and Cooke (2005). It is also argued that, the 
independent directors paid more attention to disclosure issues which include both 
social and environmental disclosure. It is also argued based on agency theory that, 
non-executive directors are in a better position to check and balance the activities of 
board which could improve board efficiency and more effective through the 
reduction of agency disagreements between managers of the firm and owners of the 
firm as supported by agency theory (Liao & Lu, 2009). In addition, stakeholder 
theory supported the said relationship since, it comes into play to maintained the 
relationship between the directors, the shareholders and the community. They also 
control the disclosure of fraudulent activities and pay attention to standard of 
reporting. Thus, their actions expect to increase not only the disclosure but the 
quality of such disclosure where social and environmental issues are inclusive. 
 
Furthermore, this study confirmed that any additional non-executive director on board 
will bring about an increase on social and environmental disclosure quality. This can 
be explained practically, since on average a listed company in Nigeria has at least two 
non-executive directors on board and they are performing their duty as prescribed by 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria. This is because, the main reason for 
their presence is for check and balance and also to improve the disclosure as 
supported by agency theory (Arena, Bozzolan & Michelon, 2014). Their presence 
could also maintained the relationship between the mangers and the stakeholders as 
supported by stakeholder theory. The result of the study is in line with Post, Rahman, 
and Rubow (2011) and Huang and Kung (2010) where their study found positive 
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relationship between board independence and environmental disclosure. However, the 
study is inconsistent with other studies like Barako et al. (2006) as well as Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) in terms of disclosure which includes CSED. 
 
7.3.2 Relationship between Board Size and CSEDQL 
 
Another important corporate governance mechanism is board size which plays an 
important role on disclosure. The board size is also found to be positively and 
significantly related to CSEDQL with the coefficient of 0.0079 as seen in Table 6.9. 
This is because board size could control information flow as there will be variety of 
experienced and qualified directors as a result of their numbers on board. It is also 
argued that, as an important component of CGM, large board could tackle larger 
information and deliberate more on disclosure of information of both financial and 
non-financial issue hence, which could translate into more disclosure of information 
in an annual report of company. The argument supported by agency theory where it 
indicated that the larger the members of the board, the more the competency of the 
board members hence, the extra the disclosure (Eugene, Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; 
Lim et al., 2007). The presence of larger board could also address the problem of 
stakeholders through more disclosure of social activities as supported by 
stakeholder theory (Barako et al., 2008). It is also claimed by Lim et al. (2007) 
that, the more the directors on board the more the attention to other disclosure 
issues which include social and environmental disclosure. Furthermore, the number 
of both executive and non-executive directors determine the check and balances of 
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the activities of board thereby resulting to a positive on disclosure, in the case of 
this study, corporate social and environmental disclosure quality and this could be 
attributed to the board efficiency and effectiveness as supported by stakeholders-
agency theory (Liao & Lu, 2009).  
 
Moreover, this study established beyond reasonable doubt that any additional member 
of director on board determines the increase on social and environmental disclosure 
quality. This is because, the relationship is positively significant. The result is 
consistent with Cormier et al. (2011), Huang & Kung (2010) and Cormier, Ledoux 
and Magnan (2011) where their study found positive relationship between board size 
and environmental disclosure.. 
 
This could be true as the minimum number of board‘s members a listed company has 
in Nigeria is 5 with a maximum number of 20 and average number of 10 members as 
seen in Table 6.2. This is  argued by Cormier et al. (2011) and Huang & Kung (2010) 
where they claimed that, the more the size of the board increases, the likely the 
increase in social and environmental disclosure. This in addition is supported by 
Germain, Galy and Lee (2014). In contrary, the study is inconsistent with other 






7.3.3 Relationship between Board Meetings and CSEDQL 
 
The result obtained in Table 6.9 indicates a negative relationship between board 
meetings and CSEDQL with the parameter of 0.0025. The meeting of the board is seen 
as important CGM. In terms of disclosure however, it was considered a monitoring 
mechanisms (Germain et al., 2014). In some instances, board meetings frequently is 
seen as an indication of seriousness by board members in tackling issues raised by the 
company and its stakeholders in addition to any other related business which include 
the financial and non-financial disclosure where social and environmental issues is not 
in isolation. This is not supported by the stakeholder theory and according to Chen, 
Firth, Gao, and Rui, (2006) the number of board meeting could be seen as the 
persistence and watchfulness of board in discharging their functions and duties as 
monitoring mechanisms.  
 
However, the result found is inconsistent with other findings such as Khanchel  
(2007) and  Lim et al. (2007). This could be attributed to the fact that social and 
environmental disclosure is at infant stage in Nigerian situations, in fact most of the 
companies disclose information on social and environmental issues as a result of 
stakeholders pressure (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010). Another possible explanation 
is that, even though they have meetings annually as prescribed by Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Nigeria (SEC), most of the company have only two 
meetings as against the recommended four meetings annually by the SEC. In 
addition to that, the members of board could said to pay less attention to the social 
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and environmental issues in their meetings if such negative relationship is 
established (Nelson, Gallery & Percy, 2010).   
  
Another issue that could explained the contradictory nature of the result is the need 
for a moderator since it was indicated earlier that there was mixed findings in 
previous researches. This is clearly the condition for a moderator (Ahmed & 
Duellman, 2007). Therefore, this study introduced moderator to overcome this kind 
of scenerio which could be seen later in the study. After the moderation, the result is 
therefore expected to be positive so as to be in line with the agency theory. 
 
7.3.4 Relationship between Directors’ Qualifications and CSEDQL 
 
The expertise of the directors on board base on their qualification is also an 
important aspect of CGM where it has an important role to play on disclosure of 
social and environmental quality issues. Directors‘ qualification is found to be 
positively related to CSEDQL and is statistically significant with coefficient of 
0.0027 as seen in Table 6.9. This is because, the qualifications could be a prerequisite for 
control of information flow, especially the disclosure aspect as there will be variety 
of qualified directors as a result of their qualification held. The reason for that is the 
more the qualified directors on board the more the directors are said to be qualified 
to tackle any information and could be considered more active on disclosure of 
information of both financial and non-financial issue therefore, the more the 
disclosure in an annual report of company (Gray, 1988).  
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Thus, this study established beyond reasonable doubt that any additional member of 
directors with accounting, finance and/or business qualifications on board 
determines the increase on social and environmental disclosure quality. This could be 
attributed to the fact that on average five members of the board among Nigerian listed 
firms has at least accounting, finance and/or business qualifications as seen in the 
Table 6.2. This is supported by many studies as the larger the qualified members on 
board the more the possibility for competency of the board members hence, the more 
the disclosure (Lim et al., 2007). It is also argued that, the more the qualified 
directors on board the more the attention to disclosure issues which include both 
social and environmental disclosure. Additionally, the number of qualified 
directors on board determine the quality of their activities on board thereby 
resulting to an improvement on disclosure in general thus, corporate social and 
environmental disclosure will be improve by the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the board (Gul & Leung, 2004; Welford, 2007) as supported by stakeholders-
agency theory. The theory prove that there is high tendencies for qualified directors 
to monitor the disclosure of some activities that are considered unlawful thus, 
improving the standard of the reporting (Gul & Leung, 2004). As a result of their 
high qualified representations, their activities believe to improve not only the 
disclosure but the quality of such disclosure hence, improve on social and 





7.3.5 Relationship between Board Committees and CSEDQL 
 
The relationship between board committees and CSEDQL is not significant as seen 
in Table 6.9 even though the parameter is negative, the relationship is said to be by 
chance. In the case of the committees, the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Nigeria (SEC) give the directors of the company‘s power to delegate some of their 
duties to committees; this is in line with the SEC rules where the delegation of their 
duties to other committees is under their jurisdiction. For example, the board of 
directors assign few of its obligations to sub committees, in which agency theory 
persist that it lead to management control hence, shareholders protection (Aebi et al., 
2012; Engel et al., 2010; Hoitash et al., 2009). In addition, the committee could 
relieved the activities of the directors thereby resulting to more disclosure and 
credible information which could address the strakeholders concerned as supported 
by stakeholder theory (Welford, 2007). Based on the reason mentioned above, the 
sub-committees of the boards also can be factor determinants of board effectiveness 
since their roles are now diversified for efficiency, accountability and transparency 
on any duty performed. One of the reason for their effectiveness is as a result of the 
size of the committees (Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2014; Engel et 
al., 2010). 
 
For accountability and accuracy therefore, companies form an audit committee, risk 
management committee, remuneration committee, environmental committee among 
others with the responsibility of compliance and transparency. These set of committees 
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of auditors are part of governance mechanism that monitor disclosure of an 
organizations which include social and environmental disclosure (Caskey et al, 2010). 
 
According to SEC, every company operating in Nigeria must have at least one 
committee where audit committee is mandatory (Securities Exchange Commissions, 
2011). The number of committees on board could play a significant role on 
disclosure of both financial and non-financial issues including the standard of the 
disclosure (Rodrigue et al., 2013). It is also argued that, number of committees 
could enhance the attention to disclosure issues which include both social and 
environmental. Moreover, more committees on board are expected to tackle many 
situations hence, could balance and control the companies which could improve the 
board efficiency and effectiveness (Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard, 2009).  
 
Contrary to the expectation therefore, this study could not establish that an additional 
number of committee on board will bring about an increase/decrease on social and 
environmental disclosure quality. Thus any relationship seen in Table 6.10 previously 
is said to happen by chance only. This is as a result of the fact that majority of firms 
in Nigeria have two committees only instead of three and above as seen in Table 6.2. 
As argued by Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard (2009) that the presence of few 
committees could also reduce those activities that are not up to standard on the said 
disclosure thus; the standard of reporting could be undervalued as a result of few 
committees‘ presence. However, the contradictory nature of the result could be 
explained by the need for a moderator since it was indicated earlier that there was 
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mixed findings in previous researches (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007). Therefore, this 
study used modeartor to overcome the negative result which could be seen later in 
the study. After the moderation, the result is therefore expected to be positive and 
significant so as to be in line with the agency theory. 
 
7.3.6 Relationship between Audit Committee Independence and CSEDQL 
 
The relationship between audit committees independence and CSEDQL is positively 
significant with parameter 0.0259 as seen in Table 6.9. As earlier discussed in the 
literature, audit involve the step by step of ratifications of accountability and 
compliance of both financial and non-financial  measures in line with rule of law set 
by an organization base on the guideline of the countries standard settings which in 
turn translate to transparency in such organization (Choi et al., 2010; Goodwin-Stewait 
& Kent, 2006). For accountability and accuracy therefore, companies form an audit 
committee with the responsibility of compliance and transparency. This committee of 
auditors is one aspect of governance mechanism that monitor disclosure of an 
organizations which include social and environmental disclosure (Goodwin-Stewait & 
Kent, 2006). 
 
According to Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria, every company 
operating in Nigeria must have an audit committee which will also have at least one 
non-executive member on board (SEC, 2011). The number of non-executive 
members on board could play a significant role on disclosure of both financial and 
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non-financial issues including the standard of the disclosure (Ho & Wong, 2001; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). It is also argued that, the non-executive auditors in audit 
committee paid more attention to disclosure issues which include both social and 
environmental. In addition, non-executive directors are assume to be in a better 
situation to control and balance the activities of the committee which could 
improve the committee efficiency and effectiveness (Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 
2002). It is important to note that, the audit committee independence does not mean 
an increase in the burden of audit committee rather is an indication of the level of 
independency of the committee which could play a role on the quality and quantity 
of disclosure. Their presence could also checkmate other activities that are 
suspicious in nature on the said disclosure thus; the standard of reporting could also 
be improved. Consequently, their presence is expected to improve the quality of the 
disclosure as per as social and environmental is concern. 
 
Furthermore, this study confirmed that an additional non-executive auditor on the 
committee will bring about an increase on social and environmental disclosure 
quality. This as discussed earlier is seen the parameter of the ACI which is 
statistically significant. The result obtained can also be attributed to the fact that firms 
in Nigeria have high proportion of non-executive directors on audit committee which 
according to Barako et al. (2006) and Ho and  Wong  (2001) it imporve the 
disclsoure of social and environmetal details in addition to its quality. The result is 
also supported by the stakeholder and agency theory where the agency argued in 
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favour of the audit committees since they represent the company and thus, want to 
protect the image of the companies in the eyes of its stakeholders. 
 
7.4 Non-Executive Directors Ownership  
 
The relationship between NBO and CSEDQL is negatively significant with 
parameter 7.4500 as seen in Table 6.9. The ownership of board is seen as the key 
influence on the decision making by the board of directors (Ahmed & Duellman, 
2007). The more the board members own stock, the more likely they have keen 
interest on the activities of the company, thus, disclosure changes based on that 
interest (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008). The said ownership could be executive 
directors or non-executive directors and non-executive directors who have shares 
tend to play a significant role on the disclosure, in other words, they will protect the 
image of the company in the eyes of the stakeholders via pushing of transparency in 
the disclosure (Mak & Li, 2001; Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010). 
 
The ownership of the non-executive members of the board independence is also a 
key player on disclosure of information for both financial and non-financial in an 
annual report of company since there could be some element of control that could 
strengthen the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism (CGM) 
and the quality of disclosure. It is argued that, the non-executive directors that own 
stock in a firm paid more attention to disclosure issues which include both social 
and environmental ones as asserted by  Haniffa and Cooke (2005). Some scholars 
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believed that, those non-executive directors with stock ownership are better 
yardstick in terms of disclosure issues and CGM. For example, Ang et al. (2000) 
suggested that, even though non-executive directors are expected to be the highest 
controlling mechanism on the board, their roles would be more effective if they 
have significant shares in the company.  
 
As seen in the result the NBO is negatively statistically significant. Since the NBO 
is introduced as moderator therefore, is expected to strengthen the relationship of 
the variables concerned in respective of the direction of the relationship established 
between the NBO and CSDEQL. This can be argued that, the more the shares held 
by non-executive directors of a firm, the more they monitor the firms‘ management 
and performance thereby, resulting into increase on disclosure (Zattoni & Cuomo, 
2010). Just like other CGM, the non-executive directors with stock ownership could 
also checkmate the disclosure of fraudulent activities and pay attention to standard of 
reporting. Thus, their actions expect to increase not only the disclosure but the 
quality of such disclosure where social and environmental issues are inclusive. 
 
7.4.1 The Moderating Effect of Non-Executive Directors’ Ownership on the 
relationship between Board Independence and CSEDQL 
 
The moderating effect of non-executive directors‘ ownership on the relationship 
between board independence and CSEDQL is found to be positively significant with 
parameter of 1.8200 as seen in Table 6.9. This is because, previous literature established 
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mixed results in the case of board independence and corporate social and 
environmental disclosure as discussed earlier. For example, Brammer and Pavelin 
(2006) could not able to establish a significant association on board independence 
and CED, other studies confirmed the presence of positive relationship between the 
ratio of non-executive directors and CED by Post, Rahman, and Rubow (2011). This 
is also confirmed by Huang and Kung (2010). Therefore, this study deduced the 
relationship among board independence and CED is mixed and that triggered 
moderation. In consistent with agency theory therefore, Mohd, Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006), argued that, the larger the amount of equity interests by the non-
executive directors the greater the incentive for the directors to monitor the 
management hence, the more the disclosure thus, this study hypothesized that the 
positive relationship between board independence and CSEDQL is moderated by non-
executive directors ownership.  
 
Furthermore, this study confirmed that any additional interaction between non-
executive director ownership and board independence will bring about increase on 
social and environmental disclosure quality ceteris paribus. This is because there is 
sufficient evidence to claim the said relationship as the p-value found is less than 
10%. The result could be attributed to the fact that, Nigerian firms have a number of 
non-executive directors that owns a good number of shares hence, are expected to pay 
more attention to the disclosure of social and environmental issues so as to protect 
their investment. The result is also supported by stakeholder theory in addition to 
agency theory, where the result confirmed that, any increase in board independence in 
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the presence of more non-executive directors who owns shares, will increase 
corporate social and environmental disclosure quality.  
 
7.4.2 The Moderating Effect of Non-Executive Directors Ownership on the 
relationship between Board Size and CSEDQL 
 
The moderating effect of non-executive directors‘ ownership on the relationship 
between board size and CSEDQL is found to be positive however, is insignificant 
with parameter of 1.6100 as seen in Table 6.9. This is as a result of yet another important 
mixed result established in the case of board size. For instance, while Cormier et al. 
(2011), Huang & Kung (2010) and Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan (2011) established 
positive relationship between board size and CED, some could not establish any 
relationship between board size and sustainability/CED (see Michelon & Parbonetti, 
2012). Other studies also proved to establish a negative association between board 
sized and social and/or environmental disclosure (Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Cormier 
et al., 2010). This is due to fact that, board size could control information flow as 
there will be variety of experienced and qualified directors as a result of their 
numbers on board as supported by stakeholder and agency theory. Therefore, this 
study deduced the relationship between board size and CSED, need to be moderated. 
Hence, this study hypothesized that the positive relationship between board size and 




In addition, this study could not confirm that any additional interaction between non-
executive director ownership on board and board size will bring about increase on 
social and environmental disclosure quality. This is because there is no sufficient 
evidence to claim the said relationship as the p-value found is greater than 10%. This 
could be attributed to the number of board as many Nigerian companies have large 
board size hence, could lead to some difficulties in controlling their opinion and their 
decision (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Due to their number however, the alteration 
of their report could not be simple as the board members could think their opinion 
represent the majority, thus, the non-executive directors who owns stock will find it 
difficult to intervene even if the opinion of the board is not in favour of the firm.  
 
7.4.3 The Moderating Effect of Non-Executive Directors Ownership on the 
relationship between Board Meetings and CSEDQL 
 
The moderating effect of non-executive directors‘ ownership on the relationship 
between board meetings and CSEDQL is found to be positive however, is 
insignificant with the value of 2.2900 parameter as shown in Table 6.9. This followed 
by established mixed result associated with board meetings which is yet important 
CGM. This is confirmed by Laksmana (2008) where a study is conducted on board 
meetings and found that, the more the meetings of the board the high the chance of 
transparency of an organization. In order words, there is sufficient evidence of 
positive relationship between frequency of board meetings and voluntary disclosure 
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(CSED inclusive). Nevertheless, in their analysis, Cormier et al. (2010) found no 
evidence of relationship between board meetings regularly and voluntary CED. 
  
In line agency theory therefore, Mohd et al. (2006) argued that, the larger the 
amount of equity interests by the non-executive directors the greater the incentive for 
the directors to monitor the management hence, the more the disclosure therefore, this 
study hypothesized that non-executive directors ownership moderates the relationship 
between board meetings and CSEDQL. In addition, stakeholder theory also give 
support on the non-executive directors role on disclosure which support same 
direction. Thus, this study expects stronger relationship as postulated in hypothesis 7c. 
Thus, the relationship between BM and CSEDQL is more effective when non-
executive director‘s ownership is introduced.  
 
The result could not established the so, therefore, the result of the study did not 
support hypothesis 7c. This could be attributed to the low number of board meetings 
by Nigerian companies where most of the companies have only have three with even 
some two meetings which below the standard of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Nigeria.  This lead to some low reporting hence their performance 
could also be insignificant. Due to the low turnout of the board meetings therefore, 
the non-executive directors who owns stock will definitely have low input and even if 
the non-executive directors have more input that depends on the board meetings as is 
only where a meeting held other issues could be deliberated hence, the disclosure can 
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be considered. Therefore, the insignificancies of the moderation can be explained by 
the low number of meetings annually by listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
7.4.4 The Moderating Effect of Non-Executive Directors Ownership on the 
relationship between Directors’ Qualifications and CSEDQL 
 
The moderating effect of non-executive directors‘ ownership on the relationship 
between directors‘ qualifications and CSEDQL is found to be positive however, is 
insignificant with the parameter of 6.5400 as shown in Table 6.9. The relationship 
between the director‘s qualifications and CSEDQL is also found to be mixed. For 
instance, Haniffa and Cooke (2000) conducted a study in Malaysia but on voluntary 
disclosure generally and established an insignificant association however, Barako, 
Hancock and Izan (2006) found the relationship between the number of board 
members with accounting and/or business with voluntary disclosure to be 
significantly positive. This is also in line many studies that proposed the larger the 
qualified members on board the more possibility for competency of the board 
members hence, the more the disclosure (Lim et al., 2007).  
 
Furthermore, this study found no significant interaction on the relationship between 
directors‘ qualifications and CSEDQL even though there is slide improvement in the 
parameters obtained from the interaction on the said relationship which is 6.54 as 
against the direct relationship of  0.0027, the said relationship is said to happen by 
chance.  This can be explained by looking at the composition of board members in 
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relation tom their qualifications among listed firms in Nigeria. Majority of the board 
members of the firms have other qualifications other than those mentioned to be 
qualified for decision making on social and environmental disclosure quality. Due to 
low qualified members on board therefore, there is high tendency that the CSEDQL 
will also be low (Welford, 2007) and this is confirmed by this study from the 
insignificant moderating relationship found. The study is consistent with the 
stakeholder and agency theory where the theories supported that, the more the 
qualified directors, the more the quality of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure. Since, members of the board have low qualifications to determine 
disclosure issue therefore, the non-executive directors‘ that own shares have limited 
role to play on the board members as their opinion could be trashed by the board 
members due to fact that, they lack knowledge on disclosure issues. 
 
7.4.5 The Moderating Effect of Non-Executive Directors Ownership on the 
relationship between Board Committees and CSEDQL 
 
The moderating effect of non-executive directors‘ ownership on the relationship 
between board committees and CSEDQL is found to be positively significant with 
parameter of 7.7000 as seen in Table 6.9. This could be attributed to the fact that, many 
studies found contradicted results on the relationship between board committees and 
social/environmental disclosure. For instance while, McKendall et al. (1999), 
Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) could not establish an association between the 
presence of social responsibility committee and disclosure, Peters and Romi (2014) 
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reported a positive relationship between the CER committee presence and CED 
among other committees. In addition, Hassan and Ibrahim (2012) documented a 
positive linked between the presence of committees and quantity and the quality of 
CSD. As earlier stated, Mohd, Ghazali and Weetman (2006), argued that, the larger 
the amount of equity interests by the non-executive directors the greater the incentive 
for the directors to monitor the management hence, the more the disclosure. 
 
As stated earlier, this study found a significant positive moderation of non-executive 
directors‘ ownership on the relationship between board committees and CSEDQL. 
This could be attributed to the level of committees among the listed firms in Nigeria as 
majority of the firms meet the requirements of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Nigeria. The non-executive directors that own stock in the company 
can participate in various committees formed thus could monitor the activities of the 
committees due to their presence in those committees. It is important to note that, the 
participation of non-executive directors that own stock in the company depends on the 
number of committees considered in the firms. When committees are high their 
participation could be high and vice versa. Thus, this study found an evidence that the 
more the interaction between non-executive directors‘ ownership and board 
committees, the more the corporate social and environmental disclosure quality. The 





7.4.6 The Moderating Effect of Non-Executive Directors Ownership on the 
relationship between Audit Committee Independence and CSEDQL 
 
The moderating effect of non-executive directors‘ ownership on the relationship 
between audit committee independence and CSEDQL is found to be positively 
significant with parameter of 6.7300 as seen in Table 6.9. The committee of auditors is 
one aspect of governance mechanism that monitor disclosure of an organizations 
which include social and environmental disclosure (Goodwin-Stewait & Kent, 2006). 
Previous literature on the relationship between audit committee independence and 
CSEDQL established mixed findings for example, some studies empirically shows 
that there is positive relationship between audit committee independence and the 
disclosure but voluntary disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Ho & Shun Wong, 2001) 
while O‘Sullivan, Percy and Stewart (2007) disclosed that the presence of audit 
committee, the independence of such committee will impact the forward looking 
details of disclosure positively and to some extent no relationship.  
 
Furthermore, this study confirmed that an additional interaction of non-executive 
auditor on the committee and non-executive director‘s ownership will bring about an 
increase on social and environmental disclosure quality in line with the stakeholder 
and agency theory. This is seen in the parameter of ACI*NBO found in table 6.10 
above. The said relationship is statistically significant. Base on the established result, 
this study conclude that one increase in interaction of non-executive director‘s 
ownership and audit committee independence will increase CSED quality by 6.7 
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ceteris paribus. This is because most of the listed firms in Nigeria have at least 50% 
representation of non-executive directors in audit committee as required by the 
Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commissions. Thus, their role as non-executive 
directors can be of high value since they will exercise their independency to defend 
the firms at maximum as possible (Robinso & Owens-Jackson, 2010).  
 
In addition, there is need to increase the number of non-executive directors in the 
audit committee based on the the result. Thus, additional of non-executive directors 
do not increase the burden of the audit committee, rather it makes the committee to 
be more independent in their decision which could improve CSED. 
 
7.5 Research Summary  
 
This study employed stakeholders‘ and agency theory to established the impact of 
CGM on CSED quality among listed firms in Nigeria between 2010 and 2014. This 
is coupled with the examination of the role of non-executive director‘s ownership on 
the established relationships. In doing that, an alternate hypothesis were formulated 
against the explanatory variables of the model among which board independence, 
board size, board meetings, director‘s qualifications, board committees and finally 
audit committee independence were examine individually in relation to corporate 
social and environmental disclosure quality. In addition, the study also examines the 
role of the non-executive director‘s ownership on the relationship between BI and 
CSEDQL, BS and CSEDQL, BM and CSEDQL, DQ and CSEDQL, BC and 
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CSEDQL and finally ACI and CSEDQL. Other variables included in the study are 
the control variables which include firm‘s size, industry and profitability.  
 
The model of the study is said to be moderately fitted as the R-square value of the 
model is approximately 27% which means that BI, BS, BM, DQ, BC and ACI are 
jointly accounted for 27% changes in CSEDQL among Nigerian listed firms. The 
Adjusted R-square value also signifies that, the whole explanatory variables 
including the number of observations of 500 items jointly explained 25% changes in 
corporate social and environmental disclosure quality. The model is assume to be 
moderately fitted as the R-square is greater 10% in the case of panel data study 
(Gujarati, 2004).  
 
In the process of conducting this study, the result found a significant positive 
relationship between board independence and environmental disclosure and is in line 
with Post, Rahman, and Rubow (2011) and Huang and Kung (2010). Hence, the study 
confirmed that any additional non-executive director on board will bring about 
increase on social and environmental disclosure quality and as discussed earlier is 
statistically significant hence, this study conclude that one increase in board 
independence will increase corporate social and environmental disclosure quality. 
This is in line with the proposed hypothesis where it indicates that there is positive 





Additionally, the relationship established between board size and CSEDQL is said to 
be positively significant at 1%. Thus, the alternate hypothesis that said there is 
relationship between board size and corporate social and environmental disclosure 
quality is supported due to the sufficient evidence found in favour of the hypothesis. 
This is in line with the proposed hypothesis where it indicate that there is positive 
relationship between board size and CSEDQL among listed firms in Nigeria. Hence, 
increase in member of the board will increase corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality since; the result against the relationship is significant. 
 
However, contrary to the expectation of this study on the positive relationship 
between board meetings and corporate social and environmental disclosure quality, 
the result found is negative. Yet, the relationship so established is significant. 
Therefore, the said relationship is weak significant. Hence; the result supports the 
relationship between board meetings and corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality. The proposed hypothesis that postulates that there is positive 
relationship between board meetings and corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality is supported subject to the moderating effect simply because of the 
negative parameter. 
 
Moreover, the study established beyond reasonable doubt that there is positive 
relationship postulated against the directors‘ qualifications and social and 
environmental disclosure quality. This is because, the relationship shown is 
significant hence, the result shown in Table 6.9 in respect of the said relationship is in 
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line with the postulated hypothesis of the study. Base on the sufficient evidence found 
the study conclude that an increase in one of the director‘s with either accounting, 
finance or even economics will increase corporate social and environmental 
disclosure thus the hypothesis is thereby supported. Therefore, the hypothesis in 
respect of director‘s qualifications and CSEDQL is supported base on the sufficient 
evidence found.  
 
On the other hand, contrary to the expectation of this study, the positive relationship 
between board committees and corporate social and environmental disclosure quality 
is not supported. The result of the study found negative insignificant relationship. 
Since, the relationship so established is negative as against the postulated hypothesis 
therefore, moderation was considered. 
 
Furthermore, this study established beyond reasonable doubt that, there is positive 
relationship between audit committees independence and social and environmental 
disclosure quality. This is because, the relationship obtained is significant therefore, 
the result obtained in respect of the said relationship is said to be in consistent with 
the postulated hypothesis of the study and thereby supported. Therefore, the alternate 
hypothesis in respect of audit committees and CSEDQL is supported base on the 
sufficient evidence gathered. Thus, any additional increase in the non-executive 
member of audit committee will significantly increase corporate social and 




The above explanations are all in the case of direct relationships meanwhile a 
moderating variable called non-executive directors ownership is introduced to 
strengthen the direct relationship discussed above. Therefore, the study conducted the 
interactive relationship between non-executive director‘s ownership and board 
independence in relation to CSEDQL, non-executive director‘s ownership and board 
size in relation to CSEDQL, non-executive director‘s ownership and board meetings 
in relation to CSEDQL, non-executive director‘s ownership and director‘s 
qualifications in relation to CSEDQL, non-executive director‘s ownership and board 
committees in relation to CSEDQL and finally, non-executive director‘s ownership 
and audit committee independence in relation to CSEDQL. 
 
Even though there was a significant positive relationship between board size and 
CSEQL however, there was clear indication of stronger positive relationship as 
compare to the previous parameter found in the direct relationship with sufficient 
evidence to back the said interaction. The study found the higher the interaction of 
non-executive director‘s ownership and independent directors on board the higher the 
CSEDQL as supported by stakeholders and agency theory. Thus, one increase in the 
interaction of non-executive director‘s ownership and board independence will bring 
about 1.82 increase in CSEDQL with the econometric assumption of other things 
remain constant. 
 
In the case of board size, as a significant positive relationship between board size and 
CSEQL was established, the interaction was positive and there improvement in the 
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parameter as compare to the previous parameter found in the direct relationship. 
Despite the increase in the parameter, the study could not found sufficient evidence 
to back the said interaction. Therefore, the hypothesis of the study that postulate the 
higher the interaction of non-executive director‘s ownership and board size the higher 
the CSEDQL could not be supported. Even though the parameter shows that one 
increase in the interaction of non-executive director‘s ownership and board size will 
bring about 1.61 increases in CSEDQL, is still not statistically significant hence, the 
relationship happened by chance. 
 
In addition to the previous direct relationship found, board meetings was found to be 
negatively related to CSEDQL and statistically significant as oppose to the postulated 
positive relationship between board meetings and CSEDQL. This is one of the 
relationships that are needed to be comparing with the moderating parameter. As the 
interaction was positive is welcoming development since it was clearly supporting 
the postulated hypothesis both in the direct and the interactive relationship. Despite 
having a positive parameter as oppose to the direct relationship, the study could not 
found sufficient evidence to back the said interaction. Therefore, the hypothesis of 
the study that postulate the higher the interaction of non-executive director‘s 
ownership and board meetings the higher the CSEDQL could not be supported.  
 
Whereas directors‘ qualifications has a significant positive relationship with 
CSEDQL as established in the direct relationship, the interaction was also positive 
and there is improvement in the parameter as compare to the previous parameter 
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found in the direct relationship. Despite the increase in the parameter however, the 
study could not found sufficient evidence to back the said interaction. Therefore, the 
hypothesis of the study that postulate the higher the interaction of directors‘ 
qualifications the higher the CSEDQL could not be supported. Even though the 
parameter shows that one increase in the interaction of directors‘ qualifications will 
bring about 6.54 increases in CSEDQL thus, is not statistically significant hence, the 
relationship happened by chance. 
 
Unlike board meetings, board committees also have a direct negative and significant 
relationship with CSEDQL however, the interactive relationship found between the 
non-executive director‘s ownership and board committees with CSEDQL is positive 
and statistically significant. This justified the use of the moderator as the relationship 
found in the direct hypothesis is against the proposed hypothesis of the study. Thus, 
the moderating relationship is quite important for this study. This is because, it 
supported both the direct and the moderating hypothesis proposed by the study. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of the study that postulate the higher the interaction of 
non-executive director‘s ownership and board committees the higher the CSEDQL is 
thereby supported. That means one increase in the interaction of non-executive 
director‘s ownership and board committees will bring about 7.7 increases in 
CSEDQL since is statistically significant. 
 
Audit committee on the other hand, has as a significant positive relationship with 
CSEQL directly and at the same time the interaction is positive and significant. 
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Comparing the two relationship found, there is improvement in the parameter as 
compare to the previous parameter found in the direct relationship. This is in 
addition to the level of significant base on that, this study found sufficient evidence 
to back the said interaction. Therefore, the hypothesis of the study that postulate the 
higher the interaction of non-executive director‘s ownership and audit committee 
independence the higher the CSEDQL is supported. This is seen in the parameter 
which indicates that one increase in the interaction of non-executive director‘s 
ownership and audit committee independence will bring about 6.73 increases in 
CSEDQL with the economic assumption of other things remain constant.  
 
7.6 Research Implications and Recommendations 
 
The study play an important role on the theoretical, practical and methodological 
aspect where by the literature is enhanced base on all the CGM and corporate social 
and environmental disclosure quality.  
 
7.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
 
There are two theories considered by the study, namely; stakeholder theory and 
agency theory which best explained the relationship among the individual 
explanatory variables derived from the CGM and the predicted variable CSEDQL. 
Furthermore, the reason for the use stakeholder‘s theory and agency theory on 
corporate governance perspective in relation CSED quality is because, stakeholder‘s 
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theory takes account of the stakeholders concerned and their agitations, while the 
agency theory carter the dissemination of information between the companies and its 
stakeholders.  
 
Based on the findings of the study, board independence, board size, director‘s 
qualification and audit committees independence are found to individually influence 
the quality of corporate social and environmental disclosure in Nigeria as they are 
significant and they were fully supported by the theories.  
 
Also, the study employed non-executive director‘s ownership as moderator which 
added more value to the existing literature. This is because, as the non-executive 
members owns shares they are expected to pay more attention to the activities of the 
company and the reputation of the said company as well since they have an interest 
to pursue. 
 
In addition, the interaction between non-executive director‘s ownership and board 
independence, non-executive director‘s ownership and board committees and finally 
the non-executive director‘s ownership and audit committee independence are found 
to be significant in explaining changes in the quality of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure in Nigeria. Empirically, the study improved the governance 





7.6.2 Practical Implications 
 
The Ministry of Environment can use the findings in a manner suitable to them since 
the study focused not only on the disclosure but also the quality of the disclosure 
hence, it will make the said ministry to pay attention on the quality of social and 
environmental disclosure since it is significant in the case of its stake holders. The 
stakeholders include host communities and corporate bodies where they can benefit 
from the findings in the formulation of appropriate CSED determinants. Through the 
ministry of environment in addition, environmentalist can benefit from the findings 
through understanding the characteristics of a firm that discloses social and 
environmental issues and how it performed. Government of Nigeria can engage both 
local and foreign investors to comply in line with the findings and operate base on 
the nature of companies as to whether the firm is socially and environmentally 
friendly or not. They can invest their savings to maximise returns. Government and 
other Policy makers like SEC and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) can understand 
through the findings the clear effect of economic policies to the sectors under study. 
From the findings, they can get useful information for the determination of 
appropriate social and environmental policy to the economy.  
 
Furthermore, the study targeted and enlightens audience as employees of the 
company, shareholders of the firm, the media, both local and international, 
environmentalist, trade and industry associations and customers where they will find 
this study suitable for any debatable policy at hand when their action is needed. 
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Others are the suppliers, environmental regulators, local communities, science and 
education (Singh, 1996) which are in one way or the other part of policy makers be it 
now or later on. Managers of companies involved can also find this study 
contributory since is expected to provide more insight on the problem of governance 
and the quality of CSED. Professional bodies such as Institute of Chartered 
Accountant of Nigeria (ICAN), Association of National Accountants of Nigeria 
(ANAN), Chartered Institute of Management Accountant (CIMA) can also benefit 
from the outcome of this study since they rely on financial disclosure of companies 
for their opinion and auditing. This is in addition to the curriculum of those 
professional bodies as from time to time changes with the current challenge, hence 
they can put the result of this study into consideration as to where and when to 
introduce or remove a particular variable of concerned. Finally, the finding will 
provide potential researchers with areas for further study. 
 
7.6.3 Methodological Implications 
 
The study used a GRI checklist to measure CSEDQL as a contribution in the 
research this is done using un-weighted index where it filled the gap in CSEDQL 
literature. In addition, the study contributed on the quality of social disclosure, 
environmental disclosure and both including their measurement which in turn 





The study also extends the data from the usual cross sectional to panel where five 
years were considered for the analysis. It also takes into account of the techniques of 
data analysis as the study deemed it necessary to utilise Feasible Generalised Least 
Square as opposed to usual panel regression. This is due to failure on the 
assumptions of ordinary regression analysis and the Feasible Generalised least 
Square regression best explain the parameters in questions than other techniques of 
analysis. Therefore, the study finds that as a contribution as many studies either used 
ordinary Least Square or Panel regression and not Cross Sectional Time Series also 
known as Feasible Generalised Least Square, regression.  
 
Furthermore, the methodology is also a keen in the aspect of this research where, as 
earlier stated, Feasible Generalised Least Square is utilised as a result of the 
inefficiency of Ordinary Least Square versus Random Effect model and Fixed Effect 
model simply because of the presence of heteroskedaticity and autocorrelation. 
Whereas the parameters obtained if OLS, Random or Fixed effect is used, could not 
achieve Best Linear Unbiased Estimate. Thus, this could hinder the use of the 
findings for generalisation. 
 
7.7 Limitations of the Study 
 
The study suffered some limitations among which the number of listed companies as 
at the time of this study stood at 203 but only 100 companies are considered. This is 
because, many companies‘ financial report and accounts are not available and some 
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of the reports available could not provide the information needed for this study. 
Hence, in the process, this study found only 100 companies suitable for this study.  
 
The study involves only the internal CGM whereas external governance mechanisms 
were excluded. The study also used the social and environmental disclosure as one. 
This is due to the inadequacy of information from the listed companies in Nigeria 
and there is no separations of information in regard to social and environmental in 
Nigerian financial reports of the firms. 
 
Despite these limitation however, the value of the study can said to be observed as 
the study use rigorous method of measurement and proper establishment of the 
findings and adequate observations is considered. Therefore, the study conclude that, 
the limitation could not hinder the validation of this study but can only be improve if 
those limitations are considered.   
 
7.8 Further Area of Research  
 
Further study can improve this study by including more explanatory variables in 
addition to the number of companies. Since this study only used seven explanatory 
variables including moderator, other studies can increase it as the more the variables 
of the model the more the fitness of the model hence, the study can better be 
generalised. The inclusion of external CG variables such as regulators of the 
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companies, the government and the financial institutions can also be considered in 
the new model thereby increasing the validity of the new model. 
 
In terms of observation, however, other studies can go beyond five years as this 
study only considered five years as from time to time challenge emanates due to 
some government policies, economic conditions, international engagements among 
others. As seen in the study two theories were considered, therefore, other studies 
can bring an additional theory that may best explained the relationship if any.   
 
Depend on the country one is conducting research, further studies can also separate 
social from environmental disclosure. In the case of Nigeria as the time of 
conducting the study there may be more information for the country which could be 
improved to meet the world standard. 
 
7.9 Conclusion  
 
This study aimed at establishing the moderating effect of non-executive ownership 
on the relationship between CGM and corporate social and environmental disclosure 
quality. This is because, there is limited studies in this area globally and specifically 
in Nigeria. In addition to this motivation of this study, others are, limited research 
conducted with broad governance indicators in Africa particularly Nigeria, over 
concentration of CSED volume instead of the CSED quality, the use of small 
samples by previous studies addition to its homogeneity, thus, leading to some 
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constraints on the dimension of the firm and the composition of the industry, the 
frequent use of cross-sectional data and that could not explain the trend of the CSED.  
 
Meanwhile, practical issues that lead to this study is the agitations and conflicts of 
stakeholders and the complains Federal Government of Nigeria on the degradation 
on environment, the issue of global warming and low reporting issues relating to 
social and environmental disclosure among firms in Nigeria. In the process of 
addressing the problems, however, the relationship between CGM and CSEDQL is 
established in this study.  
 
According to Global Reporting Initiative, (2011) corporate social and environmental 
disclosure quality is measured and concerned base on disclosure of human resource, 
consumers‘ issues, community with stakeholders concern, training and development 
of employees, issues of employees health and safety, non-discriminant opportunity, 
wage related issues, labelling of product, communication, complaints, local 
community involvement, corruption control, concern for public policy and law 
compliance, usage of materials and recycling, energy consumption, water 
consumption, control of emissions, control of wastages and finally products related 
environmental effects.  
 
While CGM refers to those elements, controls and measures put in place to govern 
firm activities and control of disclosure issues thus, is compose of board 
independence, board size, board meetings, directors' qualifications, board 
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committees, audit committee independence and non-executive director‘s ownership 
(Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011). 
 
The study also used stakeholders‘ theory to support the dependent variable CSEDQL 
while agency theory is used to support the independent variables, which include 
board independence, board size, board meetings, directors' qualifications, board 
committees, audit committee independence and non-executive director‘s ownership. 
As earlier stated, this study aimed at establishing the role of non-executive director‘s 
ownership on the relationship between CGM and CSEDQL as a result of the 
inconsistencies found previously on the said said relationships. Based on the problem 
statement, the study raised three questions as based on the trend of CSED quality in 
Nigerian listed companies for the period 2010 to 2014, the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanism and corporate social and environmental disclosure 
quality in Nigerian listed companies and finally, the moderating effect of non-
executive director‘s ownership on the relationship between CGM and CSED quality 
in Nigerian listed companies. From the questions raised, three objective were 
determined to be addressed in this study which include the evaluation of the trend of 
CSED quality in Nigerian listed companies for the period 2010 to 2014, the 
investigation of the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and 
corporate social and environmental disclosure quality in Nigerian listed companies 
and finally, the determination of the moderating effect of non-executive director‘s 




In conclusion, this study conducted a trend analysis on the CSEDQL as seen in 
Figure 6.1 which addressed objective one. The trend of the analysis shows an 
improvement on the quality of disclosure on CSED especially in 2013 and 2014 with 
the lowest trend in 2011.  To address objective two and three therefore, this study 
postulated twelve hypotheses among which six which are direct relationship 
addressed objective two and the other six hypotheses are the interactive relationships 
where they addressed objective three. Out of the direct relationships five are 
significant with only one that is insignificant. The significant ones include board 
size, board independence, audit committee independence and director‘s 
qualifications, thus, these hypotheses are said to be supported. Meanwhile, board 
meeting is negatively significant which oppose the study hypothesis and this can be 
ignored provided the interaction yield positive relationship as seen in the study. 
Board committees on the other hand, has negative parameter, however is 
insignificant. 
 
Meanwhile, out of the six interactive relationships proposed, three which represents 
50% are significant and the other three are not significant. Among the significant 
ones are board independence and non-executive director‘s ownership, audit 
committee independence and non-executive director‘s ownership and board 
committees and non-executive director‘s ownership. The other three that are not 
significant in this study are board size and non-executive director‘s ownership, board 
meetings and non-executive director‘s ownership and directors‘ qualifications and 
non-executive director‘s ownership. It is important to note that, all the parameters of 
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the interactive relationships are positive in one way or the other all the direct 
relationship are improved from those with negative relationship and turn to positive 
relationship after moderation and those that maintained the positive relationships, 
their parameters were improved as established in this study. This is an indication 
that, the moderator plays a significant role in the establishment of the relationships.  
 
The study utilised two theories, stakeholders and agency theory to support the 
argument hence, the hypotheses. The outcome of the study is also in line with the 
theories. The model of the study also indicates a moderate fitness derived from the 
R-square of the model. Most importantly, all the explanatory variables, which 
include board independence, board size, board meetings, director‘s qualifications, 
board committees and audit committee independence were jointly and significantly 
impacted on the explained variable CSED quality. 
 
Based on the findings of the study, therefore, this study recommends that, the size of 
the board should be increased provided there is need for CSED quality among which 
there should be more non-executive directors on board for better independence and 
transparency. The board should also increase their meetings so as to give more room 
for discussion on matters arising and to tackle any unforeseen circumstances that 
may arise and this will make the CSEDQL better. Similarly, there is need for more 
qualified directors on board so that quality of CSED will be more better as seen in 
the earlier discussion. In doing so, the Nigerian SEC should make sure that, qualified 
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directors with financial expertise are considered first since it is part of their 
objective.  
 
Other important issues are board committees and audit committee independence. The 
study seen the need to improve board committees so that, the committees can handle 
various issue professionally and with less burden on the directors hence, the quality 
of CSED could improve. Another important issue which is mandotary according to 
Nigerian SEC is audit committee and their independence. There is need to increase 
the number of non-executive directors in the audit committee since the result shows 
that the more the ratio of non-executive directors in audit committee, the more the 
CSED quality. It is important to note that, an additional of non-executive directors 
do not increase the burden of the audit committee, rather it makes the committee to 
be more independence in their decision which could improve disclosure quality in 
the case of this study CSED quality.  
 
Based on the recommendation of the study in the preceding paragraphs , therefore 
the above study is said to have some implications theoretically, by considering the 
stakeholders and agency theory, methodologically, by considering the measurement 
of the CSED quality using GRI checklist and the use of panel data in the analysis, 
practically, institutions such as CBN, SEC Nigeria, Ministry of Environment, NGOs 
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